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This study analyzes the rapidly changing nature of the relationship between state and religion in 
Turkey between 2002 and 2012. In the process, it examines the range of opinions on and the 
different representations of this relationship in the Turkish social milieu. The study deploys a 
framework based on the center-periphery cleavage to depict the changing patterns of polarization 
and conflict resolution during this period.  
The study suggests that the social cleavages between the center and the periphery are 
prominent factors shaping discussions on the state’s interaction with religion. The power struggle 
derives from the center’s desire to extend its previous privileges and advantages, and the 
periphery’s determination to share in the same benefits. That the periphery has gained more 
social capital since the 1980s has fueled these interactions. In the struggle, the Justice and 
Development Party government has represented the periphery, whereas the Republican People’s 
Party, the military, the universities, and the higher judiciary have represented the center. 
The study focuses on two main cases to explore the trend of this relationship: the 
teaching of religion by the state, and the rights of religious minorities, including non-Muslim 
communities and Alevi groups. In general, the Turkish state has taken a similar approach to all 
religious groups. At the beginning of the new century, the state was skeptical about religious 
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activities, perceiving them as a threat to its sovereignty, especially its secular structure. Thus 
demands of Islamic groups were perceived as a threat to secularism, while non-Muslims’ 
demands were seen as a threat to Turkish nationalism. Responses to these demands, especially 
between 2007 and 2012, proved that these fears were exaggerated. 
Overall, despite constant changes through the years, Turkey has never insisted on a 
complete separation of religion from the state, even in its most secular phase. The time period 
examined, 2002-2012, witnessed what might be called a “normalization” of the state/religion 
relationship – that is, religion is no longer viewed as a threat to the state, nor is the state seen as a 
threat to religion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: STATE, POLITICS, AND RELIGION 
 
 
 
This study analyzes the rapidly changing nature of the relationship between state and religion in 
Turkey between 2002 and 2012. In the process, it examines the range of opinions and the 
different representations of the relationship between religion and the state in the Turkish social 
milieu. To this end, the center-periphery cleavages framework, adopted by two prominent 
Turkish sociologists, Serif Mardin and Nilufer Gole, proves useful in understanding the changing 
patterns of polarization and conflict resolution during this time period. 
Serif Mardin argues that, “until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery 
was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics that seems to have survived 
more than a century of modernization” (Mardin 2006 [1973]: 299). He explains how this social 
cleavage has lasted since the late Ottoman period by examining economical and educational 
opportunities. According to him, the political elite benefited from state resources, since the state 
established tight control over the economy. In addition, some families with a history of service to 
the state continued to hold a privileged position. Finally, the restriction of educational 
opportunities has deepened this social cleavage.  
During the late Ottoman period, modern educational institutions perpetuated the pre-
modern cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery. While the children of families 
who were part of the bureaucracy more readily benefited from the modern sector of education, 
the great majority of the periphery was unable or unwilling to send their children to modern 
schools (Mardin 2006 [1973]: 307). Thus people on the periphery benefited only from religious 
education, with the result that religion became the border between the center and the periphery 
(Mardin, p. 301). During later phases of modernization, mostly implemented as Westernization, 
the cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery from the center, became 
apparent (p. 304). Although Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909) tried to integrate the periphery 
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under the banner of pan-Islamism for the sake of the state, he only partly succeeded in creating a 
true national unification (p. 305). The succeeding rulers of the Ottoman State did not continue 
his moves toward unification under the Islamic banner, but preferred to endorse secular 
nationalism. The modernization of cultural life increased the cultural gap between the center and 
the periphery, as the center showed an inability to integrate the periphery into this new cultural 
framework (pp. 307-308).  
In the early years of the Republic, the Kemalist ideology presented a top-down social 
engineering project that failed to provide for social mobilization in a form that would bring a 
greater portion of the masses into meaningful relation with the center (Mardin, pp. 312-314). As 
a result, the Republican People’s Party (CHP, 1923-1950) represented the “bureaucratic” center, 
whereas the Democrat Party (DP, 1950-1960) represented the “democratic” periphery in Turkish 
political life. The coup d’état against the democratically elected Democrat Party in 1960 
underlined this cleavage: whereas the center represented the preservation of the static order, the 
periphery represented social mobility (p. 314). The 1960 Constitution legitimized the 
bureaucracy and the intellectuals as a source of sovereignty in addition to the Turkish people as a 
whole. The 1971 intervention of the military was another expression of the desire for a return to 
the rigidity of the old order (Mardin 2006 [1973]). Since Mardin’s article was published in 1973, 
he did not evaluate the changes subsequent to that date. However, the postmodern military 
intervention in 1997; the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2000s 
with high popular support, mostly by the middle class; and, finally. the AKP government’s clash 
with the secular establishment, the bureaucracy, and other ruling elite – including but not limited 
to the military and the judiciary – suggest that Serif Mardin’s center-periphery thesis remains 
valid in Turkey. In my study, I will deploy the center-periphery framework to evaluate the 
changes between 2002 and 2012.  
Recent literature in Turkey also acknowledges the center-periphery dichotomy in Turkish 
politics (see Bayramoglu 2006; Carkoglu 2007 and 2008; Ozbudun 2012; Onis 2013; Heper 
2013). On the other hand, some components of the center-periphery cleavage have changed since 
Mardin’s article. In the previous equation, factors such as socio-economic status, religious 
orientation and activity, and cultural affinity for Westernization all reinforced each other. 
However, Western-oriented politics have relatively less resonance now (Kubicek 2009).  
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Another prominent Turkish sociologist, Nilufer Gole, also investigates center-periphery 
cleavages in Turkey in her work (Gole 1997). She argues that, since the late Ottoman period and 
that of the early Republic, the Turkish elite, which owed its existence and power to the Republic, 
embraced French Jacobinism, which represented a highly centralized model of change by top-
down reformism, secularism, and nationalism, rather than Anglo-Saxon liberalism, as a model of 
change. Hence secularization became a part of social engineering rather than an outcome of 
societal development (p. 48). Shifting from an Islamic to a Western culture created cultural 
distinctions and social stratifications in Turkish society. Gole uses Pierre Bourdieu’s terms 
“symbolic capital” and “habitus” to emphasize stratification on the cultural level, rather than the 
concept of “social class” that emphasizes economic power. Accordingly, cultural codes and life-
styles are not a trivial matter of fashion and individual choices but, rather, reflect complex 
relations of inter-subjectivity, stratification, and power. Educational opportunities came to 
demarcate these cultural differences, once the central urban middle and upper-middle classes 
accessed education, while groups at the periphery lacked comparable opportunities for decades. 
This cultural gap between the elite of the center and the people of the periphery has become a 
prominent feature in Turkish society and politics (p. 52). From the 1950s on, especially after 
1983, peripheral groups moved into urban centers where they accessed secular education and 
found opportunities for upward social mobility. According to Gole (1997: 54-55),  
these new agents of change represented the move of Islam from the periphery of 
the system to its center, and yet were themselves a product of that center, of its 
educational institutions and its urban life. As these new agents of Islamism began 
to obtain the same cultural capital as the Republican elites, share the same 
university classes, occupy the ranks of parliament, and participate in public 
debates on television, they started to gain public visibility, social recognition, 
legitimacy, and prestige. The Republican secular elites, in turn, reacted primarily 
in political terms, and began to wage a battle against Islamic fundamentalism and 
in defense of secularism.   
As expressed by Serif Mardin earlier, previous social mobilization attempts from the 
periphery to the center failed because of the 1960 and 1971 military interventions, which 
represented the hostility of the central bureaucratic and secular establishment toward this type of 
social mobilization (see Mardin 2006 [1973]: 314). According to Gole, peripheral groups found 
more opportunities to access this type of social mobilization after 1983. At this time, Turgut Ozal 
(1983-91) introduced a liberal market economy and the privatization of the mass media. As a 
consequence, civil society has expanded and non-governmental organizations have proliferated. 
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These developments were surrounded by lively public debate on issues of religious and ethnic 
identity, national unity, secularism, and democratic pluralism (Gole 1997: 47).  
This grace period was interrupted by another military intervention in 1997. In this 
involvement, the military did not seize power but used other state bureaucracy, the judiciary, 
business associations, and media groups to push the Islamist Welfare Party’s government (1996-
1997) to resign. Observers among Turkish journalists coined the phrase “post-modern coup” to 
describe these developments (Turker Alkan, 13 June 1997, Radikal, and Cengiz Candar, 28 June 
1997, Sabah). The conflict between the secularist center and the conservative periphery became 
more visible during this intervention. State pressure on religious organizations was definitely 
harsh during the following years. The AKP government came to power in 2002 when this 
pressure was still at its peak. Thus the time period 2002-2012 witnessed a constant struggle 
between the secular center and the conservative periphery. In this struggle, the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), the armed forces, and the higher judiciary have represented the centrist 
coalition, while the AKP has established itself as the main representative of the periphery 
(Ozbudun 2012: 48). In the center-periphery cleavages, both Turgut Ozal (1983-1993) and Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan (since 2002) have managed to move the periphery toward the center, to the point 
where the periphery has gradually begun to play a major role in the Turkish economy and polity 
(Heper 2013: 154). This analysis benefits from both Serif Mardinʼs and Nilufer Gole’s center-
periphery and cultural gap concepts to explore the relationship between religion and the state and 
the responses to these changes in 2002-2012.  
In his more recent articles (Mardin 2005, 2007), Serif Mardin argues that the secular 
tendencies of the central elite since the Ottoman Empire have revealed a Turkish Islamic 
exceptionalism. He argues that, throughout its history, the Ottoman Empire was careful to 
distance religion from the state and give more importance to the latter than the former. The 
ubiquity of a peculiar mix of state and religious discourse promoted this exceptionalism. 
Therefore, political and social structures have not operated on a foundation of religiosity, but are 
considered to be made of the same stuff. According to Mardin, somehow this Turkish 
exceptionalism still continues to the present day – that is, the state continues to come before 
religion but only by “one millimeter” (Mardin 2005; 2007). Gunter Seufert formulates this as 
follows: “In Turkey, Islam does not determine politics, but politics determine Islam” (2011). 
Even though Serif Mardin’s exceptionalism thesis does not suggest a hostile secularism on its 
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own, as indicated by Dietrich Jung (2006), having religion controlled by the state poses a kind of 
secularism that contradicts the conventional European reading, which suggests an overt 
expression of the separation of the religious and political spheres. Instead, Turkish secularism 
has served as means of rigid state control over the religious area (Jung 2006). Ahmet Kuru 
named this rigid state control assertive secularism, as it was practiced during Turkey’s Kemalist 
past, while the politics of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have embraced a more 
passive secularism since 2002 (Kuru 2013).  
In positing social cleavages along with Turkish secularism, this study elaborates the 
changes in the relationship between state and religion in Turkey. It suggests that the social 
cleavages between the center and the periphery are still prominent factors shaping discussions on 
the state’s interaction with religion. That the periphery has gained more social capital since the 
1980s has fueled these discussions. In addition, acquisition of political power by the conservative 
AKP has helped the conservative periphery to raise its voice against the secular bureaucracy and 
the elites. While the AKP held more power following every election, the previous elites have lost 
more power on the state level, a development that can be read as the conservative periphery 
displacing the secular center to some extent.  
In the first chapter of the study, I explore literature about religion and state relations in 
general and more specifically aspects of these relations in political Islam. This chapter concludes 
diversity of religious movements and offers a better understanding for political reasons behind 
religious movements.   
 The second chapter provides background information to understand the economic, 
political, and social environment before 2002 in Turkey and how this environment helped 
transformation of Islamic groups. Accordingly, transformation of Islamic groups started in 1980s 
and became visible in 1990s. However, the majority misinterpreted this visibility by assuming 
that it is early signs of Islamization, as we see its examples on discussions related to wearing of 
headscarf in universities and other public places. The state institutions, steered by the military, 
implemented a repressive secularism to erase these signs, especially in state organs in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. In addition, the economic crisis in 2001 caused political instability. 
Eventually, all of these developments helped the emerging of the AKP ruling in 2002. Although 
the transformation of Islamic groups started long before the AKP government, this 
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transformation accelerated during its rule. The AKP experience of Turkey mostly depicts the 
transformation of Islamic groups in this chapter.  
The following two chapters explore the trend of the state-religion interaction under the 
AKP government in the years 2002-2012 by examining two cases: the teaching of religion by the 
state and the rights of religious minorities. The state-taught religion includes developments vis-à-
vis vocational imam-hatip school, Quran-based courses, and compulsory and elective religion 
courses in primary and secondary education. The chapter depicts that the Turkish state left its 
previous heavy-handed approach vis-à-vis religious education.  
In regard to religious minority rights, I examine both non-Muslim communities and the 
Alevi groups. This chapter reveals that on the issue of non-Muslim rights, the pattern of the 
state’s attitudes was similar to that concerning the religious rights of the Muslim majority, with 
the exception of the Alevis. In the early years of 2000s, the state was more skeptical regarding 
actions of non-Muslims, especially in the issue of missionary activities. While the Turkish 
economy gained strength under the AKP rule and converts to other religions stayed limited, these 
early fears diminished. Since non-Muslim communities do not have meaningful demographic, 
economic, and political power, the Turkish state became more generous regarding their rights. 
This lack of power diminished the perceived treats of the Turkish state concerning these 
communities and led being more openhanded vis-à-vis their demands.  The Turkish state also 
responded some demands of Alevis but not as much as expected by them. This chapter explores 
possible reasons that cause this disconformity.  
In the following chapter, I will explore literature about religion and state relations in 
general and more specifically aspects of these relations in political Islam. To understand political 
Islam, it is important to identify the relation between religion and the state in general. Therefore, 
first, I explore relationship between the state and religion in general by looking at how they 
interact with each other. As a part of this interaction, I will look at theories about “the end of 
history” and “the clash of civilization,” and “civil religion” since they were the most argued 
theories about the state-religion nexus at the end of the twentieth century. I will look at how the 
state influences, impacts, and in turn regulates religious observance and education. I will also 
look discussions and possible solutions to problems of religion and the state interaction in 
literature. Finally, I will look at how processes of modernization alter patterns of religion and 
state interaction.  
	  	  
7	  
As following, I will explore how the interactions of the state and religion pertain in 
particular to Islam. This includes exploring the historical roots of political Islam, and why it 
became more important during the last century. I will also examine political Islam’s opposition 
to colonialism and the role of the West as it sought to use political Islam against communism. In 
the second part of the chapter on political Islam, I will discuss how autocratic regimes used 
political Islam to legitimize their rule, and how that is related to the so-called Islamic resurgence. 
Since this discussion pertains to patterns of political participation, I will also discuss arguments 
relevant to Islam and democracy. Finally, I will explore how political Islam operates in selected 
Muslim countries, with a focus on Turkey.  
 
 
 
A. STATE AND RELIGION 	  
1. Interaction  
 
We can compile the literature of the relationship between religion and the state under commonly 
used models: 1. Secular, 2. “State religion” or “established church,” and 3. Cooperation (Gunn 
2007: 3). 1. The first may be described as the “separationist” model. Even though there are huge 
differences between France, the U.S., and Turkey, they may be thought of as in this category. For 
instance, France has had a rigid separation–not a hostile one—of church and state since 1905. On 
the other hand, American secularism does not preclude religious-inspired discourses in politics 
on topics such as abortion, although much contention is focused on symbolic gestures such as the 
display of the Ten Commandments in public or prayer in public schools. Even though Turkey is 
often regarded as following the French model, laïcité, this is not completely true since Turkey is 
deeply involved in religious life; Turkey has state mosques, official imams, and mandatory 
religion courses in primary and secondary education. 2. The second type of relationship between 
the state and religion is “state religion” or “established church.” Examples of this relationship 
include Great Britain and Norway, which both have an “established church.” Also, Gunn 
includes some states such as Sudan and Iran under this category. However, Ahmet Kuru 
categorizes the second type under the name of “religious state” by looking at whether there exists 
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an official religion and whether the legislature and judiciary are controlled by religious 
institutions. If a country fulfills both criteria, it could be described as a “religious state”; if it 
fulfills the first but not the second, it could be described as having an “established religion” 
(2009: 247-254; also see it for state-religion regimes index of 197 countries). 3. In “the 
Cooperationist” model, states do not grant any special status to a dominant religion, but 
cooperate closely with churches in a variety of ways, such as providing funding for church-
related activities or religious education. This model includes such countries as Spain, Germany, 
Italy, and Poland as well as several Latin countries (Durham 1996: 20-21). However, these 
categories are not strict. Countries can change their stand from one category to another, over 
time or use the arguments from other categories in different political environments.  
These three categorical interactions between the state and religion may be described from 
the state’s perspective as 1. Hostile states, 2. Dominant states, and 3. Separate states (Gustafson 
and Moen 1992: 7-14). 1. In hostile states, religious ritual, or even individual acceptance of 
religious belief, is suspected as potentially subversive or a potential challenge to state 
sovereignty. 2. In dominant states, religion heavily depends upon the state. But the state often 
seeks legitimacy from religious affiliation. 3. In separate states, religion is a personal matter 
between the individual and God. Religion does not have any political influence or power. If 
religion has any political influence, it is very limited.   
However, none of these categories are concrete. All of these terms, “secular state,” 
“separation of church and state,” “religious state,” seem to describe more the constitutional 
claims of the state rather than social processes or sociological realities. Therefore, the separation 
of religion and state is a political theory rather than a governing reality. Some argue that the 
complete separation of religion and politics is illusory (Lee 2010: 3-21). Others argue that the 
idea of a nonreligious state is very modern and doubtful (Bellah 1992 [1975]: 166). Robert D. 
Lee shows that even one of the most secular countries, France, is not very secular in terms of the 
separation of religion and politics since it is involved in religious organizations and education. 
On the other hand, although Iran claims to be an Islamic state, this is not completely true since its 
constitution depends on the dual foundations of religious credentials and popular sovereignty 
(Lee 2010: 3-19). Also, the constitution of Iran contains some important elements which have 
been borrowed from secular Western sources rather than from the Sharia, such as sovereignty of 
the people, nation, the rights of the nation, the legislature, the judiciary, parliament, republic, 
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consultation of the people, and elections (Schirazi 1998: 1-19, 161-172). Even though Iran 
enshrines the Sharia as the privileged source of all legislation, ninety percent of legislation is on 
matters irrelevant to the Sharia, such as administrative procedures, traffic regulations, and 
economic policies. Also, in his famous ruling of 1988, Khomeini allowed bypassing the Sharia in 
favor of the interests of the government by declaring that the Islamic government, as the heir of 
the authority of the Prophet, is empowered to suspend any provisions of the Sharia whenever it 
suits its interests (Zubaida 2000: 63-66).  
James T. Richardson claims that separation of church and state in the modern world is an 
antiquated concept. All kinds of governments grapple with religiously motivated citizens who 
attempt to influence politics (2004: vii). However, Alfred Stepan names these kinds of 
separations as “friendly separations” in the modern world (2001: 222). For instance, while the 
1905 separation of church and state was a hostile one in France, in 1959 the state started to 
support Catholic schools. Even by 1961, 20 percent of the total educational budget in France was 
used for private Catholic schools. So, even though there was a separation in political terms, it 
had become a “friendly” separation over time (ibid.) Also, such a situation might be described as 
passive secularism (see Kuru 2009).  
The same arguments have been made about Islam. Abdullahi A. an-Naim looks at the 
relationship between state and religion in the Islamic world by defining 1. The state itself as an 
instrument of religion, 2. Religion as an instrument of the state, and 3. Separation of religion and 
the state (2008: 258). I discuss Naim’s ideas on religion and state relations later.   
Naim’s categorization is a result of looking at religion as a dependent or independent 
variable. Most of the literature on religion and politics focuses on religion as an independent 
variable and politics as a dependent variable (Lee 2010: 41). For instance, when scholars look at 
the compatibility of Islam, Christianity, or any other religion with democracy, they look at 
religion as an independent variable or the only cause. However, as I will explore in the Islam vs. 
secularism section of this chapter, Islam (and other religions) may be viewed as just one societal 
context among others, such as economics, geography, social structure, in the experience of the 
democratization process. In some countries, the religious context may be more or less influential, 
but it is not the leading influence.  
As expressed by Alfred Stepan, even though the relation between Islam and democracy 
has been questioned many times, democratization theory does not really help us understand this 
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particular relationship. Stepan’s analysis of Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, and post-
1997 Iran “demonstrates the analytic weakness of focusing only on Islam as the principal 
obstacle to democratization, while neglecting the overall sociopolitical, military, ethnic, 
economic, and international context” (2001: 246).  
Robert D. Lee argues that, in the long run, religion appears to be a dependent variable. 
Regardless of societal factors, religion is a product of political influence and decisions. However, 
in a shorter time period, religion may be a variable independent of political systems. So, religion 
has the possibility to affect politics in short-term perspectives (2010: 9-76). 
To help us understand this, Lee compiles an abundant literature on religion and politics 
under 24 hypotheses and puts them into three categories (2010: 44-76): 1. Those that regard 
religion as an obstacle to political development; 2. Those that embrace religion as helpful in 
promoting political development; and 3. Those that deny any importance to religion in 
explaining political development. He concludes, “The evidence collected from four case studies 
[Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Iran] does not suffice to confirm any general hypothesis about 
religion and politics” (Lee 2010: 292). In other words, every hypothesis on religion and politics 
can be supported or rejected depending on when and where the research is done. For instance, 
Islam was a unifying element in the Ottoman Empire for several centuries. However, in the eyes 
of the political elites, Islam lost its power as a unifying element in the late Ottoman Empire and 
upon the founding of the Turkish state. As a result, it was abandoned for the sake of Turkish 
nationalism. On the other hand, during the same period, Muslim colonies had used Islam to 
solidify their national consciousness against colonizers.  
Juan J. Linz refuses to treat religion as a negative factor in politics. On the other hand, he 
does not see religion solely as a dependent variable. Religious values and systems have their own 
unique capacities to influence politics. These capacities are not reducible to other social forces 
and are not replaceable (Smith 1995: 75). Hence, religious systems may provide critical support 
for human development; on the other hand, they may create serious obstacles (ibid. p.87).  
Until now I have analyzed discussions about state and religion interaction in modern 
sociology. These discussions have roots in the earliest preoccupations of classical sociology. For 
instance, Max Weber collects the relations between secular and ecclesiastic power under the 
terms of hierocracy, theocracy, and caesaropapism (1978: 1159-1162). In hierocracy, either the 
ruler gets the legitimacy through religion or the religious leader is also a political ruler (also see 
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Murvar 1967; Swedberg and Agevall 2005: 112). In caesaropapism, the religion is dominated by 
secular powers. Theocracy refers to an extreme form of hierocracy, in which the religious leader 
is also a political leader. Also, some scholars add erastianism to Weber’s typology.  Theocracy 
refers to an extreme form of religious autonomy; conversely, erastianism refers to a relatively 
low degree of religious autonomy (Robertson 1987: 157-158). However, this system of 
classification of types, like most other classifications, does not tell us why religion or politics are 
connected in a particular way rather than another.  
At the present time, new theories are being produced to unveil relationships between state 
and religion. Even though their focus is not the exploration of relationships between religion and 
the state, “the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations” theories are two of the most 
discussed theories about the interaction between state and religion during the last two decades. 
The end of history theory asserts that history leads us towards a modern liberal democracy which 
is quite the opposite of what we saw in the first section of the chapter, which shows that most 
states are either religious, or conversely hostile or abusive toward religion. In the case of the 
clash of civilizations theory, Huntington shows civilizations as necessarily in conflict with each 
other, associates world religions with civilizations, and sees religion as a central defining 
characteristic of civilizations. In this theory, religion is an important element which shapes the 
state. So, in the next section, these two theories will be discussed. 
 
2. The End of History or Clash of Civilizations  
  
Fukuyama, basing his theory on Hegel, argues that a necessary unidirectional history of mankind 
will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy. There are two main 
reasons for this: economics and “the struggle for recognition.” Human beings seek recognition of 
their own worth, or of the people, things, or principles that they associate with worth. For 
instance, a religious believer seeks recognition for his particular gods or sacred practices, while a 
nationalist demands recognition for his particular linguistic, cultural, or ethnic group. These are 
individual attitudes, but there are also universal recognitions such as that entailed by the liberal 
state, in which citizens are being recognized as equal, and as a result of this equal recognition the 
liberal state becomes a universal value  (2006 [1992]).  
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Fukuyama claims that there would be no further progress in the development of 
underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled. He 
supports his ideas with Hegel and Marx: both thinkers asserted an “end of history”: for Hegel 
this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society (ibid). 
However, Huntington develops a counter thesis in response to Fukuyama. According to 
Huntington, in the new multi-polar world, “the most pervasive, important, and dangerous 
conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, 
but between peoples belonging to different cultural identities” and religions (2003 [1996]: 28). 
Huntington asserts that: 1. The balance of power among civilizations is shifting from 
Western to non-Western states and cultures. 2. For the first time in history global politics is both 
multi-polar and multi-civilizational. 3. A civilization-based world order is emerging. 4. The 
West’s universalist pretentions increasingly cause conflicts with other civilizations, most 
seriously with Islam and China (2003: 20-21). 
According to him, describing the world as West and East is not appropriate. There is not 
a unique East comparable to the West. Maybe we can see it as West and non-West. The cold war 
division of humanity is over. The new fundamental divisions of humanity in terms of ethnicity, 
religions, and civilizations remain and spawn new conflicts. These major contemporary 
civilizations are: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, and 
African (possibly). Four World religions—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism—
are associated with these major civilizations (2003: 45-48).1 In other words, religion is a central 
defining characteristic of civilizations. Again, as expressed before, Huntington claims that the 
growing divisions between different cultural identities and religions are likely to fuel the most 
dangerous conflicts. In this instance, it is helpful to see how religious institutions and their 
constituents, which include politicians and political leaders, and the state try to control and 
manage each other. So, in the next section, I will look at state and religion interaction from the 
perspective of how religious institutions and their constituents impact the state.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Even though Huntington expanded civilizations from being bi-polar to multi-polar, he has been 
criticized heavily because of his division in assuming that civilizations are univocal in their own structure. 
He misses the differentiations in one civilization (see Stepan 2001).  
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3. Religion as missionary (religion as a mission) 
 
When we look at how religions interact with politics and state, we can identify three possibilities: 
1. Religions are used for political agenda, 2. Religions are not used for political agendas, and 3. 
Religions are used to guide an individual’s own sense of politics, but individuals don’t perceive 
it as necessary for political behavior to have a religious mandate. 
It is always assumed that religions with prophetic characteristics tend to be involved in 
politics. However, Theodore E. Long shows that this is not always true (1986: 3-16). According 
to him, this assumption is faulty on two accounts. First, it diminishes the religious characteristic 
of prophecy by reducing it solely to its political function and ignoring its rich yield in other 
spheres of life. Second, it disregards the multi-faceted nature of the interaction between religion 
and politics.  
According to Long, two main sets of independent variables determine this relationship: 
societal conditions and the characteristics of prophecy itself. Societal conditions are a) the degree 
of institutional differentiation, particularly of religion, b) the degree of religious pluralism, c) the 
degree of religious liberty, d) the degree of rationalization, and e) the degree of societal crisis. 
Characteristics of prophecy are a) the level of organization and institutionalization, b) its social 
resources, c) its social location, and d) its type of religious orientation (ibid.). So, modernity or 
development of a society influences the degree of acceptance of the religious prophecy, but 
prophecy can also interact with other social, political, and individual interests to impact society. 
As we have seen until now, religious institutions and their constituents, and the state have 
an influence on each other. Although the church has mastered the state at times in history, 
through much of history the state has dominated the church, as explained by Bellah (1992: 167). 
Therefore, I will look at how the state regulates religious institutions and their constituents. 
 
4. Regulating Religion 
 
Law, school education, and official religious organizations are instruments by which the state 
may seek to control religious ideas and institutions. Also, covert state institutions such as secret 
intelligence services and indirect methods such as tax exemption help the state to regulate 
religion.   
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This regulation is also enshrined in international laws. For example Article 18 (1966) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the most accepted text about 
religious rights, adopted by 155 states, declares: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” Article 
9 (1950) of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) states the same principle.  
Even though UN and ECHR articles seem generous toward religious freedoms, “public 
order” and “the fundamental rights and freedom of others” are open to a wide interpretation to 
restrict religious freedoms.2  
As expressed by Finke and Harris, despite 83 percent of all nations promising religious 
freedoms in their constitutions, 64 percent of those nations have two or more laws restricting the 
practice, profession, or selection of religion (2009: 7). Even though they proclaim an explicit 
commitment to guaranteeing fundamental human rights, most nations violate even their own list 
of rights. So, there is a significant gap between constitutional words and political deeds (Markoff 
and Regan 1987: 164-165).  
In short, constitutions or any other laws which generate religious freedoms are not 
sufficient by themselves to secure religious freedoms. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For instance, see the case of Karaduman v. Turkey (app. no. 18783/91, ECHR) and the case of the Leyla 
Sahin v. Turkey (app. no. 44774/98, ECHR). In the first case, a veiled female student completed her 
university degree with her headscarf, but was refused the degree certificate because of her identity 
photograph, which showed her in a headscarf. In the second case, a fifth-year veiled medicine student was 
expelled from university because of her headscarf. 
In both cases, the ECHR was favorable to the headscarf ban. In the first case, “a student, who chooses to 
attend a secular university, should accept the regulations of the university. These regulations provide a 
system to allow for students from different beliefs to coexist. Particularly in countries where the vast 
majority of the population belongs to one particular religion, exhibition of the rituals and symbols of this 
religion without regard to any restrictions of place and form can cause pressure on students who do not 
practice this religion or instead, belong to other religions.”  In the second case, “… when examining the 
question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, there had to be borne in mind the impact which 
wearing such a symbol, which was presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on 
those who chose not to wear it” and “notion of secularism to be consistent with the values underpinning 
the Convention. Upholding that principle could be considered necessary to protect the democratic system 
in Turkey.” 
See McGoldrick (2006) and Elver (2005) for more detailed information.  
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Moreover, sometimes changing laws does not guarantee religious rights. For instance, in 
Turkey, the parliament voted in 2008 to lift the ban on female students wearing the headscarf at 
universities and approved the constitutional amendment by 411 votes to 103 votes. In spite of 
this amendment, many academic institutions defied the law by forbidding female students to 
wear the headscarf. Eventually, the Constitutional Court made a very controversial decision by 
cancelling the constitutional amendment and annulling the law that lifted the headscarf ban.  
Immediately thereafter, the Supreme Court of Appeals' chief prosecutor appealed to the 
Constitutional Court, demanding the disbanding of the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), accusing it of "being a hotbed of anti-secular activities," and demanding a five-year ban 
from involvement in politics for senior AKP administrators, including Prime Minister Erdogan 
and President Abdullah Gul (TodaysZaman; July 31, 2008).  
Therefore, as I discuss within this chapter, we may accept that religion is multiple in the 
ways people use it, but we are less used to the idea that the state can also be ‘multiple,’ in the 
sense of consisting of different organs that have different agendas and styles of control. As a 
result, when we talk about state and religion relations, we should not understand the “state” as 
synonymous with “government” and should not think that laws and their interpretation and 
implementation are the result of governments’ actions alone. Too often people associate the 
government as the entire state. But a state’s decisions should not be understood as the actions of 
a government alone. A government is not always the most powerful decision-making body in a 
country and does not act in a vacuum; a state’s decisions can come from the influence of civil 
society, too, which consists of the entire ruling class and institutions. Even though differences 
are present from country to country, judicial bodies, universities, the military, the media, the high 
affluent class, large national and international companies, and sometimes religious leaders and 
artists help compose the state ideology and its actions along with the government.  
One other way to regulate religious ideas and institutions is school education. Even 
though some states support religious education, they do not tolerate every religion or new 
religious movement (NRM). Allowing or not allowing state or private religious schools, 
compulsory or voluntary religious courses in public schools, religious or secular elements in 
curricula, and supporting religious schools are some ways that are used by the state to control 
religious education.  
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There are three basic reactions against religion in curricula. In the secularist model—e.g. 
China, the U.S., and France—religion does not enter curricula since it is perceived as being 
either against a plurality of traditions or used to change the state ideology. In the second model, 
religion is perceived as important to shaping national identity, such as Orthodox Christianity in 
Greece. In the third model, non-confessional multi-faith religious education is offered, such as in 
England, Wales, Scotland, Norway, Sweden, South Africa and Namibia, and in the upper 
secondary years (16+) in Denmark and Finland (Cush 2007: 219; see Table 1 for a different 
categorization). 
An example which combines the first two reactions is Turkey, where private religious 
schools are not allowed. There is a type of public religious school (Imam-Hatip), but attending to 
these schools was discouraged—the students are prevented from entering the university through 
unfair entrance exams—for a long time.3 Providing religious education for children below 12 
years of age was strictly prohibited, even in state mosques. In 1997, eight years of elementary 
school education without interruption was made compulsory to stop children from going to 
Quran-based courses until 2012.4 Although coeducation was considered essential and commonly 
practiced previously, it was strictly implemented after 1997 to diminish religiosity. Even though 
Religion and Ethics courses were made compulsory for Muslim students in elementary and high 
schools in the 1980s to stop extreme leftist and communist student movements, the curricula of 
these courses have been limited by their topics and tend to address ethical issues such as 
friendship, brotherhood, respect for senior citizens, national holidays, liberties, freedom of 
thought, and secularism as assurance of religious freedom rather than religious issues.    
 It seems that Egypt has gone through experiences similar to Turkey’s. In Egypt, after 
achieving independence from colonial rule, the state took over many institutions of religious 
learning and training to use them for its own nationalist project (Mahmood 2005: 64).  However, 
in the years 1987-91, the curriculum was revised and became more religious/Islamic oriented. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Imam-Hatip schools opened in 1924 to substitute medrese and provide imams; however, they were 
closed in 1930. Even though they were re-opened in 1950s, their graduates were not allowed to enter 
universities until the 1970s. From the 1970s to 1997, their graduates had been allowed to enter 
universities. Again, between 1998 and 2012, going to these schools has been discouraged by unfair 
university entrance exams.  
4 Before 1997, five years elementary school education was mandatory. After five years elementary school 
education, many families were sending their children to Quran-based courses for one or a few years. 
Then, these students continued their education in middle schools.  
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Once again, in 1991, the education policy was re-oriented away from religion and any form of 
Islamization, since education was perceived as an issue of national security (Herrera 2003: 171-
172).  
There is also some debate about religious education in public schools in the U.S. For 
instance, the Christian Right has been opposed to sex education and has been in favor of 
traditional gender roles, public prayer in schools, tax relief for independent faith schools, and 
teaching creationism. In one case in Alabama, it was argued that if promoting a religion is 
unconstitutional, then it should be unconstitutional to teach secular humanism in schools. 
However, this argument failed in the Appeals Court. In Kansas in 1999, Darwin’s theory was 
removed from the science curriculum but then one year later, it was put back in the curriculum 
(Bruce 2003: 145-149). 
These examples show that nationwide public education is used to produce a uniform 
culture and to create model citizens (Bruce 2003: 162). States use school education to control 
religious ideas and sometimes use religious education to control social movements, which are 
deemed harmful to the state.  
In addition to educational institutions, official religious organizations help the state to 
control religious ideas. For instance, the Department of Religious Affairs represents the highest 
religious authority in Turkey. Mosque imams are state officials and are paid by the state and 
controlled by this institution. Friday and holiday prayer sermons are composed by this institution 
and sent to imams, so imams do not have chair immunity. These sermons represent opinions of 
the state rather than religious leaders or imams’ interpretation of Islam. 
This state control of religious institutions is the same in ex-Communist Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, all of which have muftiate (spiritual 
boards of Muslims) and a Committee on Religious Affairs. These countries support, in somewhat 
different ways, an official Islam that backs their governments (Gunn 2003: 404-405).  
States’ attitudes against NRMs5 and religious rights of convicts are worth mentioning 
under this section. Even though states tend to be more tolerant toward the religion of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “New Religious Movements (NRMs)” usually refers to innovative religious responses to the conditions 
of the modern world even though most of them are rooted in ancient traditions and reviving or restoring 
an ancient tradition (Chryssides 2006). Thus, most new religions can be seen as more recent versions or 
variations of an old religion, including Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism (Melton 
2004: 23), even in countries where they are majority.  
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majority, they are not likely to welcome NRMs, which they cannot control or force to assimilate. 
States then may attempt to limit fundraising, proselytizing efforts, or activities such as the 
building of facilities by NRMs (Richardson 2004: 2) since these NRMs are perceived as a threat 
to religious and national identities (Rothstein 2004: 222), a political or cultural attack (Aires 
2004: 108), or as brainwashing cults (Richardson 2004: 3). 
Moreover, some states go so far as to try to control their citizens’ religious autonomy in 
different countries. For instance, when Turkish officials discovered the religious autonomy of 
Turkish immigrants in Germany, they tried to stop them from founding mosque associations. 
However, Germany did not allow it and protected these Muslim immigrants from Muslim 
authorities outside of Germany. Eventually, Turkey founded its own representation, the DITIB, 
an unofficial branch of the Department of Religious Affairs in Germany (Aires 2004: 104-105). 
In general, there is discretion and discrimination in the operation of the judicial system 
between the rights of NRMs and the religion of the majority. If a state has a strong and 
independent judiciary and constitutional provisions guaranteeing religious freedom, high degrees 
of religious freedom would be expected. However, even autonomous judiciary bodies do not 
guarantee equality between the majority religion and NRMs.  The less judicial autonomy a state 
has, the more problematic this phenomenon becomes (Richardson 2004: 11). Wybraniec and 
Finke’s study on 2,109 court decisions on religion from 1981 to 1996 in the U.S. reveals that 
“…sectarian religions are more likely to appeal to the courts for protection of their religious 
freedoms, despite receiving fewer favorable rulings than mainline religions…” (2004: 543). 
These decisions show that even though the U.S. has one of the most independent judiciary 
bodies, its courts do not guarantee equal treatment to its plaintiffs. 
The terms NRM and minority religion can even be used to describe the world’s great 
faiths. For instance, Islam is a minority religion or a kind of NRM in non-Islamic states. Also, as 
expressed by Madeley, inequalities of treatment and governments standing between religions are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Sometimes, NRMs are referred to pejoratively as “cults and sects.” The Unification Church, Hare 
Krishna, Scientology, the Children of God, and the Divine Light Mission are some of the most used 
examples of NRMs. Even these examples might be expanded to extreme cases such as the Madonna’s 
Church of Orgasm. Even though Jehovah Witnesses, the Mormons, and Evangelical Protestants are now 
considered part of the religious landscape in the U.S., they are among NRMs. Also, as minority religions, 
universal religions might be a part of NRMs in different countries (see Richardson 2004).  
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almost universal (2006: 68). These situations make NRMs and attitudes against them by the state 
more important.  
In general, the public is uninterested in the problems of new religions and minority 
religions (Rothstein 2004: 222). It makes new religions’ problems less resoluble. Even though 
the public debate on Islam increases in Europe (ibid.), it is not widespread or potent enough to 
solve problems. 
As we saw in this part, states try to control their citizens’ religious autonomy by means of 
law, school education, official religious organizations, and indirect methods such as tax 
exemption. Also, we can imagine that this control is more severe on convicts. As a state agent, 
prisons do not show equal respect to all religions and have an arbitrary fashion to control new 
religious movements especially (Beckford 2004: 242).  
As discussed until now, if the state tries to regulate religion in covert and overt ways and 
tries to separate itself from religion by means of secularism, how do we explain religious 
symbolism, especially, in secular states?  In the following part, civil religion will be examined as 
a part of this state and religion interaction. 
 
5. Civil Religion 
 
Even though, as expressed by Bellah, the phrase “civil religion” originated in the work of 
Rousseau, it made major effect on social science study after being used by Robert Bellah 
(Wimberley and Swatos 1998: 96; also see it for critiques of this term). Bellah states,  
Considering the separation of church and state, how is a president justified in 
using the word "God" at all? The answer is that the separation of church and state 
has not denied the political realm a religious dimension. Although matters of 
personal religious belief, worship, and association are considered to be strictly 
private affairs, there are, at the same time, certain common elements of religious 
orientation that the great majority of Americans share. These have played a 
crucial role in the development of American institutions and still provide a 
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political 
sphere. This public religious dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, 
and rituals that I am calling American civil religion (1991 [1970]: 171). 
Therefore, Bellah claims that the majority of Americans share certain common elements 
of religious orientation in a framework of national symbols, rituals, traditions, and institutions. 
This “institutionalized civil religion in America” is distinct from the churches. However, this is 
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not unique for Americans, “every nation and every people come to some form or religious self-
understanding” (ibid. p.168). 
Bellah examines American presidents’ inaugurations, noting how often they include 
references to the concept of God, “a word that almost all Americans can accept but that means so 
many different things to so many different people that it is almost an empty sign” (ibid. p.170). 
Especially, founding fathers of America shaped the form and tone of the civil religion. This form 
derived from Christianity, but it is certainly not itself Christianity. All of these presidents 
mentioned God but not Christ. "God" is a central symbol in the civil religion. In this way, civil 
religion points to the religious dimension of politics and represents an essential middle term for 
resolving the debates about separation of church and state and the role of religion as integrator of 
society (Coleman 1970: 67-76).6  
Civil religion has “its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred 
places, its own solemn rituals and symbols” (Bellah 1991: 186). Memorial Day, Thanksgiving 
Day, Fourth of July, and less significantly Veterans Day and the birthdays of Washington and 
Lincoln serve to integrate the family into this civil religion in America. 
Civil religion was secular nationalism in France and Russia. Also in Turkey, 
political/secular nationalism replaced traditional Islam in serving as civil religion (Coleman 
1970: 73; also see Bellah 1965). Nationalism here was a modern and secular ideology which 
served and performed as civil religion which substituted traditional religion (Smith 2003: 98). In 
Turkey, the ruling elite wished to use Islam to strengthen social harmony as long as it was kept 
under state control (Atasoy 2009: 179).  Therefore, Turkish civil religion was not only shaped by 
a secular nationalism, but also by nominal Islam.  
Until this point, we have seen a contradiction between state and religion to become 
dominant over each other. It seems that this conflict does not disappear as Fukuyama predicted 
almost twenty years ago by saying that a coherent and directional history of mankind will 
eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy. Then, could there be a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Is the term “civil religion” still relevant today? Why did Bellah drop the term in the 1970s? See also 
Philip S. Gorski (2010), Civil Religion Today. 
In his inauguration speech in 2009, Obama said “We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and 
Hindus -- and nonbelievers.” One of our personal conversations, Prof. Mohammed Bamyeh was 
questioning including atheists in this speech: “Are they [nonbelievers] now considered part of this civil 
religion?” We will see it in future.  
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resolution to the conflict between religion and state? In the next section, I will look at 
suggestions that try to solve this conflict.  
 
6. Resolving State-Religion Conflict 
 
According to Robert D. Lee, resolution of the ideological dilemma cannot come from either 
complete separation of church and state or complete integration. Actually, complete separation of 
church and state is unattainable as we see in Turkey and the Soviet Union’s hostile secularism on 
religion. In both countries, once coercion disappears or diminishes, religious activity springs 
back. For Lee, Turkey’s (so-called pro-Islamic)7 ruling party, the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), won electoral victory because it abandoned ideological Islamism. This party has sought 
to soften the ideological secularism of the secularists without breaking with the general secularist 
idea that religion should not dictate government policy (2010: 31-32, 282-285). Hence, “stability 
comes when government recognizes it has no interest in promoting or damaging particular 
religious groups, and religious groups themselves feel secure in their relationship to the 
government.” Also, “secularists must accept religious expression in the public sphere, and 
religious adherents must accept both secularist and other religious strains as legitimate and 
worthy of respect” (ibid. p.291).  
Another resolution is “twin tolerations”: freedom of religion from the state and freedom 
of the state from religion (Madeley 2006: 61; Stepan 2001: 217). According to Stepan, religious 
institutions should not be constitutionally privileged. On the other hand, as we expect from a 
democratic state, the state must establish religious freedom for individuals and religious 
communities. Besides allowing them to worship privately, they should be able to advance their 
values in civil society as long as their public advancement of these beliefs does not violate the 
liberties of other citizens, democracy, and the law by violence (Stepan 2001: 217).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Most literature portrays the AKP as an Islamic or at least pro-Islamic party in its early years in power. 
However, this trend has changed in recent years. I prefer conservative term to describe the AKP. If using 
an “Islamic” attachment would help the reader to analyze this part, this term might be “post-Islamic” 
instead of “pro-Islamic” to describe the AKP and many current Islamic movements in Turkey and in other 
Muslim countries. This brand new Islamism, post-Islamism, does not propose an alternative social and 
political order or Islamic state, but proposes pluralism, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (see 
Dagi 2004). 
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Stepan examines this “twin tolerations” theory in specific democratic politics. Many 
scholars see the “separation of church and state” and “secularism” as core features of democracy. 
However, Stepan shows that it is not true. All Western democracies, including the most secular 
France, have a “friendly” separation rather than a “hostile” one. According to him, the lesson 
from Western European democracies lies not in church-state separation, but in the constant 
political construction and reconstruction of the “twin tolerations.” Therefore, the concept of 
secularism, in so far as it refers to state-religion separation, must be radically rethought (2001: 
216-223).  
In the case of Islam, Abdullahi A. an-Naim claims that resolution lies in a secular state in 
Muslim countries (2008). By a secular state, he means one that is neutral regarding religious 
doctrine. Since the ruling elites of Islamic countries use religion to legitimize their control and 
the fact that the state is a political institution not a religious one in the historical experience and 
current reality of Islamic societies, living under a secular state is a necessity to prevent these 
exploitations. Also, this neutrality is essential for a Muslim since religion depends on free 
choice. The state should not enforce a religious law precisely, “so that Muslims are able to live 
by their own belief in Islam as a matter of religious obligation, not as the outcome of coercion by 
the state” (ibid. p.2).  
On the other hand, Naim is aware that being completely neutral is not possible since a 
state is a political institution that is supposed to be influenced by the interests and concerns of its 
citizens. So, how do we establish this neutrality? According to him, legislation and public policy 
may reflect the beliefs and values of citizens, including religious values; however, this should not 
be done in the name of any specific religion. Maintaining this neutrality is critically important 
since human beings tend to favor their own views over the views of others (ibid. p.3-85). 
Also, he makes a separation between politics and the state and claims that the state should 
not be simply a complete reflection of daily politics. If we do not make this separation, the state 
becomes the immediate agent of the ruling party as we see from experience of Nazi Germany, 
the Soviet Union, Egypt under Nasser, Iraq under Saddam, and Syria under Hafiz al-Assad. 
Therefore, “failure to observe the distinction between the state and politics tends to severely 
undermine the peace, stability, and healthy development of the whole society” (ibid. p.6).  
Naim legitimizes and builds his vision of the secular state on “civic reason.” By “civic 
reason,” he means that policy and legislation can be publicly debated and contested by any 
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citizen in accordance with norms of civility and mutual respect. This civic reason is based on 
human rights and citizenship and would be accepted by most citizens (ibid. p.7-85). 
Also, he claims that the state should be secular, not society. So, his aim is not to 
secularize society. He uses the term “secular state,” instead of “secularism,” to avoid this 
negative perception. According to him, this “secular state” idea should be seen as achievement of 
shared visions of human dignity and social justice; not as an ideological imposition of the West 
(ibid. p.8-272). 
According to Naim, one resolution for the problematic relationship between religion and 
the state is to balance this relationship in societies’ own historical contexts. For instance, each 
Western society negotiated the relationship in the triangle of religion, politics, and the state in its 
own historical context (2008: 45). Most political regimes in Islamic history showed that they fell 
in between two polar models, complete separation and complete conflation, of the relationship 
between religion and the state. Thus, it is better for Muslim societies to recognize the 
impossibility of achieving complete separation or conflation (ibid. p.53).  
If Naim is right about Western societies’ resolution for the problematic relationship 
between religion and the state, how did Western societies solve this problem? If Western 
societies had produced these resolutions through a modernization process, we should examine 
modernization theory to understand how this might have happened.  
 
7. Modernization 
 
Almost all the founding figures of modern social science—Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, 
Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand Toennies, Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, 
and Sigmund Freud—believed that modernization—the process of industrialization, 
urbanization, and raising levels of education and wealth—greatly weakens the influence of 
religious institutions in modernizing societies and erodes the role of religion in society and in the 
minds of individuals (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 3-25; Berger 1999: 2; Casanova 1994: 17; 
Inglehart 1997: 73). Hence, secularization was seen as a necessary part of modernization; when 
the world modernized, it was expected to automatically secularize (Davie 1999: 76).  
When Western societies’ economic and cultural hegemony had become dominant during 
the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, other countries’ political and intellectual 
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leaders responded in four different ways:  1. Rejecting both modernization and Westernization 
like Japan before the mid-19th century. 2. Embracing both modernization and Westernization like 
Turkey after the founding of the Republic. 3. Embracing modernization but rejecting 
Westernization like Japan after the mid-19th century. A fourth possibility—Westernization 
without modernization—has been argued to characterize most African countries, and it has 
brought a “painful process of cultural Westernization without technical modernization” as 
presumably happened in Egypt (Huntington 2003: 72-78).8 
Turkey has embraced both modernization and westernization. This embracing, based on 
modernization, was perceived as necessary because the ruling elite was thinking modernization 
was not possible without westernization. So, indigenous Islamic culture was not seen to be 
compatible with either modernization or westernization and had to be abandoned. It followed 
that if society did not abandon it by itself, that culture had to be combated by the state. Thus, this 
kind of secularization was a state-engineered project rather than a social process in Turkey, and 
also in China and Iran (Madeley 2006: 63). Sometimes the process of westernization in Turkey 
was proceeding faster than in the West itself, such as in the case of women’s suffrage (Esmer 
2006: 224). 
However, years have shown us modernization is not necessarily associated with 
secularization. Moreover, modernization has helped religious revivalism in some countries since 
“modernization meant education, literacy, communication, global awareness, individuality, and 
choice, all of which powered religious resurgence and undermined state-controlled religion” (Lee 
2010: 281). In the following part, how modernization energizes religion will be examined.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Although often used synonymously, modernization and Westernization are distinct concepts. Also, 
neither has a single meaning. So, it is better to restrict the meaning of modernization with the process of 
industrialization, urbanization, and raising levels of education and wealth; and restrict the meaning of 
Westernization with the imitation of Western customs that are unrelated to economic development (see 
Pipes 2002: 196).  
Even though these narrow definitions, these terms might refer to adverse poles as expressed by Prof. John 
Markoff in one of our personal conversations. According to him, some aspects of western societies could 
be imitated and others rejected. This would mean that depending on which aspects we looked at, we could 
say westernization was happening or that it wasn’t happening. For instance, we could claim that Japan is 
westernizing because they have McDonald’s; on the other hand, we could claim that Japan reject 
westernization because those McDonalds serve different food or some Japanese food than they do in 
Western countries. Thus, it is inevitable to have some variation of Huntington’s typology (see Huntington 
2003: 330). 
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The Role of Literacy and the Media 
In Turkey, Islamic movements have shifted their formative ground from religious lodges first to 
printed texts including magazines and newspapers and later alongside texts to radio, television, 
and internet to promote their ideas since sermons in mosques have a limited audience. They have 
adopted media to ensure their survivability and to consolidate a modern religious identity. 
Islamic media has played a crucial role in producing and disseminating religious concepts 
(Yavuz 2003: 103-132).  
If we look more specifically at one of these Islamic movements, the Gulen movement, 
resource mobilization theory provides a lens to explain why it is (Ebaugh 2010: 6-8) or other 
Islamic movements are thriving. This theory emphasizes the importance of resources, such as 
access to media or material resources for the development and future of a social movement 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Further, new Islamic movements owe their growth to their ability to 
retrieve and use new opportunities and resources effectively. For instance, we can identify a 
major leap in its history at the moment when Fethullah Gulen began to publish a monthly 
magazine, Sızıntı, in Turkey in 1979 (Yavuz 2003: 183). Gulen’s followers were growing in 
number then, and Gulen found it effective to deliver his messages through this particular 
magazine. 
In the early 1980s, liberal economic and political reforms created opportunities for the 
Gulen movement (Hendrick 2006: 21). After 1983, an important change took place in the field of 
education. The state encouraged the privatization of the education system (Yavuz 2003: 183). 
Gulen utilized this opportunity and encouraged and led his followers to open private schools. 
During this time, with the help of the community’s journal, Sızıntı, Gulen expressed his views to 
a broader public since the journal did not remain limited to the Gulen movement, but attracted a 
large popular readership. Gulen urged people to participate in the economy, media, and cultural 
activities to create a new and confident Turkish nation. 
In the early 1990s, Gulen expanded his goal. Besides Turkey he wished to reach states in 
Central Asia. For this reason, the first group of this movement went to Georgia to establish 
transnational contact (Akoz and Atal 2005). The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in 1991 has been a trigger for the expansion of this movement in Central Asia 
(Turam 2004: 359; Park 2007: 51). Gulen’s group opened its first school in Central Asia in 1992, 
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and eventually founded some 200 educational institutions outside of Turkey, the majority of 
which are in Central Asia, in 35 countries outside of Turkey during the following 5 years (Turgut 
1997). At the end of the 1990s, these numbers expanded to 54 countries and some 300 
educational institutions including 6 universities, 236 high schools, 2 elementary schools, 21 
dormitories, 8 languages and computer learning centers, and 6 preparation courses for central 
university exams (Birand 1998). In 2005, this community had reached 100,000 students with 500 
educational institutions in 91 countries (Yuksel 2005) as well as their 1000 educational 
institutions inside Turkey. The Gulen movement has organized Turkish Olympics for foreign 
students since 2003 in Turkey. In 2012, students from 135 countries participated in this 
organization. When we look at the participants of the tenth International Turkish Language 
Olympics in 2012, it can be assumed that this movement has activities over a hundred countries. 
In Egypt, as happened in Turkey, tape-recorded sermons, radio and television programs 
have helped to spread Islamic discourses among illiterate Muslims and those who lack the time 
or ability to consult printed literature. Also, supporters of the Islamic movements have 
established a number of “Islamic schools” to counter secular education and create an Islamic 
awareness within existing institutions (Mahmood 2005: 48, 79-80).  
Modernization as an energizing factor for religion is not only endemic to Islamic 
countries. For instance, radio, television, religious magazine, more adequately trained priests, 
students, and returning emigrants had helped religious mobilization in Spain in the 1960s 
(Christian 1989: 80, 181-182).  
In the U.S., Evangelical and other conservative organizations exposed the power of 
broadcasting as a proselytizing tool (Hoover 1988: 49). Religious broadcasting goes back to the 
early days of radio. When the first professional radio broadcast in December 1920 in Pittsburgh, 
only a month later Calvary Episcopal Church broadcast its regular worship service in the same 
city (Bruce 1990: 25). Radio became a God given miraculous gift to spread the gospel and reach 
every person in the world (Stout and Buddenbaum 1996: 74-75). It was the same for television. 
The first national religious series broadcast in T.V. in 1949 (Alexander 1994: 59). In 1960, the 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) changed its rules about fulfilling public service 
obligations and ruled a station could fulfill this public service with free-sustaining time or paid 
time. Although this new regulation dropped mainline Protestant programs, it created a new 
market environment with more paid-time available for religious programs (Alexander 1994: 60; 
	  	  
27	  
Bruce 1990: 29-31; Frankl 1987: 69-70; Hoover 1988: 53-55; Stout and Buddenbaum 1996: 81-
82). In 1961, the first religious television station was established. Their number reached 30 by 
1978. Evangelicals used television broadcasting effectively; so that this trend began to be named 
Televangelism.  
Televangelists also owed their success to use other modern technologies including 
telephones and computers for solicitation and proselytization (Bruce 1990: 58-62; Cardwell 
1984: 52-54). They behaved like salesmen. They encouraged audiences to contact their show by 
mail or toll-free phones by offering some free gifts or prayers for their families. Once they got 
contact information of audiences and their personal requests, they used computers to code the 
contents and personal information and prepare more personalized replies that were more 
effective than a general reply and ensured the loyalties of their audiences.  
We can find Islamic versions of Televangelism in the Muslim world also. Abdullah 
Gymnastiar in Indonesia and Amr Khaled in Egypt are most famous among others using 
television broadcasting for religious purposes (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2009: 239-241). In 
short, modernization was not as troublesome as expected for religion. When religious people 
encountered new technologies, they found some ways to use it for religious purposes.  
Until now, I examined state and religion relations in general. In the next part, I will focus 
on this relation’s reflections on Islam.  
 
 
 
B. POLITICAL ISLAM 	  
Islam is a religion to which more than one of every five people belongs. It is the world’s fastest 
growing and expanding religion. Islam is not only the predominant religion in some fifty-six 
countries but also the second or third largest religion in Europe and America (Esposito 2005: ix). 
However, this does not mean the world’s knowledge about Islam is sufficient. Even though there 
is growing interest about Islam in the West, especially during the last decade, this interest had 
not filled the lack of getting correct information yet. For instance, many non-Muslims still 
believe that Islamist political activists and organizations are exceptionally prone to violence to 
further their ends (Anderson 1997: 17). Moreover, we can find similar thinking in the writings of 
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some people who are coming from Islamic regions (see Samir Amin 2008). Why is our 
knowledge about Islam and the Islamic region so biased?  
According to Edward Said, our knowledge about the Orient is a political knowledge; not 
a pure one. It has been contaminated by Western Orientalists beginning from the 16th century to 
today. Three things have contributed to the contamination of the simple perceptions of the Arabs 
and Islam: 1. The history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is 
reflected in the history of Orientalism. 2. The struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, 
and its effects on the liberal culture and population at large. 3. The almost total absence of any 
cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs 
or Islam (1994 [1979]: 26). 
The result of this long-term Orientalism has been a sort of consensus that has led to 
certain types of statements and misinformation such as the West is rational, developed, humane, 
and superior, and the Orient is aberrant, undeveloped, and inferior. It is therefore correct that 
“every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an 
imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric” (ibid. p.202-204, 300). Even though Said is talking 
about 19th century Orientalism above, according to him, “the principal dogmas of Orientalism 
exist in their purest form today in studies of the Arabs and Islam” (ibid. p.300). For instance, a 
survey titled The Arabs in American Textbooks reveals the most astonishing misinformation, or 
rather the most wrong representations of an ethnic-religious group (ibid. p.287). If we extend this 
study to the whole Islamic world, we will probably find the same results: bias, misinformation, 
and stereotype (Ahmida 2009: 1230-1231; Phelps 2010: 190). 
However, this does not mean that all Muslims have a single ideology about their own 
religion. They have many different interpretations and implementations of Islam (Bamyeh 2004: 
222). As Olivier Roy described, “if there is still a debate about what the Koran really says, it 
means that nobody really knows, or at least that the people who think they know disagree among 
themselves—thus we find ourselves back at square one” (Roy 2004: 10).  
In the larger picture, the link between “Islamist” movements and the political context 
within which they take root reveals that the nature of these movements has little to do with 
religion. Rather, it points to a politicization of religion as I discuss within the chapter. If that is 
the case, Islamist movements oppose a status quo which adherents believe is inherently unjust 
(Teti and Mura 2009: 92). Thus, using a term of “political Islam” is actually not appropriate to 
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describe these movements and their adherents. There is not an “Islamic answer” to all political 
questions (Anderson 2009: 199-200). Every group may understand and interpret the sacred texts 
according to their own agenda and/or Islamic knowledge. Many Islamic groups choose not to be 
involved in politics and do not have a political agenda. Some groups use politics to expand their 
ideas without violence. A few groups can use violence. So, there is not a monolithic “political 
Islam” just as we do not talk about political Christianity. It depends on adherents’ understanding, 
interpretation, and geographical and political environment. Thus, I prefer political aspects of 
Islam or Islam in politics instead of political Islam to describe these movements. When I talk 
about political Islam, generally I refer to these aspects. 
The following discussion, by following an examination of its roots, will focus on how 
this so-called political Islam is shaped in modern times. 
 
1. Roots of Political Islam 
 
The Prophet Mohammed is often seen as both a political leader as well as a religious one. 
However, he died (d. 632) without designating his replacement or establishing a system for the 
selection of his successor. After his death, tension increased among Arab communities. After a 
brief tense period of indecision, the leading companions of the Prophet selected (bi’at) one of 
their own as their leader. We can view this selection as a democratic decision. Even though this 
election was not democratic in today’s sense, it required the assent of notable Muslims and 
community/tribe leaders and in a more general sense, it was assumed that the assent of the umma 
as a whole was necessary for the legitimacy of the leader. From 632 to 661, the first four 
successors of the Prophet—called “the Rightly Guided Caliphs” in the Islamic tradition—were 
chosen in similar ways. This first period is particularly important, both because it is the origin 
and inspiration of the formation and development of Islamic ideology and institutions, and 
because it is a reference point for Muslims (Esposito 1998: 7). In the eyes of Muslims, this 
“golden age” is not a utopia; it existed in time and place. Therefore, it endows a sense of 
mythical continuity with the past (Gole 2000: 97).  However, after that early period, Islamic 
states became—according to certain interpretations—more secular. It would be wrong to think of 
them as only being strictly Islamic states in the first place.  Even though religion remained 
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organically related to state and society, Islam, both in theory and in practice, may not have been 
the guiding force in the life of its rulers (Esposito 1998: 320).  
The debate on whether a state was at the intentional roots of Islam is quite old. The Quran 
or the Prophet never spelled out any direct proposals on how a state was to be governed. Thus, 
neither a state nor any of the structural foundations of an empire were thought of as being 
necessary consequences of an Islamic system (Bamyeh 1999: 259-260). Even though, until the 
colonial period, most Muslims—despite differences in time and place—could very well believe 
and maintain that they lived in an Islamic state and society officially guided by the Sharia 
(Islamic law) (Esposito 1998: 320), it seems that it is not appropriate to name those states as 
Islamic.  
My arguments do not mean that Islam does not involve political life. Even though Islam 
does not require a special governing system, its emphasis on divine guidance influences socio-
political institutions. It means that Islam is not only a belief system in the religious sense but also 
that it could be a political doctrine at the same time. However, this does not cause a political 
Islam by itself because Islam does not specify a particular system of governance, sanctified by 
text, to manage human affairs (Baker 2003: 176).  
Now that I have reviewed the roots of political Islam, I will, in the next part, concentrate 
on a part of current discussions on political Islam by looking at widely used Islamic revival and 
secularism terms.  
 
2. The Islamic Revival vs. Secularism 
 
There is a tradition among scholars that they explain every Islamic religious movement that 
happened around the 1960s and ’70s by the general terms “the Islamic Revival” and “the Islamic 
Resurgence.”  
Nowadays, “the return of the divine” and “the religious revival” are becoming widely 
used as terms for any religious movement. However, has religion ever left the societies where 
these movements occur? According to the secularization thesis, in a modern society, religion will 
regress and lose its position, and once-accepted religious symbols, doctrines, and institutions will 
lose their prestige, and eventually religion will lose its followers (Swatos and Christiano 1999: 
213). Throughout the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, many social scientists and Western 
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intellectuals believed that “the end” of religion was near (Stark 1999: 249). People who foresaw 
the end of religion had taken the idea from being an assumption to a sanctified way of thinking. 
This is why, in modern societies, secularism is far from being a theory; as expressed by Hadden 
(1987: 588), it has become an ideology for its advocates.  
Secularization was not assumed to require force, as modern society would accept it 
willingly. As Freud asserted “secular motives would proceed unobtrusively” (1961 [1927]: 39). 
This secularization process would eventually happen. “[People] break away as soon as they are 
allowed to give up their belief in the reality-value of religion.” (Freud 1961 [1927]: 47). As we 
can see here, Freud didn’t give an exact time for this transformation.  
Rodney Stark explains the need for this vague. According to Stark, for nearly three 
centuries many social scientists and intellectuals of the West have been promising the end of 
religion. Each generation confidently believed that “within another few decades” people would 
cease believing in supernatural forces. This “prophecy” was so strong at the beginning of the 18th 
century that it was being argued that at the end of the 19th century, religion would be extinct after 
losing ground to modernity. Many people went even further, arguing that religion would be so 
weak that its end would come “within the next 50 years” and all of the youngsters of the time 
would die as non-believers (1999: 249).  
As time passed, the “prophets of secularism” were less precise about giving an exact date 
for the end of religion in a war against modernity. As if competing with each other, intellectuals 
of the 19th century declared that the days of religion were over and described religion as a 
hallucination or as a childhood disease, among other negative descriptions. The only difference 
between these intellectuals and intellectuals of the 18th century was that newer generation of 
intellectuals were content with saying the end is “soon,” but they didn’t give a definite time for 
“the end” (Stark 1999: 250). 
Since “the end of religion” did not arrive at the beginning of the 20th century, the wording 
changed towards the middle of the century—language such as "underway" or "ongoing decline 
of religion had started” became popular. Some intellectuals believed that “the evolutionary future 
of religion is extinction,” but it might require “several hundred years” (Stark 1999: 250). But 
even at the end of the 20th century, it was observed that religion was important and widespread in 
society and as a result, some serious criticism was directed toward the theory of secularism itself, 
and questions were raised. 
	  	  
32	  
After these questions about increasing secularism were raised, currently, a new saying is 
becoming widely used to characterize the religious attitude in Turkey and the Islamic world in 
general: “the return of the divine” and “the religious revival” or “the Islamic Resurgence.” 
However, it is currently said that religion never ceased being part of society and has been 
influencing the life of society in general and individual people in particular (Kose, 2002) and that 
secularist theories did not develop into anything real since they are still only theories and are not 
based on experimental and practical experience (Swatos and Christiano 1999: 210); indeed, the 
“Holy” has always been in society. Those who said that God was dead were exaggerating 
(Wolffe 1993: 1).  
For instance, Finke and Stark’s study on American churching shows that religious 
adherence in the U.S. has been stable for last fifty years and, before that, it had a gradual increase 
during the last two centuries (2005: 23). George Gallup, founder of the Gallup Organization, 
stated the same for American religiosity in 1985: “[P]erhaps the most appropriate word to use to 
describe the religious character of the nation as a whole over the last half century is stability: 
Basic religious beliefs, and even religious practice, today differ relatively little from the levels 
recorded 50 years ago" (quoted in Hadden 1987: 600). Seymour Martin Lipset’s questioning of 
the secularization thesis also could be based on the stability of religious life: “[B]y far the most 
striking aspect of religious life in America is not the changes which have occurred in it—but the 
basic continuities it retains" (quoted in Hadden 1987: 596). Hence, one can concede that religion 
is far less influential than it was; however, it is far from being extinct, even though it has gone 
through an evolutionary process and adapted to the modern world (Giddens 1993: 488). 
My criticism about the term “Islamic Revival” is that it brings to mind the secularist 
theories that I mentioned above. When many scholars saw that religion was still dominant in 
Islamic countries, they interpreted it as resurgence because they were under the influence of 
secularist theories.  However, it is very difficult to find the evidence of a deep religious decline9 
as described by the secularist theories in Turkey and in other Muslim countries (I do not mean 
that there has not been any religious decline). So, as expressed by Madeley “secularization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For instance, see Norris and Inglehart (2004). Norris and Inglehart claim that religiosity decreases in 
post-industrial societies and also in industrial societies in some way.  Even though there is not any 
religious decline in agrarian societies, the upper strata lives a secular life in those societies. However, they 
accept the worldwide of religious revivalism at the same time, especially for Islamic countries. 
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represented a state-[engineered] project rather than a [social] process” (2006: 63) in many 
countries.  
I would like to explain the increase in Islamic movements and political Islam in Islamic 
countries by referring to religiosity, which is always there in some way, going underground or 
becoming muted in expression due to heavy-handed repression by military-backed regimes, 
rather than simply to an “Islamic revival.” Beginning in the 1920s, while a minority elite and 
ruling class have accepted and implemented a Western secular world-view along with its 
ideologies and values, the majority of the Muslim population has not truly accepted and 
internalized a secular outlook (Esposito 1998: 311). In a sense, what has occurred after the 1950s 
is that devout Muslims found their political voice and representation and became more visible. 
To understand this phenomenon, we need to look at the military and the multi-party systems in 
the Islamic countries.  
For instance, if I talk specifically about Turkey, I argue that there is no real Islamic 
revival, but instead the society is being increasingly influenced by democracy and modernity. 
Islamic political activity seems like a revival because religious people are more visible in public 
life than in the past, but their visibility is a result of a growing modernization and 
democratization of the country. For instance, you might see many women wearing headscarves 
in public life.  This is the result of changing times, changing women’s social status, and women 
being more able to attend schools and work, and not being limited to the role of housewives.  It 
does not necessarily represent a growing trend of Islamic life. Moreover, Ali Carkoglu and 
Binnaz Toprak’s recent research (2007: 63) shows that women’s use of headscarves has 
decreased during the last decade in Turkey even though general opinion seems to oppose it. 
On the other hand, in political life, the growth of Islamic political parties cannot be 
explained only in terms of the Islamic revival. For instance, the ruling conservative AKP (Justice 
and Development Party), received 47 percent of the vote in the Turkish general elections in 
2007, but in 2009, the percentage decreased to 40 in municipal elections.  To have such a 
significant drop in votes shows that people are concerned not only about religious factors, but 
also about the economy and other issues.  If they were concerned only about issues of faith and 
ideology, the AKP would not have shown such a loss over two years.  
Up to this point, I have shown only one side of secularization theory, secularization as 
religious decline, since most literature focuses on this aspect. However, secularization theory is 
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made up of three different propositions: secularization as religious decline, secularization as 
differentiation, and secularization as privatization (Casanova 1994: 7). 
The decline of religion thesis postulates that the process of secularization would bring 
about a decline in religion and, in some extreme versions, until it eventually disappears. The 
differentiation thesis postulates that the secular spheres would differentiate from religious 
institutions and norms. The privatization thesis postulates that secularization would lead to 
privatization and marginalization in religion in the modern world (ibid. p.19-20).  
Norris and Inglehart believe that secularization theory is still valid but needs only to be 
re-formulated and updated since “it is obvious that religion has not disappeared from the world, 
nor does it seem likely to do so” (2004: 4). They have two premises to explain today’s 
secularization instead of demand-side and supply-side theories (ibid.): Existential Security and 
Cultural Traditions.  
Existential Security: Even though there are some differences, every state provides its 
people with a sense of existential security, depending on its economic and human development 
and socioeconomic equality. When people do not feel this security, they are inclined to adopt 
religion, as happened in non-developed countries. Also, Norris and Inglehart explain the U.S.’s 
religious level by this premise. Even though the U.S. is a developed country with a high-income 
level, the wealth is not equally distributed as happened in Europe. Even people with a high-
income have fears because of the weak social insurance system. Therefore, according to this 
theory, the U.S.’s religiosity is a deviant case.  
Cultural Traditions: The predominant religious beliefs, values, and practices in any 
society are rooted in long-standing cultural traditions and histories. Even though Norris and 
Inglehart do not use the term “popular religion,” I think we can interpret the premise of cultural 
traditions as referring to religion living in popular culture in society.   
In addition, some scholars interpret secularization as state neutrality, in which the state 
remains neutral on issues of religion and does not impose its conception of good upon its citizens 
(Madeley 2006: 64-65). In this approach, “there is room in a secular society for many different 
types of voices” (Naim 2008: 221). However, Naim identifies authoritarian secularism as the 
imposition of secularism by the state. Some examples of authoritarian secularism are Turkey, the 
Baath Party dictatorship in Iraq and Syria, Arab nationalism in Egypt under Nasser, the French 
model of Tunisia, socialist Algeria (ibid. p.182-183), current Uzbekistan (Hanks 2004: 319), 
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Russia after the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 and Soviet-installed Communist regimes, Albania 
under Enver Hoxha (especially after 1967 to his death in 1985 and after him until 1991), and Iran 
before the Islamic revolution in 1979.  Additionally, Vietnam, Cuba, China, and North Korea 
practice authoritarian secularism via “hostility” or “inadvertent insensitivity” to religion 
(Madeley 2009: 183-187; Fox 2006). 
In this part, I explained the so-called Islamic revival in terms of processes of 
democratization, liberalization, and modernization, rather than as a traditional retreat to religion. 
What seems new is the existence of a visible radical wing to this new religiosity, which seems to 
respond most directly to non-religious factors, notably Western political—rather than cultural—
influences and projects concerning Muslim countries. These factors will be discussed in the next 
part.  
 
3. Contribution of the West to Political (Radical) Islam 
 
One of the most important reasons for the radicalization of the Islamic movements is the 
Afghanistan experience. During the Cold War period, the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan 
legitimized armed conflict. Mujahidin (holy warriors) in Afghanistan demonstrated they could be 
successful against a modern army. International support for Afghan resistance led by the U.S. 
contributed to this legitimization. During the anti-Soviet jihad, little attention was given to the 
kind of Islamic regime that would follow in Afghanistan. When the Afghan war ended, some 
CIA-trained mujahidin began to use their U.S. supplied weapons and training against the West 
and Muslim governments (Noyon 2003: 34; Rubin 1997; Moghadam 2009: 37-61). When these 
mujahidin, coming from different Muslim countries, returned home after the war, they became 
dissatisfied with their un-Islamic governments (Haynes 2009: 166; Moghadam 2009: 46).  
Therefore, political Islam was not only the spontaneous result of religious revivalism by 
the peoples concerned but also a result of systematic support by outside imperial powers (Amin 
2008: 92). Along these lines, Samir Amin argues that even Hamas, at the beginning, was 
supported by Israel in order to weaken the secular and democratic currents of the Palestinian 
resistance (ibid p.91).  
The other contribution of the West to the politicization and radicalization of Islam is 
colonialism, to be discussed in the following section.  
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4. Global Jihad vs. Colonialism  
 
According to Esposito, many Muslims and Christians each saw the other group as determined to 
conquer, convert, or eradicate them. For many Westerners, Islam is the religion of the sword, of 
holy war or jihad. For many Muslims, Christianity is the religion of the Crusades and hegemonic 
ambitions. Hence, colonialism and post-colonialism have been perceived to be “the final 
Crusade” by both sides (2002: 75). 
As Edward Said (1994) pointed out, much of the West saw itself as advanced and 
progressive, and saw their colonies as backward. This perception of European superiority caused 
less embedment of the ruling class and Western colonizers in the local population of colonies 
(Freston 2009: 34).  
The continued presence of colonialism helped to radicalize political ideologies and 
practices across the political spectrum (Teti and Mura 2009: 96). In Egypt, Hasan al-Banna 
experienced both the British political and cultural presence and occupation in the 1920s. The 
threat of Westernization came both from the British and from the Westernized Egyptian ruling 
elites. Thus, Hasan al-Banna concluded that Westernization was the source of the most of 
Egypt’s political, social, and economic problems, so it was a major obstacle for Egypt and Islam. 
Thereby, he established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 to struggle against these problems 
(Esposito 1998: 137). 
All of the North African Muslim colonial countries—Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
and Sudan—went through similar experiences in resisting Western colonialism. These struggles 
for independence all were led by Sufi brotherhoods and Sufi sheiks during the 18th and 19th 
centuries. These groups used Islam to build a nationwide movement and to form a resistance 
tradition, which was alive as late as the 1940s and 1950s. Islam was a basic component and 
provided the ideological framework and symbols for mass politicization (Esposito 1998; Slisli 
2008: 99-100). These struggles were led by Hadj el-Mokrani, Sheikh el-Haddad, Sheikh 
Bouamama, and Abd al-Qadir against the French in Algeria; Abdullah Hassan against the British 
and the Italians in Somalia; el-Hadj Umar Tall in Guinea, Senegal and Mali; Mohammad as-
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Senussi against the Italians in Libya; Usman dan Fodio in Nigeria; and Ma’ al-’Aynayn in 
Morocco (Slisli 2008: 100; Marrouchi 2003: 46).10 
In short, from the late 18th century onwards, much of European military history was 
formed in conflict with Muslim populations—by the British in India, the French in North Africa, 
Russians in the Caucasus, the Dutch in the East Indies, the Spanish in Morocco, and Italians in 
Libya. Often, what we see today is directly related to these radical movements, which emerged in 
opposition to colonialism decades ago (Jenkins 2009: 9-11).  
Religion was/is not only used to legitimize Islamic leaders’ struggle against Western 
colonizers, but also it was/is used to legitimize and ensure the leaders’ sovereignty in their own 
countries against their citizens—as discussed in the following section.  
 
5. Religion as Legitimizing Force 
 
Religion is one of the most prominent legitimizers of the state. Until a few centuries ago, religion 
was the basis for the legitimacy of the state. However, Mohammed Bamyeh argues that religion 
was the only one among several sources of legitimate authority in Islamic societies (2004: 218). 
If we look at the Christian world, the Church, as God’s agent, was perceived to grant rulers the 
right to rule. Even though in modern times, religious institutions lost some of their power to 
other types of institutions, a strong residual element of religion continues to exist and continues 
to perform basic legitimizing functions (Fox 2009: 277-278).  
For example, at the inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama, he placed his right 
hand on a Bible and swore to honor his country. Also, Obama invited a diversity of clergy to 
speak and pray for America at his swearing-in ceremony.  
Both Muslim and non-Muslim states use religious discourse to legitimize their 
governances and their specific policies. For instance, history shows us that most American 
presidents used religious imagery to justify their domestic and foreign agendas. Ronald Reagan 
referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” In the build up to the Iraqi war, George W. 
Bush repeatedly used religious imagery in order to make the case for both that war and the war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Even though religious ideas played a significant role in forming the rebellion against colonizers, 
economic factors should not be ignored in order to understand these movements. See Bruce B. Lawrence 
(2000: 40-44); Hamid (2007: 374-375).  
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on terrorism (Fox 2009: 277). Even Bush’s use of the word “crusade” in a speech about the war 
against terrorism can be interpreted in this sense, even though he dropped the term later to enlist 
the support of Islamic governments. 
If we look at Muslim countries, although several Middle Eastern regimes from Algeria to 
Iraq are known as “secular,” there is actually no truly secular regime in the region. Governments 
desire to control powerful religious symbols and institutions in order to benefit from their 
prestige and to limit potential religious opposition. All governments in Muslim countries 
continue to retain aspects of religion in the state (Noyon 2003:22).  
As expressed by Esposito, rulers as diverse as Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (1969-
2011), Egypt’s Anwar Sadat (1970-81), Sudan’s Colonel Jafar al-Numayri (1969-85) and 
General Omar ul-Bashir (1989-   ), and Pakistan’s General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88) have used Islam 
to enhance their legitimacy and policies (2005: 167). 
In the name of Islam, nationalist ideologies such as the Arab nationalism/socialism of 
Egypt’s Gamal Abd al-Nassar and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, and Algeria’s Islamic socialism 
were initially legitimized by ulama (religious authorities). Governments obtained fatwas to 
justify new policies related to political, social, and economic life (Esposito 1998: 59, 134). 
Moroccan and Jordanian kings have used their lineage—which they trace back to the 
Prophet Mohammed’s family—to legitimize their rule. Also, the Saudis and other ruling Gulf 
families have attempted to appropriate religious symbolism and combined traditional and 
religious symbols to legitimize their rule (Teti and Mura 2009: 103-104).  
Even the most secular state of this region, Turkey, has used religion to legitimize some 
political activity. There is an official institution, the Department of Religious Affairs, established 
in 1924, which represents the highest religious authority in Turkey. 
In short, religion is used to legitimize or de-legitimize actions and policies and helps 
legitimize what from a Western perspective may appear to be purely “political” decisions (Teti 
and Mura 2009: 105). Political leaders or institutions use existing religious symbols for their own 
purposes in many instances, such as a crusade or jihad (Wessels 2009: 334). Thus, incorporating 
more religious symbols into government causes the politicizing of religion.  
If religion is a source of legitimate authority for some leaders and states, how does 
religion impact democratic claims, since those constitute another source of legitimization? Do 
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different legitimization sources conflict with each other under the same political form of 
government? Possible answers will be explored in the next section. 
 
6. Islam vs. Democracy or Democracy vs. Islam 
 
Religious systems’ compatibility with democracy is one of the most important and intensely 
debated questions of our times (Stepan 2001: 213). Today, both Muslims and non-Muslims 
question whether Islam and democracy are compatible. Some Muslims suspect that democracy is 
a “foreign construct” and against God’s sovereignty. In contrast, others tend to see Islam as 
inherently democratic (Bayat 2007: 4). In the same way, some non-Muslims believe that Islam 
and democracy are compatible; while others believe that they are not compatible.  
As I mentioned before, Islam does not specify a particular system of governance. The 
Quran advises shura (consultation) to make community decisions. The first four Rightly Guided 
Caliphs were chosen by this form of consultation. However, even though historically Islam can 
be demonstrated to have democratic aspects, some suspect that Islam and democracy are not 
compatible. This view tends to assume that Islamists have a hidden agenda and that when 
political Islam comes to power, Islamists will use violence and liquidate other groups (Amin 
2008: 85). 
But there is no hard evidence to support the view that Islamists, once elected to 
parliamentary office, would overturn the system (Noyon 2003: 48). Many analyses have 
concluded that Islam is not the cause of the lack of democracy in predominantly Muslim 
countries, and there is little evidence that Islam and democracy are incompatible (Pettersson 
2009: 250). Some other potential reasons for the lack of democracy include the mixed legacies of 
recent colonial rule, anti-colonial struggle, poverty in some countries, and oil-based wealth in 
others. All these factors should be considered in order to understand the persistence of 
authoritarian regimes in Islamic regions (Markoff 2009: 69). Also, the international community 
frequently provides authoritarian regimes both legitimacy and material resources (Cavatorta 
2009: 330). 
If we look at Islamic countries that have parliamentary systems, we see that it was the 
regime that overturned pluralism, not the Islamists, as happened in Algeria. Also, in Tunisia, 
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Islamic parties were outlawed.  In Turkey, Islamist parties have always been under pressure of 
sanction and were outlawed several times (Noyon 2003).  
In short, Middle Eastern regimes use the “Islamist threat” as an excuse to limit 
democratization and ban religious parties along with other kinds of parties (Schwedler 1998 
quoted in Mohseni and Wilcox 2009: 223; Lee 2000: 18). 
On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan 
were permitted to participate in elections. When they were allowed to participate in political life, 
the process diminished their radicalism and contributed to their normalization as political actors 
(Esposito 1997: 27). In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has experienced 
the same transition. The political party out of which the AKP developed, the Welfare Party (RP), 
was more conservative before coming to power. The RP softened its ideas during its government 
administration in 1996. When the RP was outlawed in 1998, one of its successors, the AKP, 
became more liberal and won the elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 to become the ruling party 
until now.  
One of the most important problems regarding democracy in the Middle East is that it has 
almost always seemed a secondary goal. The ruling elites see democracy as an instrument for 
serving higher values: secularism for Turkey, nationalism for many Arab countries, and religion 
for Iran. Many of the ruling class have argued that their citizens are not mature enough to 
exercise democratic rights and that their countries require a more limited system, a “guided 
democracy” (Noyon 2003: 76). 
However, the only way to truly test the behavior of Islamists in political systems is by 
allowing them to participate in the political life under the same rules and standards as other 
groups (Noyon 2003: 49). And when Islamists are allowed to participate in democratic political 
life, it seems that they adapt to it.  
Since the late 1980s, Islamic groups have won a significant number of seats in 
parliaments in countries as diverse as Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, 
Kuwait, and Pakistan. The varieties of Islamic activist groups and experiences are a testimony to 
the flexibility of political Islam (Esposito 1997: 4). Therefore, the next step is to examine some 
of these Islamic activists and their movements. 
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7. Islamic Movements  
 
Islamic movements are a part of the political, social, and cultural environments of their societies. 
Therefore, they are very diverse. Islam does not have a central authority or clergy class.11 Islamic 
movements are not directed from a specific group or place. Even though some Islamic 
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami have expanded into 
different Muslim countries, they do not have a central authority. When these movements expand 
into other countries, they gain different forms and meanings. Also, as time passes, they change 
group identities, framing, aims, targets, and enemies. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
established in 1928 to re-Islamize society against Westernization and colonialism; however, by 
and by, it became a movement against secular autocratic (or democratic) regimes.  
Also, many non-religious movements employ Islamic symbols, slogans, parties and 
actors to legitimate their struggle and mobilize popular support (Esposito 2009: 2-3). These 
movements increase especially in moments of crisis, threats, popular discontent, foreign 
occupation, or even of natural disasters. Their leaders, who were previously politicians, 
diplomats, or members of the military, are being legitimized during crises (Slisli 2008: 101-102).   
Contrary to popular stereotypes, most activists of Islamic organizations and movements 
are young products of the modern educational system. They come from the recently urbanized 
middle or lower middle classes. They are a product of the modern world. Although they would 
like to capture the original intentions of religion, they do not intend to recreate the conditions of 
7th century Arabia. Most of them are university graduates from different disciplines: Hasan 
Turabi of the Sudan is a lawyer trained in Khartoum, London, and Paris; Necmettin Erbakan of 
Turkey studied mechanical engineering in West Germany; Hasan al-Banna of Egypt, founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, was a teacher educated and employed in secular schools; Sayyid Qutb, 
the intellectual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 60s, also was a teacher and 
also studied in the U.S. Most Islamic activists received their political education not in religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Because of its centralized and unitary form, it might be thought that the Iranian Shia has a central 
authority similar to the Catholic Church. However, in Iran, “…every Mujtahid has judicial and spiritual 
authority for his own followers, and while there is a hierarchy of status, this does not translate into a 
hierarchy of authority” (Zubaida 2000: 63).  
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schools but on university campuses. Many are serious, pious, highly motivated people who have 
become dissatisfied by the socioeconomic realities of their societies. Unlike some of their peers 
or parents, their experience of modernization has not led them to embrace it, but to criticize and 
reject its domination that is created and maintained by Western states. Hence, their goal is to 
“Islamicize modernity”—to compose an alternative modernity that combines basic elements of 
modernity alongside with Islamic tradition (Esposito 2005: 167-168; Roy 1994: 3; Kurzman 
2002: 13-14, 17).  
Islamic movements generally fall under two categories: movements that involve politics 
and have a political agenda and movements without a political agenda. These movements can be 
violent or non-violent. However, generally, non-political movements are non-violent.  
Most Islamic movements are non-violent (Teti and Mura 2009: 103-104) and non-
political; that is why we do not know about many of them. Political and violent movements 
receive more attention and more coverage in media and academia.  
A movement being non-political does not always mean that it or its members never 
engage in politics or that its members do not have any political ideas. Members may support 
different political parties. Also, non-political movements do not imply that participants do not 
use other collective challenge strategies, such as media and petitions to influence political parties 
and their political decisions.  
As I mentioned in the previous section, authoritarian governments use secularist doctrine 
as a weapon against Islamists by equating Islam with fundamentalism and extremism, and setting 
secularism as a prerequisite to democracy (Ghannouchi 2000 quoted in Esposito 2009: 14). 
Governments use varied types of coercion to control real or perceived Islamic threats 
(Haynes 2009: 166). These restrictions have both direct and indirect effects on religiously 
motivated violence (Finke 2009: 9). As expressed by Finke, despite 83 percent of all nations 
promising religious freedoms in their constitutions, 64 percent of the nations have two or more 
laws restricting the practice, profession, or selection of religion. Societal restrictions on religion 
and religious social movements have strong, positive, and direct effects on religiously motivated 
violence. Even though government restrictions on religion have no direct influence on religious 
violence, they are a strong predictor of the societal restrictions on and the isolation of religious 
groups (2009: 7, 25). 
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As a result, autocratic and despotic governments help to radicalize religious groups and to 
channel their energy into violent directions. That one of these violent directions is 
fundamentalism—as perceived by many people—will be argued next.  
 
8. Fundamentalism 
 
Many equate (Islamic) religious violence with fundamentalism. As a term fundamentalism is 
used primarily to describe religious protest movements and militant groups. Islamic 
fundamentalism has also been interpreted as populism, a Third World anti-imperialist movement, 
and as a backward movement (Riesebrodt 1993: 1-3). Fundamentalist movements exist in all 
religions and do not exclusively belong to Islam. They are to be found worldwide (ibid p.2). 
If we look at why religious movements are interpreted as symptoms of social 
backwardness, we see the same sentiment in secularist theories, which I mentioned before. 
Secularists equate progress with secularization and underestimate the significance of religious 
phenomena. As a result, religion is regarded as the relic of a past era. So, every movement that 
tries to spread the religious phenomena seems to be a backward movement (Riesebrodt 1993: 3).  
However, fundamentalism literally means “a movement or attitude stressing strict and 
literal adherence to a set of basic principles.” Before fundamentalism gained its current political 
meaning, this strict adherence to basic principles did not imply backwardness. For instance, 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) and his followers called themselves salafis, which would 
mean fundamentalist today, because they wanted to go back to the religious sources to challenge 
existing traditions. While al-Afghani struggled to return to original Islam as he saw it, his 
purpose was not to return to the past, but to formulate new Islamic responses to the changing 
conditions of Muslim countries in the light of Islamic principles. Thus, Islam can serve as a 
cultural and political identity reference in modern Muslim societies (Esposito 2005: 127-130).  
In short, all kinds of political Islamic movements must be seen as products of their 
cultural and political environment and the result of certain political and social conditions.  
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C. CONCLUSION 	  
In this chapter, I show how the literature portrays Islamic groups as diverse and without a single 
Islamic ideology. Almost every group understands and interprets the Islamic agenda in its own 
way. Even non-Islamic groups, governments, and states use religious discourse to legitimize 
their actions and politics. So, “the point about ‘Political Islam’ is not that it is ‘Islamic,’ but that 
it is political” (Teti and Mura 2009: 109). That is why I think “political Islam” is not an 
appropriate term to describe these movements; the terms Islam in politics or political aspects of 
Islam are more appropriate to describe Islamic movements and the relationship between Islam 
and the state. 
When we look at the roots of political Islam, Islam does not specify any particular system 
of governance that all Muslims would agree with; Islam advises shura (consultation) to make 
community decisions, and Muslims generally regard the period following the first three decades 
of Islam to entail some deviation from an idealized image in which the umma had more of a say 
in its affairs. After this time period, as one would expect with any popular idea, Islam began to 
be politicized by the ruling class to legitimize their own governance.  
When there were more democratizing pressures in society during the last century, 
autocratic regimes changed their tactics. Previously they had used religious discourse to 
legitimize their rule, but in the past 50 years, they began to use mostly an illusive fundamentalist 
or Islamist threat to consolidate their rule. Therefore, in many cases, it is not the Islamists or 
Islam that opposes democracy and the pluralist system, but secular autocratic regimes that want 
to maintain power. They simply want to continue their governance and use an Islamic threat as a 
weapon to legitimize and secure their existence.  
As we see with examples of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jamaat-i Islami in 
Pakistan, the Welfare Party (RP) and Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, when 
Islamic groups were allowed to participate in political life, the process diminished their 
radicalism and contributed to their normalization as political actors. As expressed by Carrie R. 
Wickham, “although the Brotherhood entered the political system in order to change it, it ended 
up being changed by the system” (2011 para. 6).  
My explanations do not mean that radical Islam does not exist. Every religious or non-
religious group can have radical branches. Islam is not an exception to this rule. However, we 
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should not forget that even though some groups can be seen as Islamist, when we investigate 
them closely, we see that their motivation is not always religious, and moreover, some have 
never had a religious agenda.    
Theories and anxieties about the future of secularism can help to exaggerate the phobia of 
an Islamic threat. Secularists often assume that religion will be extinct one day and are 
threatened when they see it does not happen. After the 1950s, the proportion of religious people 
did not increase in general (see Finke and Stark 2005: 23; Hadden 1987: 596-600; Carkoglu and 
Toprak 2007: 63), but due to liberalization and democratization in state and public life, there was 
an increase in devout acts in public and political life, as we see in examples of Turkey and other 
Muslim countries. Secularist elites mostly are not pleased to see more devout acts in public and 
especially in political life. In one instance in 2004, the former chairman of Turkey's Union of Bar 
Associations, Ozdemir Ozok, said that he could not accept having a Prime Minister who had 
graduated from an Imam-Hatip high school (vocational schools that train government employed 
imams).  
Since coming to power in 2002, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party has been 
in heated debates because of their leaders’ Islamic roots. Issues include the following: the 
wearing of headscarves by the wives of Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul; the attempt 
to allow students to wear headscarves in universities; the attempt to allow Imam-Hatip school 
graduates to be considered for entrance to universities on an equal basis with other students; the 
enactment of a “zero problem” approach with Turkey’s neighboring countries—Iraq, Iran, and 
Syria—and an increasing relationship with Middle Eastern countries instead of European 
countries. All of these are interpreted, especially by opposition parties and other 
secularist/Kemalist groups, as an axis shift in Turkish policy, a policy that almost caused the 
disbanding of the AKP by the Constitutional Court in 2008.  
I argue for further examination of the conflict between the AKP on one side and the 
secularists/Kemalists on the other as a power struggle among socio-economic classes. Together 
with the military, some other secular institutions, such as the judiciary and the universities, 
which make up a powerful elite class, do not want to lose their power against the newly 
emerging middle-class.  
Turkish politics offers an example of how authoritarian regimes, as I described earlier, 
often first use religious propaganda and later religious threats to continue their rule. The elite 
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class uses so-called religious threats to continue their reign of power. Current uprisings—Arab 
Spring—in Egypt and other Middle Eastern nations exemplify the unhappiness of the people 
with this status quo. The new generation wants a change to a democracy, and while some of 
these young people have religious concerns, their agenda is not necessarily religious.  
The class-related nature of this conflict in Turkey can be seen in the terms used. The so-
called elite class condemns supporters of the AKP for their ignorance, illiteracy, and poverty. 
The elite, who argue that the lower class sells its votes for a bag of coal, question why their votes 
are equal to the votes of shepherds on a mountain.  To support their position, the elite cite and 
praise Aziz Nesin, the famous atheist writer, who claims that 60 percent of the Turkish nation is 
dumb, referring to the referendum on the AKP’s proposed constitutional amendments, which 
gained 58 percent of the voters’ support on the ballot in September 2010. These accusations 
show that the elite do not want to lose their power to the middle class.  
The biases of the elite class shape the existing scholarly literature that comes from inside 
Turkey today. Even though this literature shows an awareness of the power struggle in Turkey, 
this awareness is not spontaneous; instead, it represents a process towards education and 
modernity.  Even devout people in Turkey now have more access to the media, especially the 
Internet, and more opportunity to express their views.  These religious individuals, as well as the 
more liberal and conservative classes of Turkey, now contribute to the native literature. 
However, such literature should focus on facts, not a repetition of the fears or “red lines” of the 
so-called elite. 
The stabilization of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey, as well as in 
other Islamic countries, depends on diminishing the fear of religious rulers’ changing the ruling 
system and destroying democracy through the rule of Islamic law. Such stabilization and 
elimination of fear are only possible if we look at other societal, economic, and political factors 
along with religion. Such an examination will show that, while the people of Turkey value the 
spiritual and traditional aspects of religion, they are most concerned about their economic 
situation and lack of employment, not their religious rights. However, I do not ignore importance 
of religious discourse in Turkish politics; some people understand Islam in the same way that 
some French and Iranian revolutionaries understood democracy (see Kurzman 2008): as a means 
to better living conditions. 
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II. INTRODUCING THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  	  
To an unexpected degree, religion and state relations have rapidly changed during the last two 
decades in Turkey. At the end of the 1990s, the Turkish state saw the increasing presentation of 
Islam in public life as a threat to its secular identity and became harsh on religious issues such as 
religious education and wearing headscarves in public institutions. However, when the 
conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the Turkish state’s 
attitude against religion gradually changed and finally the state renounced its negative attitude. In 
this study, I examine how this relationship between religion and the state has changed in regards 
to religious rights in Turkey in year 2002-2012. 
Since coming to power in 2002, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
has engaged in heated debates because of its leaders’ Islamic roots. Symptomatic of the resulting 
transformations was the attention paid to such issues as the wearing of headscarves by the wives 
of Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul; the wearing of headscarves by women in 
universities; the ability of Imam-Hatip school (vocational schools that train government-
employed imams) graduates to be considered for entrance to universities on an equal basis with 
other students. Significant also was the new “zero problems” approach with Turkey’s 
neighboring countries—Iraq, Iran, and Syria—as well as an increasing relationship with Middle 
Eastern countries instead of European countries, which became more popular especially after 
2005 when public opinion in Turkey seemed tired of the stalemate produced by the country's 
rejection to be full member of the EU, and the AKP government found more reason to start 
exploring alternative politics in the region. Opposition parties and other secularist/Kemalist 
groups interpret all these ongoing issues as signs of a basic departure from the basic project of 
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building a modern Turkey, and fought these initiatives to the point of almost causing the 
disbanding of the AKP by the Constitutional Court in 2008.  
The debates became more heated during the general election times of 2002, 2007, and 
2011; during the referendums of 2007 and 2010; and during the local elections of 2004 and 2009. 
These major events and debates surrounding the elections and referendums show that the 
question of state-religion relations in Turkey was and still is very lively, and that a part of 
Turkish society does not welcome the ongoing transformation in that relationship.  
Studying this relationship during the last decade is important since it has consequences 
on both national and international levels. On the national level, the AKP’s ongoing support of 
religious issues, as seen in examples of allowing headscarf wearing in universities and 
supporting education of religion, caused criticism and increased the fears of some seculars and 
Kemalists about the future of Turkish democracy. Since 2002, the same issues on religious rights 
have been discussed in Turkish politics repeatedly. On the other hand, the experience of 
governing challenged the AKP leaders’ Islamic ideology. They “took the [Islamic] National 
View’s shirt off” as expressed by P.M. Erdogan. This new governing experience would channel 
Islamic politics in new directions.  
On the international level, studying the relationship between religion and the state in 
Turkey presents a unique study due to Turkey’s geopolitical position: providing a bridge 
between Europe and Asia; functioning as a secular state with a Muslim majority population; 
continuing to desire membership in the European Union (EU); and—especially in the aftermath 
of the Arab spring—being perceived elsewhere as a possible democratic Muslim model. Turkey 
being a possible democratic Muslim model for other Muslim majority countries is an issue that 
has been discussed in the literature before the Erdogan government. However, the increasing soft 
power of Turkey, the popularity of Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party among Arab 
nations, the Arab spring, and the rise of Islamic parties in the Arab world increased the 
possibility that the Turkish experiment would be a possible model to follow.  
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B. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS  	  
1. Islam in Politics or Political Islam  
 
In the larger picture, Islamist movements are those that provide religion with an explicit political 
purpose. Islamist movements oppose a status quo that their adherents believe is inherently unjust 
(Teti and Mura 2009: 92). In Turkey, most secular people think that political Islam means the 
adherents of this movement will take over the state and enforce religious rules and establish 
Islamic law. However, what must be considered is that the term “political Islam” should not be 
thought of as having only negative connotations when describing the Islamic movement or its 
adherents. It must be thought of as having a broader, more fluid connotation since there is not a 
single “Islamic answer” to all political questions (Anderson 2009: 199-200). Every group may 
understand and interpret the sacred texts according to their own agenda and Islamic knowledge. 
Many Islamic groups choose not to be involved in politics and do not have a political agenda. 
Some groups use politics to expand their ideas without violence. A few groups can use violence. 
Therefore, there is not a monolithic “political Islam” just as we do not talk about a monolithic 
political Christianity. It depends on adherents’ understanding, interpretation, and geographical 
and political environment.  
 
2. The State 
 
People frequently talk about the state as a monolithic entity but in fact the state consists of 
different organs that have different agendas and styles of control. As a result, when we talk about 
state and religion relations, we should not understand the “state” as synonymous with 
“government” and should not think that laws and their interpretation and implementation are the 
result of governments’ actions alone. Too often people associate the government as the entire 
state. But a state’s decisions should not be understood as the actions of a government alone. A 
government is not always the most powerful decision-making body in a country and does not act 
in a vacuum; a state’s decisions can come from the influence of civil society, too, which consists 
of the entire ruling class and institutions. Even though differences are present from country to 
country, judicial bodies, universities, the military, the media, the high affluent class, large 
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national and international companies, and sometimes religious leaders and artists help compose 
the state ideology and its actions along with the government.  
 
3. Conservative, Conservative Democracy 
 
For my study, it is also important to consider the terms conservative and conservative 
democracy, because they both help to define the ruling government, which has been in power 
since 2002 and has had influence over many segments of the Turkish politics. The leaders of the 
AKP described themselves as a conservative party that follows conservative democracy. In a 
2005 handbook of the government performance, P.M. Erdogan explains conservative democracy 
as “a political-intelligent project in which, in simple terms, heads towards building a libertarian 
political order by leaning for support of the nation and their values as well as in accordance with 
the universal norms of democracy… the idea of conservative democracy corresponds to the 
healthy synthesis of ‘tradition’ and  ‘newness.’ In this case, new values will not clash with 
traditions but will gain a dynamism which completes one another.” 
This term was a foreign term for Turkish politics. It was meant to show that the AKP was 
not a party along the lines of the National View movement and did not have any Islamist 
ideology. Since conservatism is associated with religious reactionism in Turkey, the founders of 
the AKP have preferred not to define the party only as conservative (Cagliyan-Icener 2009: 600) 
and they coined conservative democracy as a result. Since Erdogan claimed that he abandoned 
his Islamist ideas, he needed to show it with his party's politics. His first aim was being 
pragmatic rather than what the term actually means. Therefore, the term “conservative 
democracy” has served a broad function in Turkish politics. In this sense, conservative 
democracy means being open to embracing new ideas without abandoning traditional values in 
Turkish politics.  
 
4. Post-Modern Coup/Intervention in 1997, February 28 Process 
 
While pro-Islamic Welfare Party and its leader Prof. Necmettin Erbakan was in power, on 
February 28, 1997, the military controlled National Security Council (MGK) presented the 
cabinet with a long list of demands—18 in total (so-called “official advice”). The aim of these 
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demands was to restrain the influence of Islamists in the economy, in education and inside the 
state apparatus. To summarize: schools controlled by religious groups should be inspected and 
transferred to the Ministry of Education; a transition should be made to eight-year obligatory 
elementary education (its aim to close middle-level section of imam-hatip schools and preventing 
to attend year-run Quran-based courses); Quran-based courses should be inspected and 
supervised; media outlets supporting military personnel who have been fired because of 
involvement in fundamentalist activities should be placed under scrutiny; codes on attire should 
be observed; acts and statements insulting Ataturk should be punished. In addition, a committee 
was set up to effectively implement the MGK's decisions. In the meantime, the military 
pressured Prime Minister Erbakan to step down. In this involvement, the military did not seize 
power but used other state bureaucracy, the judiciary, business associations, and media groups to 
push the Islamist Welfare Party’s government (1996-1997) to resign. Observers among Turkish 
journalists coined the phrase “post-modern coup” to describe these developments (Turker Alkan, 
13 June 1997, Radikal, and Cengiz Candar, 28 June 1997, Sabah). Implementation of the MGK 
decisions (regarding persecution of Islamic groups and their institutions, religious education, and 
strict implementation of headscarf ban) was named February 28 process by referring the meeting 
day of the MGK on February 28, 1997.  
 
5. Quran Courses 
 
Quran/Quran-based courses are the general name of particular courses that were outside of 
school education. These courses are mostly focused teaching of reading of Quran from Arabic 
scripts and memorizing Quran instead of giving a general religious education since the Ottoman 
State. Teaching the reading of Quran from Arabic scripts might take a few weeks to a few 
months. Meanwhile, memorizing Quran might take one to three years. In recent years, these 
courses started to include more options in religious education. They also added some classes 
similar to public school education; however, they are not an alternative to school education at all 
and their diplomas do not have equivalence to even an elementary school diploma. These Quran-
based courses should not be confused with elective Quran classes in the primary and secondary 
education, which entered the school curricula in 2012.  
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C. BACKGROUND 	  
When the Ottoman State collapsed in 1923, modernists and Islamists struggled together to re-
establish the country of Turkey. After the formation of the Republic of Turkey (1923), many 
Islamists withdrew from politics because of the new state’s attitude against religion. These 
discriminatory attitudes forced Islamists within Turkey to lead their lives “underground” (Narli, 
2003: 125).  Furthermore, due to the secular input from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a leader during 
Turkey’s War of Independence and one of the founders of Turkey, many other religious 
individuals withdrew their support from the secular factions of the nation. 
Berna Turam, a scholar of political sociology, acknowledges the dissatisfaction of the 
religious population within Turkey when he writes, “A large group of founding fathers regarded 
religion as ‘an important force in establishing the larger Turkish nation’” (2004: 353). Many 
devout citizens, including Said Nursi, who was the founder of the Nur movement and the 
ancestor of the Gulen movement, believed that unity could only exist if religion and the teaching 
of it became in integral part of the country. Without a strong religious foundation, the non-
Turkish Muslims of the region (i.e. cities with a majority of Kurdish people) "would not feel true 
brotherhood for the Turks." These diverse groups needed to find a way to co-exist because the 
success of Turkey depended upon cooperation and solidarity among the different nations living 
within Turkey (Nursi 1958 [2004]).  
Despite the recognition that the acceptance of Islam would lead to brotherhood, Turkey 
initially moved towards secularization by reducing the power of Islam within the state and even 
eradicating it from Turkish life. When modern Turkey achieved independence in 1923, the 
leaders did the following to minimize or reduce the role of religion in the country: abolished the 
caliph (a ruler of the Muslim community similar to the Pope within the Catholic community) in 
1924; closed dervish lodges and Islamic monasteries in 1925; revoked the second section of the 
Constitution that mentioned “the official religion of Turkey is Islam” in 1928; banned the veil 
and fez in 1934; and constitutionalized that “Turkey is a secular state” in 1937.  All of these 
actions, especially the abolishment of the caliph, increased the concerns of devout people about 
this new government. As the people grew more anxious about the government’s lack of a 
	  	  
53	  
religious ideology, they organized a rebellion in early 1925 in eastern Turkey. The secular 
establishment of Turkey exemplifies this rebellion as how religious movements tend to struggle 
with the government to return to Islamic laws and an Islamic state within Turkey.  
Hence, Kemalists/secularists have seen religion as a threat for their power and have 
interpreted all demands for greater religious freedom as an attack on secularism and on the 
Republic itself.  As a result, the secular groups perceive the expression of religious interests 
through religious organizations or political parties as alarming, rather than as a natural outcome 
of electoral politics or democratic rights (Toprak 1981: 3). Therefore, religion itself has not led 
to the disproportionate impact of fragmentation on Turkish politics. Instead, it is the perceived 
threat of religion to Kemalist secularism that has been responsible for religion’s politicization 
(Toprak 1981: 123).  
As the above paragraphs indicate, religious movements functioned under pressure during 
the first three decades of modern Turkey; because of this tense situation, religious groups often 
went underground. After 20 years of one-party rule, the establishment of new parties was again 
allowed in 1946.  Four years later, one of these new parties, the Democrat Party, which was more 
tolerant of religion, won election by a significant majority; religious people and groups then 
began to reappear. Many scholars interpret this religious emergence as the Islamic revival; 
however, it seems that this reappearance is more related to the end of the one-party rule and the 
subsequent growth of freedom and democracy.  
After the establishment of the multi-party system, parties were forced to compete for 
power, and Islam became an important factor in attracting votes. The pious rural periphery, 
which had largely been excluded from politics since the foundation of the republic in 1923, now 
became an important political constituency whose interests had to be taken into consideration by 
conservative political parties (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008: 35).  
Despite the multi-party system, Turkey’s democratization process has not been easy. 
Since the 1950s, tensions have marked the relations between the civilian government and the 
military in Turkey. The country has experienced three military interventions (coups) since the 
establishment of multi-party democracy: 1960 (between 1960-61), 1971 (between 1971-73), and 
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1980 (between 1980-83), and one “post-modern intervention” 12  in 1997. After these 
interventions, the military returned power back to the politicians in a few years.  
According to Dagi, the Turkish military embodies two conflicting political traditions. 
First, there is a deep-rooted tradition of intervention in politics, which is largely brought about by 
the military’s self-perception as “the guardian of the state” and its distrust of politicians. This 
self-perception legitimized and raised the military’s intervention. Second, there is the legacy of 
the military as a “modernizer” (1996: 124). This second reason for intervention has similarities 
with the intellectual class described by Kurzman (2008). The military, as a part of the 
enlightened-intellectual class, had and continues to have the mission to modernize the state and 
people. The intellectual class feared that any attempts towards democratization prior to the 
establishment of mass education would have dire consequences. When this part of the 
intellectual class did not like the democratic results, it did not hold back from intervention to 
enlighten society to benefit the masses. It is not surprising to see the same thoughts among 
today’s intellectual class in Turkey. According to this class, ordinary people are cahil 
(ignorant/incapable)—they lack the ability to make a wise decision.  
The military’s interactions with political Islam have varied. The 1960 and 1971 
interventions were conducted basically because the political elites had drifted from Kemalism 
and had, therefore, lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the intellectuals and military elites (Heper 
1994: 19). 
After the 1960 intervention, the military turned power back over to the politicians in 1961 
and returned to the barracks, but only after instituting a number of reforms that strengthened its 
political role. One of the most important reforms was the creation of the National Security 
Council (MGK), a body dominated by the military and entrusted with ensuring that the 
government’s domestic and foreign policies were in line with the basic tenets of the Kemalist 
revolution, particularly secularism. While technically an advisory body, the MGK 
institutionalized the role of the military in the political process and provided a mechanism by 
which the military could transmit its views directly to the civilian leadership (Rabasa and 
Larrabee 2008: 36). Therefore, the 1960 Constitution legitimized the bureaucracy and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The 1997 intervention was different than the previous ones. This time the military never came to power. 
Instead of dissolving the parliament or withdrawing the constitution, the Turkish military pressured pro-
Islamic Prime Minister Erbakan to step down.	  The military used politicians to implement their requests by 
pressure.	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intellectuals as one source of sovereignty in addition to the Turkish people (Mardin 2006 
[1973]). 
Even though secularist thinking catalyzed the 1960 intervention, Islamic groups increased 
their voice again in a few years. When the military thought that the Islamists’ voice had 
increased too much, the 1971 intervention attempted to stop raising Islamic ideology again.  
After the 1971 intervention, left and communist movements increased in the 1970s. The 
1980 intervention’s first aim was to stop these extremist left and communist groups. As 
expressed by the first communiqué the goal was “to preserve the integrity of the country, to 
restore national union and togetherness, to avert a possible civil war, to re-establish the authority 
of the state and to eliminate all the factors that prevent the normal functioning of the democratic 
order” (Dagi 1996: 125). Hence, the military used Islam and Islamic values against these groups 
to create balance. Great emphasis was given to religion in the national education system: 
Religion and Ethics courses were made mandatory in elementary schools and high schools and 
many Quran-based schools/courses were opened. However, after a decade, the military and other 
secular groups realized that this balance broke down to favor Islamic groups.  
The 1997 intervention tried to stop the increasing power of political Islam. This 
intervention was named “the post-modern intervention/coup” because this time the military 
never came to power. They used politicians to implement their requests by pressure. Many 
Quran-based courses closed, middle-level section of imam-hatip schools were closed, and 
women’s headscarves were banned in universities and public places.  
The short democratic life of Turkey shows that it swings between secular/military 
intellectualism and Islamic values. After the Justice and Development’s (AKP) success in 
general elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011, it seems this pendulum again is swinging toward the 
Islamic side.  
According to one of the prominent Turkish sociologists, Nilufer Gole, in the post-1980 
period, a dialogue was established among the proponents of different ideologies. For the first 
time, Islamists and secularists debated around the same table. These debates assured pluralism 
(1994: 214).  
Actually, we can see this optimism in the writings of many scholars, journalists, and 
writers at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1995, Ustun Erguder wrote in his article on the Turkish 
Party System and the Future of the Turkish Democracy that: 
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Turkey seems to be completing its first ten-year cycle without a military 
intervention. No matter which date you take as your milestone… Turks appear to 
have broken the pendulum between take-overs and transitions. The question 
facing an analyst is not the probability or the timing of another military 
intervention. I believe Turkey has buried military interventions, for the 
foreseeable future, in the depths of her history. 
When we think that after two years from these statements Turkish democracy lived 
through a post-modern intervention, we can suggest that political scientists’ foreseeable future 
was very limited about Turkish democracy and its relationship with the religion.  
Actually, the 1997 intervention was different than the previous ones. Instead of 
dissolving the parliament or withdrawing the constitution, the Turkish military pressured pro-
Islamic Prime Minister Erbakan to step down. For this reason, the events were labeled a “post-
modern intervention/coup.”   
In 1997, the military used the National Security Council to implement their requests 
instead of intervening directly. The Islamist Welfare Party gained 21.4 percentages of votes in 
1995 elections and its party leader Prof. Necmettin Erbakan became Prime Minister in a coalition 
government. The secular establishment of Turkey did not welcome this incident but did not 
intervene directly. However, in the last days of January 1997 something happened that we could 
call “the beginning of the end.” The Sincan Municipality in Ankara held an event about 
Jerusalem, attended by the mayor and the Iranian Ambassador. A play staged that night changed 
the entire milieu in Turkey. It was claimed that the Iranian ambassador made a call for the 
implementation of Sharia. The newspapers argued that the Mayor said: "We will achieve our 
goals by remaining patient. The headscarf is our flag." (Sundays Zaman; March 01, 2009).  
After this event, the military urgently called on civilians to take immediate action. A few 
days later, in February 4, tanks traveled down the streets of this city. The General Staff 
announced that this was a normal activity, recalling that this was a routine repeated every six 
months. However, this time, reporters were called to record the scene. It was obvious that this 
action was not a routine. It was a warning to the government. Consequently, the February 28 
process began at the end of this month.  
The General Staff invited members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals, the Council of State, public prosecutors and judges, university rectors and journalists to 
its headquarters where they were briefed about recent developments and fundamentalism. It was 
argued at the meeting that Turkey was transforming into a different country like Algeria. The 
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military representatives stressed that they would rely on coercive measures if needed. (Sundays 
Zaman; March 01, 2009).  
On February 28, 1997, the MGK presented the cabinet with a long list of demands—18 in 
total (so-called “official advice”). The aim of these demands was to restrain the influence of 
Islamists in the economy, in education and inside the state apparatus (Zurcher 2004: 300). To 
summarize: schools controlled by religious sects should be inspected and transferred to the 
Ministry of Education; a transition should be made to eight-year obligatory elementary education 
(its aim to close middle-level section of imam-hatip schools and preventing to attend year-run 
Quran-based courses); Quran courses should be inspected and supervised; media outlets 
supporting military personnel who have been fired because of involvement in fundamentalist 
activities should be placed under scrutiny; codes on attire should be observed; acts and 
statements insulting Ataturk should be punished. In addition, a committee was set up to 
effectively implement the MGK's decisions. 
Eventually, on June 18, 1997, the Welfare Party (RP) leader and Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan resigned from his post. Afterwards, the Constitutional Court closed the party 
for "acting against the secular principle of the republic'' on January 1998. The court, whose 
decisions are irreversible, also banned Erbakan from politics for several years (revoked in 2009), 
along with some other RP politicians. 
After 1997, the military changed its defense concept. At this time, priority was given to 
combating internal threats coming from Islamic fundamentalism rather than guarding against 
external dangers. Nevertheless, the military was aware that previous interventions had failed to 
provide a lasting solution. For this reason, the military did not want to intervene without trying 
all other methods such as pressuring media and civil society organizations; and they succeeded.  
During the decade following this intervention, an atmosphere of fear seems to have 
maintained its effects on Turkey. Almost all decisions made by the National Security Council 
(MGK) were still in effect in the country until mid-2000s.  
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D. IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 	  
The mosques are our barracks, 
the minarets our bayonets,  
the domes our helmets,  
and the faithful our soldiers. 
What did you feel when you read these lines? Did they sound to you like a jihad call 
against unbelievers? Or did they sound to you like the expression of a devout Muslim’s wish to 
protect his religion and stand up for it? Or did you feel religious hatred? Would you feel different 
if you heard them fifteen years ago? Readers may have different responses; so does the Turkish 
state. The reaction of the state against the poem has differed during the last fourteen years in 
Turkey. The change of the Turkish state’s behavior against these lines illuminates the fact that 
the Turkish state has becoming more tolerant of religion. 
These verses are from a textbook that was recommended to students and teachers in 
elementary and high schools in Turkey by the Ministry of National Education. The verses were a 
part of a poem that is believed to belong to a famous Turkish-Islamic poet, Ziya Gokalp, and 
were written during Turkey’s Independence War at the beginning of the 20th century. When then-
Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan read the poem in a rally in late 1997, the Turkish court 
sentenced him to ten months in prison for inciting religious hatred. The Supreme Court of 
Appeals also approved the sentence. Erdogan was forced to give up his mayoral position and 
served four months in prison in 1999. The conviction included a political ban that prevented him 
from even claiming the head of a local government in a village. However, Erdogan is Prime 
Minister of Turkey now (as year of 2013). He has held this position since 2003 and he won the 
last three general elections. He was not even supposed to be a mayor in a small town again, but 
he rules Turkey now. After his third electoral victory, Erdogan read the same poem again in July 
of 2011, fourteen years later since 1997. He read the poem in front of Parliament and received a 
standing ovation from most Parliament members.  This time no prosecutors accused him of 
religious hatred. No state apparatus became alarmed. The media did not claim any religious 
hatred and only reported it as Erdogan reading the same poem again. Did the meaning of the 
poem change during the last fourteen years? How is it possible that the same verses 
recommended in textbooks in the 1990s incited religious hatred and brought imprisonment at the 
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end of the 1990s, but did not cause any problem in the 2010s even though they were read by the 
same person, P.M. Erdogan?  
This one instance suggests that Turkish politics and the state apparatus’ reaction against 
religion significantly changed during the last decade. Also this instance represents a change in 
Islamic groups’ ideas. The Turkish state and Turkish politics became more tolerant of religion, 
especially Islam. One of the most prominent reasons for this change is the conservative Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), primarily headed by religiously devout leaders who came to 
power in 2002. Hence, the AKP helped to transformation of political Islam as well as Turkish 
politics (Gole 2013: 336). The AKP is still in power and will hold it at least until the next 
elections in 2015. The latest opinion polls conducted by six different research centers, 
MetroPOLL, ANAR, GENAR, A&G, INFO, and ANDY-AR, in 2012 show that the AKP is the 
most likely party to continue in power after 2015. Therefore, it is important to examine the time 
period between 2002 and 2012 when the AKP came to power. By examining the AKP 
government era, we can begin to understand the changes that took place between politics and 
religion during the last decade. This investigation must begin with an understanding of the 
political forces that brought the AKP to power in 2002. 
Even though the AKP was established in 2001, in this study, this party mostly represents 
ongoing changes in Islamic groups. Almost all the literature agrees that the AKP and Turkish 
politics have undergone a transformation on religious issues during the last decade. However, 
there is no agreement on the time period of this transformation or reasons for it, even though the 
February 28 process was an important cause of this change and a reference point for most 
scholars. In that time period, the Constitutional Court disbanded the Welfare Party (RP) and its 
chairman Erbakan from politics for "acting against the secular principle of the republic'' in 
January 1998.  
When the Welfare Party was disbanded, its former deputies founded the Virtue Party 
(FP). In the 1999 elections, as the first elections after the intervention of 1997, there were 
concerns to see if there would be an Islamist backlash. Even then-President Demirel declared 
that if this party won elections, “the state would act” because the FP was essentially the same as 
the RP but operating under a different name (Zurcher 2004: 302). However there was no 
backlash. FP received 15.4 percent of the total votes and finished as the third party.  
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The Virtue Party was also charged with inciting protests against a headscarf ban in 
universities, and orchestrating a failed bid in 1999 by one of its legislators, Merve Kavakci, to 
take an oath in Parliament wearing a headscarf. Her stand was regarded as a political challenge 
to the secular principles upon which the Turkish Republic was founded. The headscarf issue 
became a symbol of the simmering confrontation between secularist and pro-Islamic forces. 
The Virtue Party was accused of being a direct continuation of the Welfare Party and 
eventually the Constitutional Court closed the party in 2001 for the same reason: “acting against 
the secular principle of the republic.” After the Virtue Party was closed, the movement formally 
split. The traditionalists established the Felicity Party (SP) with Erbakan exerting leadership 
behind the scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the Justice and Development (AKP), 
with Erdogan as party leader.  
The founders of the AKP were open to cooperation with the secular establishment. The 
AKP defined itself not as an Islamic party but as a conservative democratic party similar to 
Christian democratic parties in Western Europe (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008: 46-47). 
Some argue that the February 28 process helped to create the attitudes that would 
eventually take shape in the AKP. Some argue even if this process helped, it was not the 
determining reason for the formation of the AKP. Fuat Keyman sees the AKP’s rise as part of a 
general transformation of Turkey rather than a single outcome of the February 28 process. 
According to him, Turkey has been undergoing a complex process of transformation since 1923, 
and this transformation in recent years has been widening, deepening, and accelerating. The AKP 
has achieved its electoral victory by responding to Turkey’s recent transformation process much 
more successfully than its competitors (2010: 317). On the other hand, Zeyneb Caglayan-Icener, 
without mentioning any early transformation, sees the February 28 process as having a 
transformative impact on the Islamist groups to make them realize that radical Islam would find 
no place in the political arena any longer (2009: 596).  
Sebnem Gumuscu and Deniz Sert (2009) state that the socio-structural transformation of 
the Islamist constituency since the 1980s is the primary factor behind the transformation of 
Islamic political identity. The AKP represented the rising devout bourgeoisie by investing in 
economic liberalism, democratic politics, and social conservatism. According to Gumuscu and 
Sert, the February 28 process and its psychological effects cannot be the determining reason for 
this shifting identity because neither military intervention nor party closure was a new 
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experience for Islamists. Islamist parties were closed in both 1971 and 1980. Disbanding these 
parties did not result in a change in their ideology nor moderation. Gumuscu and Sert argue 
persuasively that after the disbanding of RP and FP, the Islamist National View (MG) movement 
split into two branches: the moderate conservative AKP, and the SP, which continued the 
disbanded Islamic parties. According to Gumuscu and Sert, abolishing the RP and the FP during 
the February 28 process cannot be the only explanation for why the MG movement split since 
the parties of this movement had been abolished twice before (2009: 958-961).  Even though 
Gumuscu and Sert have a strong argument, they do not mention that when Islamist parties were 
closed in 1971 and 1980, the military came to power and closed other parties and disbanded their 
leaders from politics. However, during the February 28 process only the Islamist RP was closed. 
This action put more pressure on Islamists. When they established their new party, it was also 
closed in two years, in 2001. In short, the transformation of Islamists began in the 1990s but was 
accelerated by the events of the February 28 process, disbanding two parties in two years, and 
banning Necmettin Erbakan from politics, which lowered his ability to steer his party from 
behind the scenes.  These events triggered the division of political Islam into the reformist and 
traditionalist factors (Cinar 2006: 473).  
According to Sultan Tepe at the time of the 2002 election, both the AKP’s party 
organization and its ideology were far from complete. Tepe sees the change of the AKP as a 
transformation rather than evasion by examining attitude of the AKP against the question of 
public wearing of the female headscarf (2005: 71, 78).  
From Dagi’s perspective (2008), the AKP represents a shift from “political” to “social” 
Islam. Although the party’s leaders continued their individual commitment to Islam as a religion, 
they did not develop an Islamist agenda. Their not doing so also demonstrated a realistic political 
strategy, given the social, political, and institutional limits facing an Islamist endeavor in Turkey. 
Not only did the February 28 process end fantasies about Islamizing society, but it also resulted 
in some Islamists declaring the failure of the idea of an Islamic state. Islamic groups recognized 
that the social and economic networks of Islam had been most damaged when “political Islam” 
reached its peak in the late 1990s; therefore, these groups began to remove their support from 
Islamist political movements. Instead, many in Islamic circles endorsed a conservative-centrist 
approach that they hoped would enable them to preserve Islamic social and economic networks. 
The idea of a “social” rather than “political” Islam gained momentum. Having experience in 
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mayoral positions also helped the Islamist groups replace their utopian endeavors to transform 
society with more pragmatic efforts that would address such public service concerns as 
inefficient roads, unreliable trash collection, insufficient water supply, and weather pollution. 
This pragmatism resulted in the transformation of political Islam and the emergence of the AKP. 
Even the language of emotionally charged issues changed. In the 1980s, Islamic groups had 
confidently argued that women had an “Islamic obligation” to wear the headscarf. By the late 
1990s, however, these same groups spoke not of Muslim duties but of human rights as a way to 
object to the ban on headscarf wearing in universities. Evolving situations and weakening self-
confidence had given “universal” norms and values a new status among defenders of Islamic 
symbols and identity. 
However, this rapid transformation in ideology and practice raised suspicion within some 
secular groups. With the threat of constitutional banning looming for decades, Turkish Islamist 
movements had to acquire ways to function with a more limited political environment. The 
possibility that their political parties could be banned complicated the efforts of the Islamist 
political parties from identifying and understanding themselves. According to this approach, the 
practice of takiyye, hiding the true ideas of an Islamic party to escape constitutional prosecution, 
was deployed at the expense of clarity of political argumentation. To avoid prosecution, Islamic 
parties and groups communicate to the public through symbolic words and deeds. By doing this, 
they did not openly violate the constitutional principle of secularism in the public (Dagi 2008). 
As a result, many secular groups did not believe the sincerity of the AKP and accused it having a 
hidden agenda. However, according to Dagi (2008), the AKP split not only from the leadership 
but also from the ideology of the old pro-Islamic circles. So, these accusations do not stand on a 
strong argument; rather they represent baseless fears.  
Some issues, such as action or even non-action for the headscarf ban, increased fears and 
suspicions of secular groups. The headscarf issue became silent even though it was debated 
freely before. The AKP did not take any step to solve the headscarf issue in its early years. 
Islamic groups also stayed silent (Tepe 2005: 79). This inaction caused more suspicions among 
seculars that Islamic groups would use the headscarf issue for a hidden agenda in the future, and 
some literature at the time expressed these concerns also. As expressed by Menderes Cinar, the 
maxim “once an Islamist always an Islamist” helps assertive secularists to maintain their fears 
about the AKP (2006: 469). Kemalist/secular elites believe that the AKP has a hidden agenda. 
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Since they mostly couldn’t find any supporting evidence to find out this hidden agenda, they use 
“mind reading.” So according to secular groups, the AKP should be checked, guided, and 
balanced (Cinar 2006: 480). However, as expressed by David Ghanim the AKP proved that it 
does not have any hidden agenda in any rate (2009: 79).  
Accoring to Cinar, the AKP reflects the transformation of Islamism in Turkey (2006: 
470). Therefore, when we examine the AKP, we can understand the reasons of Islamic 
transformation in Turkey. During the RP, Islam was a solution to all issues from social problems 
to economic development (Cinar 2006: 474), but the slogan of “Islam is the solution” failed to 
prove viable and also Islamist parties with this kind of thinking brought crisis rather than a 
solution (Ghanim 2009: 75-76). However, it was different in the AKP.  For the AKP the choice 
is not between Islam and the West or between alienated elite and its pious contenders but the 
choice is between old and new understandings of modernization (Cinar 2006: 476).  
Cihan Z. Tugal explains the transformation of radical Islamic movements in Turkey by 
their defeat and learning their lessons from this defeat. According to him, moderate Islam is not a 
self-promoted concept that explains the change of radicals but a strategic outcome after the 
defeat of radicalism and radicals’ strategic response to this defeat. Tugal explains this process of 
absorption by the Gramscian concept of passive revolution and claims that without the defeated 
mobilization of Islamists, moderate Islam would not exist (2009: 3-4).  
As the literature demonstrates until this phase, transformation of Islamic groups and the 
AKP is a result of social change that is combined with modernization, globalization, and 
economic, historical, and political conditions. However, the same socio-political conditions did 
not moderate ideas of secular groups in Turkey, and even the opposite. Esra Ozyurek’s study 
(2006) suggests that secularist groups are more radicalized recently. Berna Turam’s study also 
suggests a backlash in secularist groups, particularly women’s groups, especially during the 
presidential elections in 2007. These groups radicalized their statements and expressed that they 
do not favor a democratic system if it helps Islamic groups. This sentiment was expressed in the 
interviews with statements such as “We do not want democracy anymore, as is used and abused 
by the Islamists.” The increasing success of Islamic politics and the accompanying visibility of 
pious women have radicalized Kemalist women’s activism, encouraging a militant secularist 
backlash. (Turam 2008b: 40; 2008a: 477-492).   
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Therefore, social change because of global values cannot be the only explanation to 
explain moderation in strict politics or values. How can one group moderate its politics, and the 
other becomes stricter under the same social environment? Maybe we should consider also class 
struggle and losing privileges. According to Ayla Gol (2009: 807) “The real struggle is not 
between pious and secular Turks. The fundamental problem that underlies the conflict is the 
power struggle between the AKP and the secular establishment during the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey.” 
If most literature states that the AKP does not transform Turkey into an Islamic state and 
if those claims were correct, why the same literature feel the need to put a disclaimer in their 
writing? For instance, Ayla Gol states that “is Turkey in transition from a secular to an Islamic 
state under the policies of the AKP government? This article’s findings indicate a resounding no. 
The article has sought to demonstrate that the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the context of 
the AKP’s tenure in power needs to be understood within a complexity of social, economic, 
historical and ideational factors.” However, in the same article, she feels a necessity to make a 
disclaimer by saying “Under these circumstances the ruling AKP has no option but to protect the 
basic principles of secular democracy and, thus, to prove that the allegedly hidden Islamic 
agenda of the government is an exaggeration” (2009: 807-808). In an article written in 2009, 
after the AKP has been in power for seven years, why does a scholar expresses a disclaimer even 
though her findings say the opposite? Isn’t it a violation of the assumption that everybody is 
innocent until proven guilty? So we return the beginning “once an Islamist, always Islamist” 
assumption and the academia represents a bias here.    
In this case, learning why and when the transformation of Islamic groups occurred 
becomes more important. If the February 28 process were the only cause, this transformation 
would seem to be a strategic outcome that hides the real intention of Islamists. As a result, fears 
for the future of democracy would be more likely to arise. On the other hand, if this 
transformation were a result of a longer time period in which social patterns played an essential 
role, then the intention of Islamic groups would not be a concern. Understanding this change is 
only possible by examining the programs implemented by the AKP government during its last 
decade of rule in Turkey. This examination will also provide a trajectory for the future of 
Turkey’s relationship with religion. 
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As expected from any social change, the transformation of the interaction between 
religion and the state has its own limits. One of these limitations is that secular groups did not 
offer Islamic groups enough support during this transformation. Due to their suspicions of Islam, 
secular groups continued to accuse Islamic groups of having hidden agendas. The EU process of 
dealing with Turkey also disappointed Islamic groups. The European Court of Human Rights’ 
(ECHR) endorsement of the headscarf ban in Turkey was a breaking point that slowed down the 
process of transformation. Also, secular groups becoming more inflexible about their ideas 
during the presidential elections in 2007 caused a counter reaction among Islamic groups. 
Furthermore, some Islamic groups interpreted this transformation as a weakening of religious 
affiliation and an embracing of the capitalist market. Such criticism of their religious ties caused 
some Islamic groups to question their values. Finally, when Islamic groups gained power and 
started to emerge as the new elites who steered the state, they became more resistant to change.  
In summary, the literature acknowledges a transformation within Islamic groups but does 
not agree on the reasons or timing. This transformation, along with other socio-economic factors, 
helped the AKP to come to power in 2002 and to currently maintain its power. The AKP’s 
ideology resulted from the transformation of Islamic ideology in politics. Moreover, while in the 
power, the AKP contributed to this transformation. The AKP not only helped to transform the 
identity of Islamic groups, but it also helped to change the state’s attitude to one that opposed 
religious identity.  Therefore, an examination of the relationship between religion and the state in 
Turkey necessitates a look at both political and social changes within Turkey. 
 
 
 
E. METHODOLOGY  	  
In this study, I examine how religion and state relations have changed between 2002 and 2012 in 
Turkey. In understanding how this relationship changed over this 10-year period and making a 
comparison between issues, I focus on two main cases: the teaching of religion by the Turkish 
state and the rights of religious minorities. I use these two cases to help me answer my research 
question: How do people in different social locations experience, understand, and evaluate what 
happened in state-religion relations between 2002 and 2012? 
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As my first case, I will examine the teaching of religion by the Turkish state in order to 
understand the nature of the relationship between these two entities in the years 2002-2012, 
along with responses to this nature in different social situations. Discussions about the state 
teaching religion, Islam in particular, go back to the early Republic; indeed, Turkey has lived 
through many political changes on this issue in succeeding years. Since its foundation, Turkey, 
which has always wanted to have a state-controlled religion, has used state-taught religion for 
this purpose. However, its aim was to control religion, not to make people devout.  
Recently, this policy seems to be shifting. In February 2012, Prime Minister (PM) Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan declared that raising devout generations is part of his party’s mission (Hurriyet 
Daily News 02 February 2012). Examining changes in state-taught religion as my first case will 
help me explore if there is a new direction for this issue. The status of vocational imam-hatip 
schools, theology faculties in public universities, obligatory religion and ethics courses and 
elective religion courses in primary and secondary education, Quran-based courses run by the 
Department of Religious Affairs, and teaching Quran script in mosques have been part of the 
discussion about state-taught religion since 2002. I will examine the political changes in these 
issues. 
In addition, the religious education system of Turkey has an influence in the international 
arena. Pakistan and Afghanistan have examined the imam-hatip schools of Turkey since 2009, 
along with those in Bulgaria and Russia. In 2009, Pakistani PM Yousuf Raza Gilani told Turkish 
PM Erdogan how imam-hatip schools might offer a model for Pakistan in order to prevent 
religious fundamentalism. In that meeting, Erdogan recommended these schools by emphasizing 
that the imam-hatip schools in Turkey offered an education along the lines of a normal high 
school curriculum; in addition, they offered classes on religion. Erdogan noted that he himself 
was an imam-hatip graduate (Today’s Zaman 27 October 2009). Even though Pakistan's intent 
was to use the imam-hatip school system to reduce religious fundamentalism, there was an 
opposing view. Prof. Hakan Yavuz of the University of Utah has criticized imam-hatip 
education, asserting that "many of the problems we are seeing in Turkey today are very much a 
product of the imam-hatip schools … you see this new moral code being formed; those who 
drink are bad, those who date women are bad, if you are gay you should be excluded, if not 
killed" (Global Post 12 August 2010). 
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As my second case, I will examine rights of religious minorities. This issue has not been 
discussed much in Turkish politics, since these minorities are less then one percent of the 
Turkish population and do not have meaningful political power. In addition to non-Muslim 
religious minorities, the Alevi group, which constitutes over ten percent of the population in 
Turkey, has been a part of the discussion of religious minority rights. Although the 
overwhelming majority of Alevis consider themselves Muslim, they have some distinct and 
different practices compared to Sunnis. The Sunni majority has mostly ignored these differences 
along with the right of Alevis to implement these practices freely. In addition, some Alevis 
interpret Alevism as a separate religion outside Islam as well as a separate culture. Because of 
these different interpretations, it is worth examining Alevi rights in the context of religious 
minority rights in Turkey. 
Indeed, examining changes in religious minority rights allows us to interpret the main 
reasons behind the changes on the issues of headscarf and state-taught religion during 2002-12, 
and whether these changes were a part of a general amendment based on civil, human, and 
religious rights or the promotion of one religion, namely, Sunni Islam.  
The aim of this research is to explore the range of opinions and the different 
representations of relationship between religion and the state in the Turkish social milieu via an 
interview survey (see Appendix A) along with examining legal and political changes, including 
failed bills. As a qualitative study, this research maximizes the opportunity to understand the 
different positions taken by members of the interview groups (Gaskell: 2010 [2000]: 41). The 
success of the study depends upon the range of opinions garnered. This study employs a 
comparative-historical methodology of institutional and ideological practices, especially in legal 
and social reforms. “Comparative-historical analysis is a field of research characterized by the 
use of systematic comparison and the analysis of process over time to explain large-scale 
outcomes such as revolutions, political regimes, and welfare states” (Mahoney 2004: 81).  
 
1. Sampling and Validity  
 
For the research, I interviewed thirty people (see Appendix B) from different groups including 
people who are members of Parliament, spokesmen of political parties, high-level officials and 
muftis in the Department of Religious Affairs, presidents or spokesmen of Alevi associations, 
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religious leaders or press agents of religious minorities, organized institutions or groups that 
promoting the legacy of Ataturk, journalists, and academicians.  
To increase validity of the sampling, I interviewed Parliament members or administrators 
of five major political parties: Justice and Development Part (AKP; it is a conservative party and 
got 50% of votes in 2011 elections), Republican People’s Party (CHP; a secularist party, 26%), 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, a nationalist party, 13%), Peace and Democracy Party (BDP; 
a Kurdish nationalist party, 7%), Felicity Party (SP; an Islamic party, 1%). All of them 
represented 97% of population in 2011 elections. 
To have a variety of different opinions among religious minorities, I interviewed persons 
from different Christian churches including Orthodox and Catholic. I also interviewed members 
of the Jewish community.  
 
2. Limitations  
 
A limited sample size and the unknown degree of sincerity of the respondents are general 
limitations in qualitative research. Another is the sensitivity of the research area. Even though all 
of the interview groups have expressed their ideas about the research topic explicitly in public 
(as in press conferences, newspaper interviews, radio and TV programs, and writings in 
newspapers and journals), politicians especially have to reckon with the possibility of losing 
votes or popularity if they express their ideas openly.  
However, the range of interviews in the study should restrict this limitation. For instance, 
it can be assumed that members of the ruling party would abstain from criticizing actions of the 
government. On the other hand, members of opposition parties are likely to severely criticize 
actions of the ruling party. In addition, the interviewees for this study include opinions of 
different groups such as secularists, conservatives, Islamists, religious-nationalists, secular-
nationalists, and religious minorities. Even if interviewees deliberately fail to mention some facts 
related to an interview question in order not to harm their group’s interests, it can be assumed 
that representatives of other groups would mention these facts. Having this level of variety helps 
minimize the limitations of this qualitative research. 
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3. Interviews 
 
The interviews ranged from one to three hours. They were mostly conducted in Istanbul, Ankara, 
Duzce, and Edirne provinces in Turkey in 2011-2012.  
I chose interviewees by looking at their interests in the topics covered by this study. To 
this end, I contacted parliament members from different political parties who are serving on 
education committees in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Most parliament 
members responded positively to my interview request. The most challenging part was finding a 
mutual time for interviews. I was in Turkey for a certain time period only and wanted to 
complete the interviews then, since my aim was to have interviews face-to-face rather than by 
telephone or Skype. I did not choose to send my questions to participants in order to avoid 
written responses—I felt that this procedure would have limited my follow-up questions and 
brought into question the sincerity of the responses. In some cases, I had to reschedule interviews 
several times, since the availability of interviewees changed at the last minute. Some interviews 
were interrupted dozens of times by important phone calls that parliament members felt 
obligated to answer. Some interviewees asked to see the interview questions beforehand. Some 
of them also requested a copy of the voice recordings and transcripts.  
Since I saw and felt the visual and auditory expressions of interviewees, I am confident in 
saying that they seemed to me sincere in their responses. When I asked about particular political 
decisions and bills, a change in voice level was a common way to show disapproval of some 
changes. In some replies, I could feel interviewees’ anger, surprise, and disapproval. All these 
signs can be interpreted as attesting to the reliability of the responses.  
In addition, during the interviews, I realized that most interviewees assumed that my 
political views were similar to theirs. They completed some answers with “Is it not so?” or 
similar sentences showing that they expected a confirmation from me. I avoided providing any 
confirming or rejecting responses to these questions in order not to lead interviewees on. Mostly, 
I replied by saying, “I see,” which did not indicate either confirmation or rejection of the 
opinions of the interviewee in order to lead the conversation. Furthermore, some interviewees 
presumed that we shared similar religious beliefs. For example, it is a common practice to offer a 
beverage, usually Turkish tea, to guests in Turkey. In some cases hosts bring tea to their visitors 
without asking, as a symbol of Turkish hospitality. Thus, when I arrived at the office of one 
	  	  
70	  
person to conduct an interview in the month of Ramadan, he called his secretary and asked for 
two Turkish teas without consulting me. The secretary hesitated momentarily, asking, “Maybe 
your visitor is fasting?” He replied in surprise, “You must be kidding! Who would fast?” 
According to the PEW Research Center, 84 percent of the Turkish population fasts during the 
month of Ramadan in Turkey (PEW 2012: 16). Even though fasting is a common religious 
practice during this time, the interviewee did not think it possible that the researcher would be 
participating. When interviewees think that they share similar political and religious beliefs with 
the researcher, they feel more comfortable in their responses. In cases when interviewees thought 
that I did not share similar political and religious beliefs, I realized that they appreciated my 
endeavor to contact them, include them in my research, listen to their opinions, and possibly 
express these opinions in my dissertation or other platforms later. They found this research an 
opportunity to spread their beliefs, especially in literature in English.  
I encountered a few negative experiences also. Since I was a graduate student in the U.S., 
some interviewees questioned my intentions for doing this study, such as why would Americans 
want to learn about these topics? Why do Americans do research on Turkey? Do not these 
studies benefit American interests? These kinds of suspicions are more common among groups 
on the far left and those on the far right committed to Turkish nationalism and/or political Islam. 
So I emphasized that I chose this topic personally. Neither my advisor nor any other committee 
members forced me to do so. Moreover, I decided who would be on my committee. Since I had 
my own fellowship, the department had no input in deciding my research topic. After I took a 
class in political sociology, I realized that my interest lay in this area. After these explanations, 
interviewees seemed convinced that this was indeed my research project, not that of some 
American interest group.  
Questioning the intention of research is not only common for people outside Turkey as 
well. When I did an empirical study on the perception of religion among elementary school 
teachers during my M.A. thesis project, I encountered similar questions. At that time, I was a 
graduate student at Marmara University in Turkey. Some people questioned whether that project 
was a way to report to the Turkish state about teachers’ beliefs. Some teachers, who knew me 
personally, since I was a teacher in the same region, did not question my sincerity, but they were 
skeptical about the intentions of my M.A. advisor. He could possibly work for the government, 
and even I would not know that. In that study, I explained this skepticism by the negative 
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experiences of interviewees during the period of military coups in Turkey. The same bases of 
skepticism are valid for foreign researchers. Many people believe that foreign research has not 
only academic purposes but other bases when doing a study on Turkey. Since I was not a 
foreigner, this form of skepticism was not high and mostly disappeared after my explanations.  
In addition, the great variety of interviewees led to some difficulties in posing questions. 
When I prepared the questions in advance, I did so in an objective way, such as by using 
the official names and abbreviations of the political parties. However, in the case of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), even the official abbreviation causes tension in different groups. 
For example, the official abbreviation of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi) is AK Party (AK Parti). Supporters of the Justice and Development Party use the official 
abbreviation AK Party, whereas opponents prefer to use AKP, since ak means white and clean in 
Turkish and has many positive connotations. The party's opponents do not want to use a term 
that has such positive connotations. Deliberately choosing one abbreviation rather than another 
gives a sign as to whether the person supports this party or not. Using the actual name of the 
party instead of its abbreviation would seem to solve this problem, but it does not. Since 
everybody uses an abbreviated form, using the long form would attract more attention and lead 
to questioning the reasons for the decision. During the writing of this study, I preferred using 
the AKP abbreviation, since it has no positive or negative connotations for the English reader and 
is reader-friendly. However, since I conducted my interviews in Turkish, in the questionnaire I 
used the official abbreviation, AK Party. During the interviews, I mostly adjusted to how 
the interviewees referred to it. In one case, when an interviewee saw that the questionnaire 
used AK Party, he protested. I simply explained that I had to use the official abbreviation in 
order not to show any bias against the party. For the most part, this took care of the problem.  
My interview group included politicians, state officials, journalists, members of the Alevi 
and Kemalist associations, and religious minorities. I did not expect to receive rigid or 
straightforward responses from every group. I anticipated that contacting religious minorities 
would be hard. To my surprise, they welcomed my interview requests. Among all the groups, 
journalists and members of the Alevi and Kemalist associations provided the most 
straightforward responses. Since they did not have any political affiliation, they were not under 
any political pressure. I would say that interviewees from political parties expressed their 
opinions clearly, but they were more careful not to cause political harm. In one case, one of the 
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vice presidents of a political party did not want the interview to be recorded. He said that we 
would talk for more than an hour but I could not write up the whole interview, only a few 
paragraphs that would be misunderstood out of context. In another instance, a politician asked to 
turn off the recorder during the interview when he made a few more explanations about a related 
question. However, all these examples are among the general limitations of any qualitative study. 
They do not affect the general reliability of the responses.  
Since I am a Turkish national myself, I cannot say that I had no political opinions before I 
undertook this research. But I sought to include interviewees from across the political and 
religious spectrum and inserted opinions of different groups on the same issues. The interviews 
took, on average, over one hour each. Since I could not include every opinion of the 
interviewees, I chose particular passages that represented diversity on a specific issue as well as 
selected paragraphs that helped explain the social cleavages framework of the study. In addition, 
instead of relying on vague interpretations, I focused on tangible political changes by examining 
laws and court decisions in order to end up with a more objective view.  
 
4. Other sources 
 
This study gathered its data from three main sources: first, primary sources such as legal 
documents including laws, court decisions, and records of the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey (TBMM); second, from elite interviews; and third, from secondary data such as books, 
articles, and the media.  
This study comprises the years 2002-2012. During data collection for this study, there 
were ongoing changes. An accurate representation of these recent changes in literature would 
take a few months to a few years. Therefore, media coverage became an important source for this 
study in order to follow current changes. I mostly read the secularist Hurriyet, the conservative 
Zaman, and the liberal Radikal newspapers for a variety of views. Hurriyet and Zaman have 
English versions, namely, the Hurriyet Daily News and Today’s Zaman. Whenever I found the 
same news in the more limited English versions, I referenced them to help the English-language 
reader in accessing it. Both Hurriyet and Zaman are top-selling newspapers in Turkey. Indeed, 
all the newspapers that I referenced during the dissertation are highly respected, with a history 
lasting decades. I mostly used newspapers to access the speeches of party leaders and politicians. 
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Since they did not feature commentary or interpretations from newspaper staff, their reliability 
should be of the highest order.  
I used newspapers’ internet search engines to access their archives via key words such as 
imam hatip, Quran courses, and missionary activities in the years 2002-2012. After receiving the 
search results, I skimmed all related news. In cases when there was a proposed bill, a newer 
legislation, a higher court verdict, or a party leader’s polemical speech, the news showed a 
cluster covering a certain time period that helped in identifying what I needed.  
In addition, coverage of newspapers is a good resource to outline the political and social 
environment in a certain time period. I used frequency of news related to missionary activities as 
well as sharia and secularism to depict the political environment between 2002 and 2012. Again, 
I used these newspapers’ internet search engines to find related news. When I used the frequency 
tables, I did not elaborate the content of the news but just looked how many times the key words 
appeared. At first sight, using a frequency table without looking at the content of news would 
seem to be unreliable, since it would surely include unrelated news. For instance, I looked how 
many times the word sharia appeared in newspapers, to help me understand the political 
environment in Turkey. Some of this news, however, had nothing to do with Turkey but was in 
the form of news coverage of other countries such as Iran. However, a closer look revealed that 
even these unrelated news articles increased in certain time periods, thereby suggesting their 
relationship with domestic politics. For instance, some newspapers started to have more coverage 
on how adultery was punished in Iran and Saudi Arabia. This increase suggested that even this 
unrelated news was intended to influence domestic politics. In addition, when I examined the 
frequency of news, I did not attribute any importance to the number of news items but rather to 
their fluctuation in the years of 2002-2012. In a way, the number of news items on particular 
topics should be distributed nearly equally over the years in the same newspaper, assuming that 
every newspaper has a news policy that ordinarily lasts for years. Therefore, it is a significant 
change in the number of particular news items over the years that calls for a closer examination. 
In the case of following changes in legislation, including failed bills, on related issues, I 
examined the archives of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) and the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, where the new legislation and other official announcements 
are published. Both sources are open to internet access. Their archives can be examined online, 
respectively, since the years of 1908 and 1921. I used their search engines to access related data 
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by looking for key words such as imam hatip, Quran courses, Alevi, and non-Muslim. I did not 
use any specific sources to interpret newer legislation, but mostly benefited from parliamentary 
discussions on proposed bills just before they were voted on. In these speeches, the benefits and 
deficiencies of proposed bills were generally revealed. However, it is possible that at times the 
implementation of newer legislation would differ from the original intentions of lawmakers. I 
mention some relevant incidents in the course of this paper.  
Finally, I examined related court decisions. It was not practical to look at local court 
decisions, but I did examine higher court decisions including those of the Constitutional Court, 
the Council of State, the Supreme Court, and the European Court of Human Rights. I included 
only decisions that set binding precedents in order to avoid unnecessary repetition.  
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III. THE TEACHING OF RELIGION BY THE TURKISH STATE 
 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  	  
A state’s attitude toward religious education may be divided into four categories: supporting 
religious education in both public and private schools, supporting religious education only in 
private schools, opposing religious education, and not interfering with religious education (see 
Table 1). Every state has different reasons to choose one of these approaches. Even though 
democratic countries and pluralistic societies are more likely not to interfere in religious 
education and leave it to individuals or non-governmental organizations, they are not free from 
discussions about religious education, which has many dimensions. Most of these discussions are 
shaped around the following topics (Thomas 2006: ix; Glenn 2000).  
• Teaching a particular religion in public schools. 
• Making religious courses compulsory. 
• Funding private religious schools. 
• Allowing students or teachers to wear religious attire or adornments. 
• Teaching the big-bang theory, evolution, and/or creation. 
• Portraying one religion as superior to others.  
• Promoting religious beliefs in textbooks.  
• Offering prayers at school functions. 
• Having prayer rooms in schools.  
• Scheduling school hours according to prayer times and religious holidays. 
• Celebrating religious holidays in schools. 
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Table 1: Religious Education by Countries 
* Denominational teaching of religion.  
** Possibility of paying special attention to Christianity.  
Source: see the Routledge International Handbook of Religious Education (2013); 
Religious Education in Public Schools: Study of Comparative Law (2006).  
 
 
Supporting both 
public and private 
Supporting private Not interfering Opposing  
A) Compulsory: 
Finland 
Greece 
Norway 
Sweden 
Turkey 
 
B) Exempted-Comp. 
Austria* 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Malta 
United Kingdom 
Argentina  
France 
USA 
Japan China 
Cuba 
C) Optional-Compulsory: 
Australia 
Belgium* 
Germany** 
Netherlands* 
Switzerland 
D) Optional: 
Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria 
Italy* 
Russia 
Spain* 
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The attitude of states swings between supporting and opposing religious education. Even 
if a state supports religious education, this support does not cover all religions. Sometimes laws 
prohibit religious education in some way, even though these laws may be ignored at the public 
level. If a state should feel a threat against its sovereignty from a religion, it would most likely 
prohibit its teaching in schools or try to control religious education by instituting its own 
curriculum. Even though autocratic regimes are more apt to feel this type of threat, democratic 
regimes experience similar fears from time to time.  
These fears mostly justify not teaching religion in public schools at all, which means 
leaving students ignorant of an important social aspect and fact of public life. Warren A. Nord 
explains this ignorance in the American education system with the following map story: 
Once, when St. Petersburg was still Leningrad, the economist E. F. Schumacher 
was lost there. Although he was standing near several enormous churches, they 
didn’t appear on his tourist map. When his interpreter showed him where he was, 
Schumacher asked why the churches were not on the map. He was told: ‘We 
don’t show churches on our maps.’ Schumacher protested that one nearby church 
was on the map. But that is not a church, he was told. ‘That is a museum…. It is 
only the ‘living churches’ we don’t show.’ ‘It then occurred to me,’ Schumacher 
wrote, ‘that this was not the first time I had been given a map which failed to 
show many things I could see right in front of my eyes. All through school and 
university I had been given maps of life and knowledge on which there was 
hardly a trace of many of the things that I most cared about and that seemed to me 
to be of the greatest possible importance to the conduct of my life.’ Just as 
churches did not appear on his tourist map, so religions had been left off the 
conceptual maps his education had provided him. Or if they did show up, they did 
so in ancient times and faraway places, more or less as a museum piece.  
In the last few years, the maps of St. Petersburg have changed. The conceptual 
maps we provide students in our public schools and universities continue to chart 
a world without religion (Nord 1995: 1). 
Nord’s map story suggests that although a living religion would be perceived a threat and 
would be prohibited; in fact, prohibiting something that is living is more dangerous.  
Since every power group has a tendency to control perceived threats, International legal 
mandates help controlling the state, the biggest power group, and its attitudes for certain rights. If 
a state abstains signing and implementing some human rights agreements, it would risk its 
relations in the international arena. Even if a state signs the international covenants, it would 
have some reservations or not implement all requirements. The state might restrain implementing 
these covenants because of the state ideology or domestic pressure. However, the state’s attitude 
to these rights is not straightforward. The state can comply with some aspects of a norm but not 
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others or it can violate a norm but engage in lip service. When norms conflict, compliance is not 
an all-or-nothing but occurs in varying degrees. This multifaceted nature of compliance poses a 
challenge to interpret the state responses to international pressure (Cardenas 2007: 1). In the 
following, I will examine the Turkish state’s attitude to the religious education rights in the 
international law.  
Having a religious education is secured by international law. Article 18 of the United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) states that  
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.  
Article 13, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966), is even more generous in terms of parental rights. It states that 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their 
children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which 
conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or 
approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own convictions. 
Thus Article 13 not only secures parental rights to teach children according to their 
convictions, but goes one more step by giving the right to have an education outside public 
education.  
One hundred sixty-seven countries ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, while160 ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Turkey signed both covenants on 15 August 2000, ratifying them on 18 June 2003 to 
align its legislation with that of the European Union (EU) to qualify for membership 
negotiations.  
At first glance, it could seem surprising to see Turkey signing a document that allows for 
a religious education not under state supervision. However, Turkey expressed some reservations 
for this document, namely: “The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to interpret and apply the 
provisions of the paragraphs (3) and (4) of the Article 13 of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in accordance to the provisions under the Articles 3, 14 and 42 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.” In other words, Turkey would not allow a religious 
education that was not under its surveillance.  
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Since my analysis covers the years between 2002 and 2012, it would be helpful to look at 
discussions in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) when this covenant was 
accepted to understand the political changes in Turkey during this ten-year period.  
In 2003, a Member of Parliament (MP) from the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), Ms. Nur Dogan Topaloglu, gave a brief speech before the legislation was voted upon. 
Topaloglu explained the significance of this covenant and its acceptance by almost all the 
countries in the world, including all the member countries of the EU. She explained the 
reasoning behind the reservations by saying: 
The General Staff showed its concerns (hassasiyet) about Articles 13 and 15 [of 
this Covenant], which are related to economic and social rights. Article 13 is 
about the religious education of children. Article 24 of our Constitution states that 
religious and moral education and the teaching of religion are under the 
governance and surveillance of the state. Article 15 [of the Covenant] is about 
participating in cultural life. That is why [the General Staff] showed this concern 
(TBMM records 06/04/2003).  
This brief speech reveals the political environment of Turkey in 2003. A ruling party’s 
parliament member explains the reasons behind the reservations appended to a widely accepted 
covenant by referring to the General Staff’s concerns, even though it is not a military-related 
issue. The MP talks about religious education, but she does not reference any scholarly study, the 
Ministry of National Education, or the Department of Religious Affairs. She refers to an article 
in the Constitution, but does not support her argument with input from the juridical body, the law 
schools, or a bar association. She expresses only the reported concerns of the General Staff.  
That is why it is important to look at the power of the military and the political 
environment to understand the changes in religious education since the foundation of the 
Republic.  
 
 
 
B. HISTORY 	  
The religious education issue had been discussed abundantly from the 1920s to 2002. However, 
the center of these discussions was mostly political and ideological (Ayhan 2004: 527). The 
Turkish National Assembly was founded on 20 April 1920, even while the War for Turkish 
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Independence was still going on. Official records show that, even in the early weeks of the 
Assembly, the education issue in general and, more specifically, religious education came to the 
attention of the parliament members and were discussed in the Assembly. This shows the 
importance of this topic in the context of that period’s political, economical, and social 
environment (Ayhan 2004: 28-35). In these early years, the National Assembly opened madrasas 
and improved their programs to cover both religious and science education (Ayhan 2004: 37-38). 
After this new state won its war of independence and secured its sovereignty, it legislated 
the unification of education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) on 3 March 1924 and placed all educational 
institutions, including madrasas, under the aegis of the Ministry of Education13. Halis Ayhan 
(2004) and Mustafa Ocal (2011) stated that this law did not suggest closing any educational 
institutions; rather, its primary intention was to improve the curriculum by putting them under 
the direction of the Ministry. Most of the parliament members were not thinking that madrasas 
would be closed. However, then-MP Vasif Cinar, who suggested this legislation, was 
immediately appointed the new Minister of Education. He closed all the madrasas with an 
official notice (genelge), following his appointment (Ayhan 2004: 55, Ocal 2011: 86-93; also see 
Armagan, Zaman 04/13/2008, and TBMM records 04/17/1924, noting that MPs at the time 
objected to the minister by shouting NO! NO! when he claimed he was implementing the law by 
closing the madrasas).   
Even though the Unification of Education Law did not specify closing madrasas, it did 
have some initial signs. Article 4 of this law said, “The Ministry of Education will found a 
school of theology under Istanbul University to train experts and open public schools to train 
official imams to serve on behalf of religious affairs.” These public schools were later named 
imam-hatip schools. The intention was clearly to establish a government-controlled school of 
theology along with imam-hatip schools to substitute for madrasa education.   
In 1949, the Minister of National Education, Tahsin Banguoglu, explained the intention 
of the legislation on the unification of education in one of his speeches in the Assembly. He said 
that “the spirit and meaning of the Unification of Education Law are to create only one general 
educational system, only one school system, and only one upbringing, in order to raise people 
who have only one mentality, and then create only one real nation in Turkey” (TBMM records 
01/03/1949). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This ministry was named the Ministry of National Education later.  
	  	  
81	  
As we see in the explanations of the then-Minister of National Education, the aim of the 
Republic was to raise a single-minded generation. The only obstacle in the way of this aim was 
religion, which should be dealt with accordingly. The early Republicans never saw any problem 
in expressing these ideas. There was only one correct way to repeat the success of the countries 
of the West, and that was to offer a modern, science-centered, education.  
Following the Unification of Education Law, 29 imam-hatip schools were opened in 
1924. In two years, all of them had closed except two, which finally closed in 1931. During the 
transition to multi-party democracy, there was a new attempt to re-open imam-hatip schools. 
However, this attempt also failed, so the Ministry offered ten-month imam-hatip courses in 1949. 
Re-opening imam-hatip schools became a possibility only after the first free elections and the 
ascension to power of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950. Indeed, this party opened imam-hatip 
schools immediately in 1951. Their number increased gradually, from seven in 1951, to 19 in 
1960, 71 in 1970, 339 in 1980, 382 in 1990, and over 500 in 1997.  
There were many changes to the status of imam-hatip schools and their graduates’ 
entrance to universities. These students could not enter universities until 1973, including the 
school of theology except for the Higher Islamic Institutes. Between 1973 and 1983, they were 
admitted to social science-related universities. Between 1983 and 1998, they had equal rights 
with all other high school graduates (Ayhan 2004: 546). After the post-modern intervention of 
the military in 1997, the middle-level sections of the imam-hatip schools—that is, grades 6, 7, 
and 8—were closed. The scores of their graduates on the national university entrance exam 
decreased compared to those from other general high schools, if they applied to other than a 
school of theology (decree passed on 07/30/1998 and implemented for university entrance exams 
in 1999) (YOK no. 98.8.90). Moreover, the students were not allowed to transfer to a general 
high school in order to have a fair chance at the entrance exam. The Board of Education and 
Discipline (Talim Terbiye Kurulu Baskanligi) released an official notice (karar), No. 186, on 
09/09/1998, that restricted imam-hatip high school (IHL) students’ transfer to general high 
schools, when the Turkish state realized that these students were looking for other ways to have 
an equal chance at the exam. When transfers to general high schools were prevented, parents 
naturally wanted to withdraw their children from IHLs and register them for distance education 
high schools; however, this avenue was also blocked shortly by the state: transferring to distance 
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education was restricted three weeks later, on 09/30/1998, with the approval of the Ministry of 
National Education (Article 4229).    
The first reason for opening imam-hatip schools was to provide vocational school 
training for future official state imams. However, many parents did not send their children to 
these schools for that purpose, but mostly to learn Islam outside of general public education (see 
Ayhan 2004: 194, Ocal 2011: 310-314, Unsur 2005: 247-281). After the February 28 process in 
1997, the Turkish government wished to restrict these graduates and limit their ability to go to 
universities.  
Even today, current debates question why imam-hatip schools enroll so many students, 
given that Turkey does not need so many imams. As noted above, the intent of parents or 
students was not always for the students to become imams. Especially in the later years of the 
imam-hatip schools, this intention was clear. A female, for instance, cannot become an imam in a 
state mosque, but the enrollment of girls in these schools reached 50% at one time. If their 
intention was not to become an imam, it was to have a regular religious education outside of a 
formal public school.  
This intention was even clear to foreign observers as far back as sixty years ago. Howard 
A. Reed shared his survey of imam-hatip schools during the 1954-55 academic year in his article 
titled Turkey’s New Imam-Hatip Schools: 
“On the basis of interviews with a considerable number of these seniors in all of the 
seven original schools during the academic year 1954-55, it is clear that the great majority want 
to continue their education, even beyond the lise [high school] stage” (Reed 1955: 151). Even a 
foreign observer, who was in Turkey for only a few months to investigate the newly established 
imam-hatip school system, saw that these students wanted to continue their education in 
universities, and not only in the field of religion. 
The same observations and statistics about imam-hatip school graduates not choosing to 
become imams as a profession found a place in the preparation of a report by the Turkish 
Education National Commission in 1958-1959. The Ford Foundation also supported preparation 
of this report, which was published in 1960. In the section titled Education about Religion, it 
mentioned, “Even though they opened as vocational schools, Imam-Hatip Schools are 
functioning as any secondary school instead of being a vocational school since the majority of 
their graduates do not work as imams” (MEB 1960: 112-113).  
	  	  
83	  
Therefore, it can be concluded that imam-hatip schools respond to a public demand for 
teaching religion to students. The demand was not mainly for training Islamic clergy. There is a 
similar situation with regard to other kinds of religious teaching by the state, as happens in 
Religion and Ethics courses in primary and secondary education, as well as Quran-based courses.   
The real question is not why Turkey trains so many students to become imams, even 
though most do not follow that profession. Indeed, the answer to this question was clear even 
sixty years ago, in that these parents/students wanted a formal high school education along with a 
religious education. The real question is how the Turkish state can ever provide an education 
apart from the unified approach, given that its fundamental intent is what sociologists call 
cultural reproduction. According to Bourdieu, 
The educational system acts like Maxwell’s demon: at the cost of the energy 
which is necessary for carrying out the sorting operation, it maintains the 
preexisting order, that is, the gap between pupils endowed with unequal amounts 
of cultural capital. More precisely, by a series of selection operations, the system 
separates the holders of inherited cultural capital from those who lack it. 
Differences of aptitude being inseparable from social differences according to 
inherited capital, the system thus tends to maintain preexisting social differences 
(Bourdieu 1998 [1994]: 20). 
Imam-hatip schools were intended to break this cultural capital. Even though the Turkish 
state wanted to restrict them to a profession related to religion that had little voice or power in 
the new secular state, the schools themselves would like to carry their education into other 
professions. In 1974, 77% of their graduates continued their religion-related studies. In 1992, the 
proportion was 50% (Ocal 2011: 310-313). These numbers were more striking when one looks 
into the university preferences of the imam-hatip school graduates. Even in the 1988 university 
entrance exam, the majority of IHL graduates indicated their interest in other than theology 
faculties. This situation caught the intention of Turkey’s biggest business association, Turkish 
Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD). TUSIAD prepared a report to Zekai Baloglu in 
1990, which concluded that IHL graduates preferred law and public administration programs to 
theology. This, however, was not the intention of the Unification of Education Law. The number 
of enrolled students was to be limited according to the employment needs in their fields (TESEV 
2004: 82-84). (See Tables 2 and 3.)  
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Table 2: IHL Graduates' University Acceptance in 1988 
Academic program Accepted students 
Theology    988 
Other programs 4,885 
Open (distance) education 4,058 
TOTAL 9,931 
Source: TESEV 2004: 82 
 
Table 3: Freshmen Number of IHL Graduates in University Departments 
Years Law Political 
Science 
Teacher 
Training 
Programs 
Teacher for 
Religious 
Instructor  
Theology 
1999* 232 277 3,285 322 1,420 
1999 54 97 315 669 1,324 
2000 96 149 639 778 1,254 
2001 82 93 541 785 917 
2002 91 70 374 603 685 
Source: TESEV 2004: 47 
* There was no differentiated implementation of the coefficient factor, which reducing 
IHL students’ scores.  
Again, when we look at imam-hatip school graduates’ university preferences in 1998, it 
seems that most of them were not interested in theology programs. The Higher Education Board 
(YOK) designated these different university preferences as an irregularity (carpiklik), when it 
justified its different coefficient for vocational schools in its 27 April 2004 report:  
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The irregularity in the above figure is that the natural way of further education for 
graduates from teacher high schools are educational programs, and for imam-
hatip high school graduates the natural way is entering theology or Religion and 
Ethics Teacher programs. However, there was an opposite situation, where even 
though graduates of imam-hatip high schools were supposed to enter theology and 
Religion and Ethics Teacher programs, they entered other educational programs 
even more than teacher high school graduates…. This irregularity was partly 
turned toward its natural way with [the coefficient factor in] the university 
entrance system in 1999. If vocational schools use the same coefficient factor as 
other general high schools, as happened before, similar irregularities would recur 
(from TESEV 2004: 24). 
Going outside religious education for an imam-hatip graduate was seen as an irregularity. 
These graduates not only went to other faculties, but also further along in the state apparatus; 
finally, one of them became the first imam-hatip school graduate to become prime minister of 
Turkey in 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This was not acceptable by some elites. In one instance 
in 2004, the then-chairman of Turkey's Union of Bar Associations, Ozdemir Ozok, said that he 
could not accept having a prime minister who had graduated from an imam-hatip high school, 
obviously referring to Turkish PM Erdogan (Hurriyet 05/15/2004). 
In sum, imam-hatip schools did not serve to continue cultural capital but quite the 
opposite: they helped lower-class religious families to enter the state apparatus. Again Bourdieu 
states how the educational system justifies continuing class differences: 
…the educational system helps to provide the dominant class with a ‘theodicy of 
its own privilege’ not so much through the ideologies it produces or inculcates, 
but rather through the practical justification of the established order that it 
supplies by masking ‒ under the covert connection that it guarantees, between 
qualifications and jobs ‒ the relationship, which it surreptitiously records, under 
cover of formal equality, between the qualifications obtained and inherited 
cultural capital.” (Bourdieu 1999 [1980]: 133).  
This established order was so internalized that, when the new executive board in the 
YOK wanted to remove the coefficient factor in 2009, the Council of State annulled the decree. 
Then the YOK reduced the impact of the coefficient factor by 0.15 to 0.13, but the Council of 
State also annulled that attempt. This time, the YOK increased the coefficient factor a little by 
0.15 to 0.12. The YOK was taken to court in several lawsuits. In one of these lawsuits, a teacher 
high school senior plaintiff demanded to return to the old system by stating, “… his rivals 
increased [for university entrance] because of reducing the coefficient factor [from 0.3/0.8 to 
0.12/0.15]…) (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 2010/1).  
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Again, the correct issue here is not the appropriate number of imam-hatip schools, but 
who should teach religion to children? Or should a religion be taught in public schools? Does the 
law permit the teaching of religion to children by their parents or any other non-governmental 
organization?  
Examination of the debates in the National Assembly, along with education meetings of 
the Ministry of National Education since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, indicates that 
the same issues about religious education have been discussed over and over. Halis Ayhan 
observed that the same issues came up nearly every session until 1982, especially during the 
military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 (Ayhan 2004: 528).  
After the post-modern military intervention in 1997, the Turkish state wanted to restrict 
imam-hatip school graduates to their religious profession. In 1998, for example, the Council on 
Higher Education (YOK) decreased the scores of imam-hatip school graduates on the national 
university entrance exam by multiplying their grade point average (GPA) by 0.2, while general 
high school graduates’ GPA was multiplied by 0.5. A recently revealed secret document sent by 
the General Staff to the YOK before this change shows how the military was involved in every 
matter related to religion, especially during that time period. The document was signed by the 
second President of the General Staff and read as follows: “GPA issue abused by reactionary 
[Islamic] groups” and should be dealt with accordingly (Zaman 01/14/2009). Furthermore, just 
before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in October 2002, the YOK 
increased the differences for estimating GPA scores. In this new estimation, the scores of imam-
hatip graduates were multiplied by 0.3, while those of general high school graduates were 
multiplied by 0.8. This change became effective in the 2003 national university entrance exam. 
In the Turkish system, universities admitted students based only on their success in the national 
exam, with the exception of fine arts schools, which looked for skills other than scores on the 
national exam. In this case, an imam-hatip school graduate’s entrance to a university became 
almost impossible; even when these graduates received exceptionally high scores on the national 
university exam, they could attend only low-ranking universities. Since imam-hatip schools were 
classified as vocational schools, all other vocational schools were affected by these changes as 
well, even though the only reason for them was to prevent imam-hatip students from entering 
universities.  
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Between 1998 and 2002, 53 imam-hatip schools closed (Ocal 2011: 344-354). Because of 
the difficulty their graduates encountered in entering universities, most students and parents did 
not want to enroll in an imam-hatip school (see Appendix C).  
In the 1970-1971 academic year, imam-hatip schools had around 50 thousand students. 
When their graduates were allowed to enter universities, these numbers increased. Thus in 1981-
1982, there were over 200 thousand; in 1990-1991, over 300 thousand; and in 1996-1997, when 
they had the highest student population in their history, over 500 thousand students were being 
educated in these schools. The total student numbers represent students in both middle-level and 
high school sections of the imam-hatip schools. At first glance, these numbers would be seen as 
enormous, but even in their highest populated year of 1996-1997, students enrolled in imam-
hatip schools constituted only 9.3% of all students at the secondary education level. This 
proportion never passed 10.88%, which occurred in 1995-1996 (TESEV 2004: 103).  
After the prospect of entering a university was diminished because of an unfair 
examination system, and the middle-level sections (6th, 7th, and 8th grades) were closed, the 
number of students enrolled in imam-hatip schools dropped to around 65 thousand in the 2002-
2003 academic year. This number has increased somewhat since the AKP came to power in late 
2002; indeed, at the beginning of the AKP’s second term in 2007-2008, the number of students 
in imam-hatip schools reached nearly 130 thousand. In the third term of 2011-2012, this figure 
became nearly 270 thousand.  
Even though there were no legal changes in the situation of imam-hatip schools in the 
early years of the AKP government, the reason for the increasing number of students in these 
schools was that parents thought that this new government would soon solve the university 
entrance system issue. Since PM Erdogan and his children were graduates of imam-hatip 
schools, which meant that his children also would be “victims” of the coefficient factor (Hurriyet 
04/04/2004), parents felt encouraged to enroll their children in these schools. Clearly, they 
believed that the problems of the imam-hatip schools would be solved in a short time period 
before their children graduated.  
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C. 1. CHANGES RELATED TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION, MEB 
 
C. 1.1. Imam-Hatip High Schools, IHLs 
 
2002-2012 
The AKP came to power in November 2002. During the early months of that government, the 
first priority was to lift the political ban on Recep Tayyip Erdogan to allow him to be elected to 
Parliament. During the short term, therefore, the AKP avoided dealing with hot topics, spending 
most of its energy on starting negotiations for European Union membership. Then the AKP, with 
support of the CHP, changed the necessary laws to allow Erdogan to be eligible to participate in 
future elections. Indeed, in the next local elections in March 2003, Erdogan won a seat in 
Parliament and became Prime Minister (PM).  
In September 2003, in his monthly public TV speech, Erdogan mentioned that his 
government would change the YOK law and revoke the unfavorable coefficient factor in time for 
the 2004 university entrance exam. After this speech, Erdogan started to take the necessary steps 
to change the law. There were two main purposes for the suggested bill: increasing the power of 
the government over the executive board of the YOK, and reducing the effect of the coefficient 
factor for vocational school graduates. This legislation suggested dividing all high school 
programs into three categories: science, social science, and equal weight—which includes both 
science and social science in balance. If a student chose a university program related to his/her 
high school field, the coefficient factor would be 0.8; if not, then it would be 0.45. Thus all 
imam-hatip school students were considered to have had an education related to social science; if 
they chose a university program also related to social science, they would have equal opportunity 
with general high school graduates. Even though this legislation was still restricting them to 
certain fields, it was a lot better than the old system. 
However, even this small amendment met with an enormous reaction from the secular 
establishment of Turkey. Then-President of the Higher Education Board (YOK) Kemal Guruz 
declared, the YOK was “definitely against any amendments in the current higher education 
system in Turkey” (Hurriyet Daily News 10/25/2003). On 25 October 2003, some university 
presidents, their academic staff and students, along with Kemal Guruz and other stubborn 
secularists participated in a public demonstration called “Respect to the Republic March” by 
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visiting Ataturk’s tomb in Anitkabir, Ankara. They marched under a banner calling for a direct 
military coup, “Military, move in.” At the end of the march, Guruz declared, “Turkish 
universities are rigid against [Islamic] reactionism, ethnic division, and religious fundamentalism 
and would be that forever” (Hurriyet 10/26/2003). Almost nine years after this march, in 
February 2012, instead of the General Staff or the Turkish army, Turkish prosecutors “moved in” 
and took the “Military, Move in” banner to Guruz, when he was alleged to be part of a 
clandestine Ergenekon network accused of being nested within the state bureaucracy and 
working to overthrow democratically elected governments—or, more precisely, the AKP 
government. Guruz claimed that he never saw this banner during the march and did not know 
any network named Ergenekon (Milliyet 02/22/2012). While his trial continued, Guruz was 
arrested on the basis of another allegation of helping bring about the 1997 post-modern coup, 
which helped taking dawn of the cabinet of the PM Necmettin Erbakan (Today’s Zaman 
07/25/2012).  
The universities themselves opposed changing the rules to allow imam-hatip school 
graduates to attend under conditions equal to those of other high school graduates. Just before he 
AKP government finally passed this law in the National Assembly on 13 May 2004, the YOK, 
under its new president Erdogan Tezic, who was appointed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, 
released a public statement insisting that only the YOK was permitted to arrange the coefficient 
factor; thus imam-hatip school graduates should not apply to any university programs other than 
theology (Hurriyet 04/27/2004).  
 
Military  
The General Staff also released a public statement days before the bill was voted upon in 
Parliament. The statement, signed by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, denounced the 
pending bill as follows:   
This bill undermines both the Unification of Education Law and secular education 
itself. Current laws define imam-hatip schools as preparing students only for 
religious service-related jobs. The aforementioned bill is not aligned with the 
letter or the spirit of these laws…. The opinions and attitudes of the Turkish 
Armed Forces related to democracy, laicism, and constitutional status of the 
Republic are the same as in the past and will be the same in the future. Nobody 
should mistake or doubt the position and attitude of the Turkish Army Forces 
(Hurriyet 05/06/2004). 
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The practice of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to involve themselves in almost every 
political issue by releasing public statements, and holding news conferences is well-known in 
Turkey. However, Hilmi Ozkok, the Commander of TAF from 28 August 2002 until 30 August 
2006, tried to modify this tradition. He made an effort to stop discussing political issues in front 
of the media. Ardent secularists nonetheless criticized Ozkok’s compliance and silence with 
regard to AKP politics. The army itself mostly did not make statements about military or 
geopolitical issues. For example, on 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted a resolution, 
publicly known as the March 1st Resolution, to allow the deployment of US troops for the 
purpose of opening a northern front against Iraq before the US initiated the 2003-2011 Iraq War. 
The US promised a credit of eight billion dollars and assistance in eliminating the PKK terrorist 
organization located in northern Iraq. The AKP government waited for an explanation from the 
army to support the government’s decision. The National Security Council (MGK) met on 28 
February 2003, just one day before this resolution was voted on in Parliament, but it made no 
recommendation on this issue of military and foreign policy. The only sentence related to this 
resolution was the following: “The negotiations with the US have been evaluated with regard to 
the probable US military intervention in Iraq” (Hurriyet 02/28/2003), a total of 13 words in 
Turkish. For another very important geopolitical issue, the Annan Plan for Cyprus, Hilmi Ozkok 
stated, “Don’t expect us [the army] to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the Annan Plan. I cannot say ‘yes’ or 
‘no.’ The decision is up to the Turkish Cypriots” (Hurriyet 04/14/2004).  
At first glance, the relatively silence of the military to the March 1st and the Annan Plan 
would be interpreted as a change in the military; however, this was not an issue in the early years 
of 2000s. The military did not show a similar tendency for religious education issue. In addition, 
the above-mentioned Ergenkon trial and the Sledgehammer coup trial suggest that dozens of 
high-ranking military personnel would make plans to overthrow the AKP government in its early 
years in the power. Hundreds of military personal have been on trial in both cases respectively 
since 2008 and 2010. The Sledgehammer coup trial ended in September 2012. The court found 
guilty most defendants for planning a coup against the AKP government in 2003. Former 1st 
Army Commander Gen. Cetin Dogan, former Air Forces Commander Gen. Halil Ibrahim Firtina, 
and former Naval Forces Commander Adm. Ozden Ornek were initially given life imprisonment. 
The court ruled serving 20-year prison sentences because they were unsuccessful in 
overthrowing the government. Other over 200 serving and retired military officers were 
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sentenced 16-year imprisonment. The defendants appealed the case to the higher court (Today’s 
Zaman 09/21/2012).  The trail has not ended by 2013 yet. Therefore, the Commander of TAF 
(2002-2006), Hilmi Ozkok’s mild reactions to the AKP politics can be interpreted as a personal 
choice instead of a general change in the military at that time. In addition, staying silent during 
the March 1st Resolution might be interpreted as a political stand against the AKP government. It 
was known that the military wanted to pass the resolution, which opens the northern front to the 
US troops in 2003. Despite to this wish, the military did not publically announce it. Opposition 
parties and the majority of NGOs were also against this resolution. In that case, the AKP 
government was left the only component that received all public reactions. As a result of this 
public reaction, surprisingly, the AKP government couldn’t pass the resolution although it has an 
overwhelming majority in Parliament. In either case, it was a personal choice of the Commander 
of TAF Hilmi Ozkok or a strategic plan of other high-ranking military officials for leaving the 
AKP government alone to receive all public reactions, it seems to have weakened the secular 
camp politically.  
In comparison to the Turkish army’s mild reactions to the March 1st Resolution and the 
Annan Plan, it was harsh indeed with regard to the university education of the graduates of 
imam-hatip schools. Nobody at that time expected to see a change in the army’s attitude toward 
IHL students in the foreseeable future. However, eight years later, even the Turkish army 
changed unexpectedly. The TBMM Petition Commission prepared a report suggesting that 
imam-hatip school graduates might be able to apply to the Military College as of June 2012. The 
Commission stated that this report had been sent to several related branches of the state, 
including the General Staff, which had not objected to it (Sabah 09/17/2012). When the media 
covered this news, the General Staff made a short public statement to the effect that “the General 
Staff does not have a legal right to object to TBMM Commission reports” (Hurriyet 09/20/2012). 
And yet, when PM Erdogan announced his government’s intention, in September 2003, to allow 
imam-hatip school students to sit for the university entrance examination on an equal footing 
with other graduates, the most prominent objector was the Turkish army. Even in those days, this 
amendment did not cover the Military College. However, in 2012, the General Staff released no 
negative comments related to the Military College issue. This would be another noticeable 
example of how the relations between religion and the state evolved between 2002 and 2012.  
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Business Associations  
YOK and the army were not the only prominent actors opposed to the 2004 IHL bill. The 
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) observed that there were almost 65 
thousand students in IHLs and only 10 thousand available imam posts in the country’s mosques. 
Thus, it argued, many IHLs should be closed and their buildings converted to general high 
schools (Hurriyet 05/04/2004). In that political environment, the then-chairman of Turkey's 
Union of Bar Associations, Ozdemir Ozok14, said that he could not accept a Prime Minister who 
had graduated from an imam-hatip high school, referring to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan 
(Hurriyet 05/15/2004). 
Mentioned above was that the positions of YOK and the military against IHLs had 
changed. However, some institutions, TUSIAD among them, never changed their attitude against 
IHLs. When the new administration of YOK wanted to resolve the IHL issue in 2007, TUSIAD 
released a public statement almost identical with its 2004 stand, suggesting that IHL graduates be 
limited to the religious field and a large number of IHLs closed and converted to general high 
schools (Hurriyet 07/23/2009). In February 2012, when the AKP government wanted to pass a 
bill, known as 4+4+4, to reopen the middle-level school sections of imam-hatip schools, 
TUSIAD’s attitude was the same. However, this time it issued a milder statement that never 
mentioned imam-hatip schools or religious education as such, but only expressed its concerns 
related to vocational schools and the rate of schooling of female children (02/23/2012). PM 
Erdogan harshly replied to TUSIAD’s concerns, asserting that imam-hatip schools’ middle-level 
sections were closed during the 1997 post-modern intervention because of TUSIAD’s 1990 
report, mentioned above. He added, “Sorry, TUSIAD! Your wish will not come true, because it 
is not what the people want. I said to TUSIAD before that you mind your own business and let us 
mind our own business. Talk about whatever you want related to industry and trade. But don’t 
raise barriers for the education system of the country and of Anatolian children” (Hurriyet 
02/28/2012). TUSIAD replied to PM Erdogan’s criticism with the statement, “as a civil society 
organization, it had the democratic right to share its views on a proposed law. In a participatory 
democracy, sharing one’s views should not be seen as an ‘attack’…. We never mentioned the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ozok was appointed as being the Constitutional Court member by President Sezer in 2003; however, 
after news of his being registered party member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), he declined the 
post even though legally had the right to accept it.  
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issue of religious education in our statement on the proposed law and see the issue in light of an 
integrated approach to vocational education” (Today’s Zaman 03/04/2012). As can be seen, in 
contradiction to its previous statements in the early years of the AKP government, TUSIAD did 
not ground its position solely on the IHL issue and even deliberately retreated from this 
controversy. Indeed, contrary to the AKP’s early years, there was new criticism that the AKP had 
become so powerful that even NGOs feared to express their opinions against government 
actions.   
 
The Presidency   
The reader might wonder what happened to the 2004 IHL bill. Despite significant objections 
from members of the secular establishment, the AKP government passed the bill based on its 
majority in Parliament. However, then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, 2000-2007, vetoed the 
bill and returned it to the legislature, even though, if Parliament were to pass the same bill a 
second time, the President would lack the power to veto it again. In that event, he could either let 
it go or refer it to the Constitutional Court for annulment after approving it. In this case, the 
annual National University Entrance Exam was coming in two weeks and there was no way to 
pass the bill before the exam. Therefore, the AKP did not resubmit the bill in order to calm the 
uncomfortable political situation; instead, it postponed the IHL issue for unforeseeable future.  
President Sezer wrote 18 pages (almost 6000 words) of explanation for his veto. It was 
read in Parliament on 1 June 2004 (TBMM records 06/01/2004). He summarized his reasons for 
vetoing use of the coefficient factor under five categories. From this long explanation, I have 
quoted short passages under each of the five headings: 
A) “It is clear that the intention of this law is that IHL graduates would be 
able to benefit from the same coefficient factor as graduates of other general high 
schools if they choose to apply to university programs outside their field 
[theology]. Therefore, attending IHLs is being encouraged…. In addition, having 
an equal coefficient factor generates injustice for general high school graduates 
who have no vocational training and whose only opportunity is entering 
university.”  
B) “In addition, vocational secondary education is much more expensive 
than general secondary education. For every vocational school student, six times 
more resources are being used compared to a general high school student. 
Vocational schools were founded to provide blue-collar workers for the industry 
sector. Encouraging their graduates to apply to universities instead of fulfilling the 
mission of their schools [being a blue-collar worker for industries, for example] 
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wastes resources and reduces the educational quality of the universities. For these 
reasons, this bill does not carry out the principle of ‘being appropriate for the 
common good’ that should be the general purpose of every law.” 
C) “The examined bill’s real intentions are to facilitate the entrance of IHL 
graduates into university programs outside their field, and by making IHLs 
desirable again, increase the numbers of IHL students. However, it is known that 
even today there are more than enough students in these schools. Ministry of 
National Education statistics show that in 2003 there are 536 IHLs in Turkey, 
serving 105,000 students. Even though 5,000 imam-hatips are needed, almost 
25,000 students graduate from these high schools yearly. Research shows that as 
of 2003 more than 511,000 students have graduated from IHLs [since their 
establishment]. These figures show, without needing further explanation, a 
distortion in our education system and an important waste of our country’s 
resources.” 
D) “As a matter of fact, Article 13115 of the Constitution gives the task 
and authorization of ‘planning, organizing, administering, and supervising 
institutions of higher education’ to YOK. Therefore, controlling which secondary 
education graduates may enter which [university] programs under which criteria 
is granted to YOK…. For these reasons, the examined bill’s fifth article [about the 
coefficient] is against Articles 130 and 131 of the Constitution.”  
E) In his fifth reason for vetoing the education bill, President Sezer mentions the word 
secular(ism) 52 times. It may be assumed from his emphasis on secularism that his main 
objection to this bill was its violation of the secularism principle. Sezer emphasized,  
The bill that enables IHL graduates to enter university programs other than those 
in their field should be examined according to the secularism principle of the 
Constitution…. Article 1316 of the Constitution states that fundamental rights and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Superior Bodies of Higher Education (as amended on May 22, 2004). 
ARTICLE 131. “The Higher Education Council shall be established to plan, organize, administer, and 
supervise education provided by institutions of higher education, to orient teaching activities, education 
and scientific research, to ensure the establishment and development of these institutions in conformity 
with the objectives and principles set forth by law, to ensure the effective use of the resources allotted to 
the universities, and to plan the training of the teaching staff. The Higher Education Council is composed 
of members appointed by the President of the Republic from among candidates who are nominated by the 
Council of Ministers and universities, and in accordance with the numbers, qualifications and procedures 
prescribed by law, priority being given to those who have served successfully as members or rectors, and 
of members directly appointed by the President of the Republic. The organization, functions, authority, 
responsibilities and operating principles of the Council shall be regulated by law.” Before the 22 May 
2004 amendment, the General Staff was also sending a member to YOK.  
 
16 II. Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms  (as amended on 17 October 2001). 
ARTICLE 13. “Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with 
the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. 
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freedoms may be restricted according to necessity of a secular republic. Also 
Article 1417 states that constitutional rights and freedoms cannot be used as to 
remove the establishment of a secular republic. Therefore, abusing fundamental 
rights and freedoms to endanger the secular republic is prohibited… Article 17418 
of the Constitution covers the reform laws, aiming to protect the secular essence 
of the Republic of Turkey, under constitutional protection by counting these laws 
one by one…. Maintaining secular education in Turkey is implemented by the 
Unification of Education Law, Act No. 430, on 3 March 1924, secured by Article 
174 of the Constitution…. These schools [IHLs] were founded for male students 
only to train religious clergy and enable them to continue in their fields in higher 
education at the end of their secondary education. Investigations show that later 
regulations and practices have distorted the aim of the IHLs. In time, the IHLs 
have become an alternative institution, creating a dual education system, wherein 
important practices have been implemented against the principles of unification of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements 
of the democratic order of the society and the secular Republic and the principle of proportionality.” 
 
17 III. Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (as amended on 17 October  2001). 
ARTICLE 14. “None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the 
aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the 
existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights. No 
provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that enables the State or individuals to 
destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution or to stage an activity with the 
aim of restricting them more extensively than stated in the Constitution. The sanctions to be applied 
against those who perpetrate these activities in conflict with these provisions shall be determined by law.” 
 
18 I. Preservation of Reform Laws 
ARTICLE 174. “No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering 
unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of 
contemporary civilization and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force 
on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey. 
1. Act No. 430 of 3 March 1340 (1924) on the Unification of the Educational System; 
2. Act No. 671 of 25 November 1341 (1925) on the Wearing of Hats; 
3. Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and  
Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain 
Titles; 
4. The principle of civil marriage according to which the marriage act shall be concluded in the presence 
of the competent official, adopted with the Turkish Civil Code No. 743 of 17 February 1926, and Article 
110 of the Code; 
5. Act No. 1288 of 20 May 1928 on the Adoption of International Numerals; 
6. Act No. 1353 of 1 November 1928 on the Adoption and Application of the Turkish Alphabet; 
7. Act No 2590 of 26 November 1934 on the Abolition of Titles and Appellations such as Efendi, Bey or 
Pasa; 
8. Act No. 2596 of 3 December 1934 on the Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments.” 
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education and secularism. Since the IHLs were founded in order to train the 
religious clergy necessary for the country, keeping the number of high schools 
and their students in line with the country’s needs is appropriate to the concept of 
the unification of education and secularism…. Abiding by the principle of the 
unification of education is imperative if education is to direct political and social 
consciousness. In the reverse situation, new schools would be opened in place of 
closed schools [such as madrasas] according to the unification of education 
principle [a law passed in 1924]. As a result, escalating IHLs to the general high 
school level or offering the same university education rights to their graduates is 
not compatible with the unification of education law that is designed to secularize 
education; nor is it compatible with the secularism principle; with an educational 
approach that stands on a democratic, secular, egalitarian, fair, functional, and 
scientific foundation; nor it is compatible with the spirit of the Constitution’s 
foundation on the Ataturk tenets and revolutions.  
TBMM records end with the notation, “applause from the CHP rows.” Other secularists 
were also satisfied with the veto and Sezer’s explanations. On the other hand, these explanations 
did not make the conservative side of Turkey happy.  
In the foreign press, the New York Times interpreted the veto as a setback for democracy: 
The veto is a setback to religious freedom and equal opportunity in Turkey, 
preconditions for a flourishing democracy…. When the education reform was 
passed in May, Turkish financial markets dropped on fears that the military might 
intervene to defend the secular order. The worst didn't happen. The president 
vetoed the bill on legalistic grounds and the ruling party plans to redraft the 
proposal. The issue needs addressing. Turkey's 536 religious schools are 
coeducational and, with the exception of Koran study, teach the same curriculum 
as nonreligious schools. Their 64,500 students are as much Turkey's future as are 
the sons and daughters of the secular elite (New York Times, 06/06/2004).  
If we examine President Sezer’s reasons for his veto, in his second argument he stated 
that educating a student in a vocational school costs six times more to the state than a general 
high school student does. This would indeed be the case for other vocational schools, since they 
have workshops and special tools, but in the case of imam-hatip schools there is no special 
equipment. Furthermore, statistics show that “the majority of Imam-hatip high schools and their 
dormitories were constructed and furnished through donations from conservative segments of 
society. Sixty-five percent of Imam-hatip high schools and approximately half of the dormitories 
have been built without state assistance” (TESEV 2004: 43). Even in their highest populated 
year, with around a half of million students, the budget of the IHLs was 4% of the budget of the 
Ministry of National Education. This figure surpassed 4% only twice, in 1986 and 1988, by 6.2 
and 6.3% respectively (Ozcan 2010: 124. See Appendix D).  
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President Sezer mentions the Unification of Education Law and how it is important to 
shape the new ideology of the Republic and raise Turkish society above the level of 
contemporary civilizations. As the first of eight Reform Laws, which were implemented by 
Ataturk, it is protected by Article 174 of the Constitution. However, President Sezer violated the 
second of the Reform Laws under the same Article in the Constitution—Act No. 671 of 25 
November 1341 (1925) on the Wearing of Hats. According to this law, every state official should 
wear a hat. Indeed, the Wearing of Hats law has the same aim as the Unification of Education 
Law, namely, “to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization and to 
safeguard the secular character of the Republic” as expressed in Constitution. However, 
President Sezer did not see any objection to not implementing it himself.  
As we see in the hat law, there are some issues in Turkish politics that continue under the 
principle of “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” There are always some restrictions on human rights because 
of Turkey’s “special conditions,” which are so subjective that they change from person to person. 
Religious education is one of these special conditions of Turkey. It cannot be left to individuals; 
therefore, it should be controlled by the state.  
 
Higher Education Board, YOK 
In one of his other reasons, President Sezer found the IHL bill unconstitutional because deciding 
on the coefficient factor is a duty of YOK, not the government, as he asserted in his fourth 
category. Previous court decisions also leaned this way. When YOK implemented the coefficient 
factor in 1999, many students filed lawsuits against YOK, but all of them failed, since the courts 
decided that YOK was the only institution that could decide on the effect of the coefficient 
factor. 
The Council of State, the highest administrative court in Turkey, confirmed YOK’s 
authority on the size of the coefficient factor several times. In the first lawsuit against the use of 
a coefficient factor in 1998, the Council of State initially rejected the demand for a stay of 
implementation, later judging that the “No.1739 Basic Law of National Education … states that 
how graduates of secondary education enter higher education institutions is decided by YOK in 
cooperation with the Ministry of National Education” on 04/04/2000 (Council of State. 8. 
Chamber, App. No. 1998/4807, D. No. 2000/2522).  
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On another occasion, in 2000, an IHL graduate, Sinan KAYNAR, filed a lawsuit against 
YOK. The outcome was the same. The Council of State denied a stay of implementation, later 
finding on 02/11/2002 that YOK was within its rights (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 
2000/4819, D. No. 2002/893). The student also lost the appeal in a plenary session of the same 
court on 12/09/2004 (Council of State, Plenary Session of the Chambers for Administrative 
Case, App. No. 2002/556, D. No. 2004/1966).  
Once more, another vocational high school student who took the university exam in 2001 
lost a lawsuit on 12/23/2002 (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 2001/3391, D. No. 
2002/6267), as well as an appeal on 12/09/2004 (Council of State, Plenary Session of the 
Chambers for Administrative Case, App. No. 2003/869, D. No. 2004/1969) for the same reasons.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also found no violation of educational 
rights because of the implementation of a different coefficient factor for vocational high school 
graduates in its partial decision on 05/12/2009 related to the applications of two Turkish 
students. ECHR, joining the two applications, ruled on 02/15/2011 that the only violation of 
Article 6.1 was that the Turkish trials took more than a reasonable time to rule on the issue 
(ECHR, Akat and Kaynar vs. Turkey, App. No 3470/04 and App. No. 2399/06). 
 
Ministry of National Education, MEB 
In the early years of its governance, the AKP looked for other legal ways to allow IHL graduates 
to have an equal chance on the university entrance exams. First, IHL graduates failed in the 
judicial system regarding the injustice of the differing coefficient factors. Second, President 
Sezer vetoed the YOK bill, and the AKP did not bring the bill to Parliament again in 2004.   
At the end of 2005, eighteen months after the education bill veto, the AKP government 
tried a third way to eliminate the coefficient factor. The Ministry of National Education released 
an official notice (yonetmelik) on 12/14/2005 for distance high school education. As mentioned 
above, a similar notice in 1999 prevented IHL students from transferring to general high schools 
or distance high school education programs. With this new notice, however, IHL students gained 
the right to transfer to a distance education high school program even if they had already 
graduated. They were to be able to transfer all course credits that were comparable to courses 
offered by a general high school. Since IHL curriculum covered all general high school curricula, 
by transferring their credits, these students would need to take few, if any, more additional 
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credits; thus they would earn distance education high school diplomas with little more effort and 
would be able to take the university entrance exam with the same coefficient factor as other 
general high school students.  
However, the happiness of IHL students did not last long. YOK immediately sued the 
MEB, demanding a stay of implementation and annulment of the notice, alleging that “this notice 
tries to eliminate the coefficient factor that has been implemented since 1999.” The Council of 
State then ordered a stay of implementation on 02/07/2006 (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. 
No. 2005/6384, D. No. 2005/6384).  
After this court order, the Ministry decided, nonetheless, to accept applications sent prior 
to the court’s order date, since they were considered as vested rights. Nevertheless, YOK 
protested this decision also. On 06/07/2006, the Council of State stayed implementation of the 
new regulation, stating that these applicants did not have any vested rights, since the court’s 
order covered the publication and implementation of this notice (Council of State, 8. Chamber, 
App. No. 2006/1249, D. No. 2006/1249). The MEB objected to this decision, but lost its case to 
YOK (Council of State, Plenary Session of the Chambers for Administrative Case, App. No. 
2006/979) and later (06/05/2007) the entire lawsuit (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 
2006/1249, D. No. 2007/3449).  
On 07 March 2007, the court finalized the decision on the first case, finding for YOK and 
annulling MEB’s notice allowing IHL students to acquire distance education diplomas (Council 
of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 2005/6384, Dec. No. 2007/1259).  
 
Judicial System  
The AKP government did not pass the YOK limitations until the end of 2007. However, when 
Abdullah Gul became president in 2007 and appointed a new president, Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, of 
YOK on 12/11/2007, along with some new executive board members one by one, the new 
administration clearly wanted to make the coefficient factor equal for every student.  
Then the same court decided that this was not solely a decision for YOK to make. YOK 
had initiated the different coefficient factors in 1999 on its own, but it did not have the power to 
revoke its own decision. When YOK stopped requiring different coefficient factors on 21 July 
2009, the Council of State on 11/20/2009 ordered a stay of implementation of the new ruling for 
one plaintiff and on 12/01/2010 for another plaintiff (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 
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2009/8626; and App. No. 2009/6890. For final decision D. No. 2011/1288 on 03/04/2011; and D. 
No. 2011/4384 on 10/05/2011. The court decided that “there is no ground for a decision,” since 
YOK already changed the challenged grounds). YOK also lost its challenge on 12/10/2009 
(Council of State, Plenary Session of the Chambers for Administrative Case, App. No. 
2009/1005; and App. No. 2010/160). 
A secret General Staff Intelligence Department report on 21 August 2009 shows that the 
military did not lose interest in the imam-hatip issue; it was, indeed, closely following the 
coefficient decisions of the new YOK at that time. The report stated, “The coefficient obstacle 
before IHL graduates is being removed by the new regulation, so that their entrance into higher 
education institutions has become more just. Therefore, it is likely that conservative people will 
have more places in the public sector” (Zaman 12/03/2009).    
After failing to win the initial lawsuits, then-YOK President Yusuf Ziya Ozcan stated in 
his press release in December 2009, “We have contingency plans already drawn up, including 
options B, C, D, and E on the table” (Todays Zaman 12/12/2009). As a part of its “Plan B,” YOK 
reduced the effect of the coefficient factor significantly by 0.13 for vocational schools to 0.15 for 
general high schools on 17 December 2009. Immediately thereafter, two lawsuits were opened 
against YOK. The Council of State on 10/27/2010 ordered a stay of implementation for these 
new coefficient factors, since they were “aiming to make the previous stay of implementation 
ineffective” (Council of State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 2010/1 and App. No. 2010/2. The final 
decision D. No. 2011/942 came on 02/16/2011. The court decided that “there is no ground for a 
decision” since YOK had already changed the challenged grounds). YOK also lost its protest on 
02/18/2010 (Council of State, Plenary Session of the Chambers for Administrative Cases, App. 
No. 2010/148). 
Afterwards, YOK moved on to its Plan C on 17 March 2010, when it increased the effect 
of the coefficient factor a little more than in its previous decision, to 0.12 for vocational high 
school graduates and 0.15 for all other high school graduates. This time the Council of State did 
not order a stay of implementation, finding YOK’s decision correct on 16 April 2010 (Council of 
State, 8. Chamber, App. No. 2010/2304). 
Since its first implementation in 1999, in the twelfth university entrance exam, IHL 
students along with other vocational high school students would have the opportunity to take a 
fairer exam, although the effect of the coefficient factor was still not completely eliminated, 
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since over one and half million students were taking this exam and even very late decimals were 
important to estimate students’ entrance scores to universities.  
Finally, on 30 November 2011, just ten days before YOK President Yusuf Ziya Ozcan’s 
term ended, YOK removed all differences based on the coefficient factor. Two CHP members of 
Parliament brought this decision to the court also (Hurriyet 20/01/2012). However, in contrast to 
the previous cases, this time CHP preferred to stay silent and did not make this lawsuit an official 
party matter. As of 1 January 2013, there was no final decision, but it seemed likely that the 
court would accept YOK’s decision this time.  
In the 2012 university entrance exam, the fourteenth since its first implementation in 
1999, IHL students had an equal chance with general high school students for entrance into a 
university.  
This summary highlights the difficulty in explaining the development of the relationship 
between religion and the state between 2002 and 2012 based on consideration of religious 
education. The same state institutions behaved in a totally erratic and inconsistent way in a 
relatively short time period; although it appears that the policy was relatively consistent before 
that period as I mentioned in its historical process concerning state-taught religion. In the early 
years of the Republic between 1923 and 1950, the Turkish state had a negative view for the 
religion. The early rulers of the Turkish state deduced that Islam was the main reason for the 
regression of the Ottomans. They wanted to erase the religion to catch the level of contemporary 
civilizations. After the transition to multi-party democracy, this negative tendency was broken to 
secure conservative votes. The state-religion relations had gradually consolidated between 1950 
and 1997 with few exceptions. The 28 February 1997 MGK recommendations almost totally 
ruined this consolidation between 1997 and 2002. Once again, between 2002 and 2012, this 
relationship has gradually consolidated. However, this period was different than the previous 
periods on that the state institutions was not agree on the same state policy. They were a constant 
struggle. Hence it is important to understand the notion of the state in Turkey. 
 
The State: What is it? 
 Since the time of the Ottomans, Turkish people have referred to the state as a source of power; 
they have even coined the word "father-state," (devlet-baba), a term emphasizing that the state 
protects and feeds its people as would the father in a family. Even today the Turkish news 
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organizations use this term as in “The father-state helps flood victims,” “The father-state offers 
communication skills for new couples,” “Traffic victim waits for help from the father-state,” 
“The father-state protects rape victim’s unwanted child.” In politics, when then-PM Turgut Ozal 
specified, “The state is not a father,” he lost voters to his rivals (Taha Akyol, Hurriyet, 
04/10/2012). Even female students who are not accepted on university campuses because they 
are wearing headscarves have carried banners reading “Father-state send me to school.”   
In sociology, state is defined as a political entity using legitimate power through certain 
established institutions on a defined territory. Max Weber defined state in his Politics as a 
Vocation as an entity having the right to use physical force in a particular territory. According to 
him,  
A state is human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one 
of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use 
physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent 
to whish the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ 
to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving 
to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within 
a state (Weber 1991 [1948]: 78, and see Weber ?: 156). 
Weber also offers the example of a father's power over his children for his definition of 
the state: 
The modern state possesses the following primary formal characteristics: an 
administrative and judicial authority subject to statutory change, and to which the 
organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, also subject to statutory 
change, is oriented. This system of authority claims validity not only for the 
members of the state, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also 
to a large extent for all conduct occurring within the area of its jurisdiction; it is 
thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis. In addition, the use of force 
today is regarded as legitimate only insofar as it is either permitted by the state or 
prescribed by it. Thus, it leaves to the father the right to punish his children, 
which is a survival of the once independent authority of the head of the household 
to use force even to the extent of exercising the power of life and death over 
children and slaves. This claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force 
is a distinguished mark as essential to it as its aspect of compulsory jurisdiction 
and of continuous organization (Weber 1978 [1962]: 122).   
Michael Mann derives his definition of state from Weber in his enormous series titled 
The Sources of Social Power. According to him, “The state is a differentiated set of institutions 
and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover 
a territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of abiding and permanent rule-
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making, backed up by physical violence” (Mann 2003 [1986]: 37). In Erik Olin Wright’s 
definition, “the state is the cluster of institutions, more or less coherently organized, which 
imposes binding rules and regulations over a territory” (Wright ?: 118-119).  
In other words, a state should have a territory, established and differentiated institutions, 
and legitimate power. However, using the power to establish binding rules brings the interests of 
different groups to the attention of the state. As Weber notes, in this power struggle politicians 
are “never the sole determining figures in the mechanism of the political power struggle" (Weber 
1991: p. 158). Michael Mann defines power as “the capacity to get others to do things that they 
would otherwise not do”; he categorizes four modalities of power to define involved endeavors: 
ideological power, economic power, military power, and political power. In political power, he 
refers to state power, excluding it from all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social 
movements, and corporations, since state power is geographically bounded within its 
jurisdiction, while other elements do not have this boundary. In this sense, states cover smaller 
areas than ideologies, economies, or military striking power.  
However, exercise of political power can be carried out in different ways. A state could 
have despotic or infrastructural powers. In despotic power, state elites are enabled to make 
arbitrary decisions without consulting civic society, or they may keep civic society’s concerns 
outside the decision mechanism. In infrastructural power, a state, whether despotic or 
democratic, can penetrate society and implement political decisions according to its concerns. In 
this policy-making process, a modern state would take different forms according to the political 
issues of interest and those lobbying for them (Mann 2003: 5-14).   
In summary, people frequently talk about the state as a monolithic entity; in fact, the state 
consists of different organs with different agendas and styles of control. As a result, when we 
talk about the relationship between the state and religion, we should not understand state as 
synonymous with government; at the same time, we should not think that laws and their 
interpretation and implementation are the result of governmental actions alone. Too often people 
associate the government with the entire state. But a government is not always the most powerful 
decision-making body in a country, nor does it act in a vacuum; a state’s decisions can also arise 
from the influence of civil society, which consists of the entire ruling class and its institutions. 
Even though differences are present from country to country, judicial bodies, universities, the 
military, the media, the affluent class, large national and international companies, and sometimes 
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religious leaders and artists help compose the state ideology and affect its actions along with the 
government.  
Then another question arises: What is the limit of this influence in a democratic system? 
Moreover, what is democracy and how is it to be achieved? Linz and Stepan define the transition 
to democracy in the following passage (Linz and Stepan 1996: 3): 
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached 
about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government 
comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this 
government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the 
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does 
not have to share power with other bodies de jure. 
According to Linz and Stepan, a country is democratically consolidated when democracy 
becomes “the only game in town.” When this happens, it means that no significant political 
groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime; all the actors in the polity become 
habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to established norms; even 
in crises, most people believe that any further political change must emerge from the parameters 
of democratic formulas (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5).  
In this formula, there is no way for an undemocratic approach to change a policy. But 
Turkish politics have not been beyond concern, as we saw in the fears expressed by the financial 
markets in the 2004 education bill. As the New York Times reported, “When the education 
reform was passed in May, Turkish financial markets dropped on fears that the military might 
intervene to defend the secular order” (New York Times, 06/06/2004).  
Turkish politics lived the same fears during 2007 presidential elections. In the first night 
of the president elections voted in Parliament on 27 April 2007, the General Stuff released a 
statement about presidential elections saying, "it should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed 
forces are a side in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism … the Turkish armed 
forces are against those debates ... and will display its position and attitudes when it becomes 
necessary. No one should doubt that." Because this statement was published on Turkish General 
Staff’s official webpage, it was called the e-memorandum (Todays Zaman  04/28/2007). 
This e-memorandum mostly did not find expected public or even elite support; on the 
contrary, it might have helped to increase the AKP’s public support for incoming elections that 
summer. Regardless of its effects, this e-memorandum tried to interfere in Turkish democracy 
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and stayed on the Turkish Army Forces’ webpage until August 2011 (see Todays Zaman 
12/29/2011).  
Even though they were under democratic system, some high court decisions could be 
examined according to this consolidated democracy principle since some of them sound more 
like political decisions during the examined time period, 2002-2012. The Council of State’s early 
decisions were highlighting YOK’s autonomy on coefficient factor; however, when YOK, under 
its new administration, wanted to remove it, the Council of State ruled against its previous 
decisions. Afterwards, PM Erdogan criticized, “This decision shows the inner contradiction of 
the court. This is totally an ideological decision. I personally have difficulty understanding it” 
(Hurriyet Daily News 11/27/2009).  
The imam-hatip issue was one of the prominent issues that almost caused the disbanding 
of the AKP in 2008. The Chief Public Prosecutor opened a case against the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) demanding dissolving the party and disbanding its party leaders from 
politics with an allegation that this party became a hotbed of activities against the principle of 
secularism. The Chief Public Prosecutor mentioned the imam-hatip issue dozens of times in his 
lawsuit petition. The Constitutional Court was only one vote short to dissolve the AKP. Six of 
eleven judges of the court were in favor of dissolving the party; four of them demanded financial 
sanctions; only one judge, the president of the court Hasim Kilic, was in favor of rejecting the 
case. A very recent change under the EU amendments in the Constitution before this lawsuit, that 
increased vote number from six to seven for closing a political party, saved AKP’s life 
unintentionally. In this change on 17 October 2001, Article 149 of the Constitution was amended 
as:  
The Constitutional Court shall convene with its president and ten members, and 
shall take decisions by absolute majority. Decision of annulment of Constitutional 
amendments and closure in the cases of the political parties shall be taken by 
three-fifths majority. 
The Constitutional Court ruled financial sanctions by stripping half of annual state 
assistance of the AKP in 2008. The Constitutional Court’s decision was based on secularism 
principle;   
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Having assessed the evidence put forward, the Court found that activities 
contravening Article 68.419 of the Constitution had been carried out intensely and 
in a determined manner by the leader and members of the defendant party and it 
had become a center for such activities. Although the Court accepted that there 
was social demand for the removal of the headscarf ban in universities, the age 
restrictions concerning the Quran courses, and the coefficient limitation applied to 
Religious Vocational High Schools [IHL], it found that the defendant party did 
not carry out its political struggle on these issues in line with the choice 
crystallized in the concrete rules of the Constitution. These problems were 
transformed into the basic problems of politics, to a degree that would create 
tensions and divisions within society. The religious sensitivities of the society 
were being exploited for the blatant pursuit of political gain, and it had become 
harder for the fundamental economic, social, and cultural problems of the society 
to rise to the forefront of the political agenda. The President, Mr H. Kiliç 
expressed a dissenting opinion on this point” (Constitutional Court App. No. 
2008/1 D. N. 2008/2). 
With this ruling the Constitutional Court officially declared that the AKP leaders 
participated in intense and determined activities that were undermining democratic and secular 
principles of the Republic of Turkey and this party became a center for these activities. In its 
official English summary section, while expressing there is a social demand, the Constitutional 
Court counts these harmful activities one by one, “the removal of the headscarf ban in 
universities, the age restrictions concerning the Quran courses, and the coefficient limitation 
applied to Religious Vocational High Schools [IHLs].” 
All of the harmful activities mentioned about the AKP were related to education, 
especially religious education. The Constitutional Court was accepting that there was a social 
demand for religious education related to Quran courses and IHLs; however, responding to these 
public demands as a ruling party could not be acceptable. When the President of the 
Constitutional Court Hasim Kilic read the decision of the AKP case on 30 July 2008 he said, 
"There is no verdict on closure because the seven votes required by the Constitution for closure 
were not reached." Even though he was the only judge dissenting the verdict, by mentioning 
financial sanctions ruled by all other court members, he emphasized "However, in this ruling, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 III. Provisions Relating to Political Parties. A. Forming Parties, Membership and Withdrawal From 
Membership in a Party 
ARTICLE 68. Fourth paragraph. “The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties 
shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and 
nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of 
the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship 
or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.” 
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warning, a serious warning, has been issued to the party, and I hope this conclusion will be 
evaluated and actions will be taken accordingly" (BBC News 07/31/2008. Hurriyet 07/31/2008. 
Most English translations lost the repeating of the word “warning” two times, and so, judge 
Kilic’s emphasis on it). 
In other words, the Constitutional Court was seriously warning the ruling AKP (which 
won national elections in 2002 by 34%, municipal elections in 2004 by 42%, and national 
elections in 2007 by 47%) to ignore elector and more generally public demands on religion; 
otherwise, suffer its consequences, including dissolving the party.   
In its early years of the government, the AKP learned a new political theory. Even if there 
was a public demand, and moreover if this demand was so strong and widespread that would be 
interpreted as a social consensus, making totally legal changes needs approval of another 
consensus: institutional consensus.  
 
Social Consensus vs. Institutional Consensus  
To live, like a tree, single and free, 
And like a forest, in brotherhood. 
(Nazim Hikmet Ran)  
Whenever problems related to headscarf banning in universities and religious education were 
discussed in politics, there was a magic word to solve these problems: social consensus. For 
instance, one of the former PMs and then-deputy of PM, Mesut Yilmaz, in 2002, was saying the 
headscarf issue would be solved legally only after a broad social consensus, months before the 
AKP came to rule (Hurriyet 04/29/2002).  Seventy percent of Turkish women were wearing 
headscarves but, for some reason, Turkish politics did not find a social consensus to lift 
headscarf banning in universities and was still demanding a broad social consensus.   
The AKP leaders referred to social consensus countless times to solve headscarf banning 
and religious education issues (see such as, Hurriyet Daily News 3/10/2002; 6/25/2002; 
10/21/2002; 11/08/2002; 11/24/2002; 10/15/2003). When the AKP got majority in the Parliament 
in 2002, it interpreted it as one of the signs of social consensus.  
The first legal attempt to solve one of these problems was the education bill that would 
reduce the effects of the coefficient factor in favor of IHLs. As I mentioned previously, this bill 
first came to intention in September and October 2003 and later between April and June in 2004. 
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In that time, just before this bill was voted in the Parliament, the General Staff stated that the 
military is against this bill in May 2004. PM Erdogan criticized that the General Staff has no 
business becoming involved in political decision-making and clarified, “A social consensus is 
not a consensus between institutions but of the nation” (Hurriyet Daily News 05/11/2004; 
05/16/2004).  
In his next day’s column, Mehmet Barlas from Sabah newspaper was reminding PM 
Erdogan of the importance of institutional consensus in Turkish politics “‘Nation’ brings to 
power, but ‘Institutions’ end power!..” (Barlas, Sabah, 05/12/2004).  
Actually, two weeks before YOK and the General Staff expressed their concerns about 
the coefficient factor, the President of the Constitutional Court, Mustafa Bumin, stated that 
removing headscarf banning in universities is unconstitutional and any attempt to remove it by 
changing laws or the constitution would return from the Constitutional Court in his speech for 
the 42nd anniversary of the court. PM Erdogan was listening to the speech before him. After the 
speech, PM Erdogan stated to press when it was asked his opinions about the speech: 
I was claiming a theory before 2002 elections; it was social consensus. Today, I 
am more clearly state that there is a social consensus and also consensus of the 
Parliament and other institutions. It seems that social consensus and institutional 
consensus are not running together (Hurriyet 04/25/2005; see for more details 
Ergul 2005; Hale and Ozbudun 2010: 72). 
The AKP learned the importance of institutional consensus in a hard way. Even its first 
week in the Parliament, Turkish politicians and the media were talking about how “being in 
power and being able to implementing this power are totally different” by referring the AKP 
government (see Hurriyet 11/14/2002). This difference showed its results during the early 
attempts on religious education. The AKP was in power and had all legal rights but this power 
was not enough to reduce effects on the coefficient factor in IHLs.  
Discussions on institutional consensus had gone on for a long time but gradually faded 
while power of institutions shrunk against the government. The concept of social consensus has 
not lost its popularity but proved that it was an ambiguous and vague term. Every side of 
discussants referred to his/her opinions as representing the society.  
The AKP believed that it represented a social demand on religious education. On the 
other hand, its opponents accused the AKP of behaving in majoritanism instead of pluralistic 
democracy. In the early years of the AKP, there was a strong argument that participation in 2002 
elections was limited; turnout was just over 79%. Because of 10% threshold in elections, only 
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two parties entered the Parliament. Therefore, the AKP’s 34% vote did not represent the whole 
society although the AKP had overwhelming majority in the Parliament. Making legal changes 
on headscarf banning in universities and religious education while relying upon the majority in 
the Parliament would miss social consensus.  
In 2007 elections, the turnout was over 85%. The AKP raised its votes to 47% but its 
seats retreated to 341 since a third party passed 10% national threshold. Secularist CHP got 112 
seats with 21%. Nationalist MHP got 71 seats with 14%. Independent candidates won 26 seats 
with 5%. Even though 10% national threshold was still high and could have some critics, nobody 
could question that this Parliament did not represent the society since over 85% of voters 
participated in the elections and around 87% of votes were presented in the Parliament, among 
550 parliament members.  
Even this kind of high representation did not stop arguments on majoritanism, 
majoritarian imposition, tyranny of the majority, pluralistic democracy, social consensus, and 
giving some elected leader examples such as Hitler, Milosevic, and Ahmadinejad.  
In February 2008, the AKP with help of the MHP and some independent parliament 
members (MP) decided to lift headscarf banning in universities by making a constitutional 
amendment. Article 1 of Law no. 5735 added the phrase "in using all forms of public service" 
following the phrase "in all their procedures" in Article 10.4 of the Constitution which would 
have become "State organs and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the 
principle of equality before the law in all their procedures and in using all forms of public 
service." Article 2 of Law no. 5735 added the following paragraph as the seventh paragraph 
to Article 42 of the Constitution "No one shall be deprived of the right to higher education for 
any reason not explicitly written in the law. Limitations on the exercise of this right shall be 
determined by the law."  
411 MPs voted ‘yes’ versus 103 ‘no’ out of 550 MPs on 09 February 2008. The next day, 
the headline of a top-selling newspaper, Hurriyet (Liberty), was “411 HANDS RAISED TO 
CHAOS” (Hurriyet 02/10/2008). The chief editor of the newspaper was expressing his fears on 
“tyranny of the majority” in his column (Ozkok, Hurriyet, 02/13/2008). The next month, in her 
live TV program, a famous movie star questioned how vulgar people brought the AKP to power 
and how her vote would be considered equal to the vote of shepherd on a mountain (Hurriyet 
03/28/2008).  
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In that environment, the Constitutional Court was an assurance for secularists and the 
court annulled the constitutional amendment to lift the headscarf ban in universities on June 5, 
2008. The Court stated, 
Under Article 148 of the Constitution, constitutional amendments can be 
examined and reviewed only as to their form. The review of constitutional 
amendments is restricted to assessment of whether the requisite majorities were 
obtained for the proposal and in the ballot, and whether the prohibition on debates 
under urgent procedure was observed. This provision bestows no competence on 
the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments as regards their substance. 
In other words, the court officially accepted that it had no legal right to examine this 
bill’s substance. However, for the sake of secularism the court ruled beyond its power,  
Article 4 of the Constitution prohibits the proposal of amendments to the first 
three. Parliament therefore had no power to propose such an amendment. The 
Court accordingly decided that it was within its jurisdiction to examine whether a 
constitutional amendment directly or indirectly changed the irrevocable 
provisions of the Constitution. President Mr H. Kiliç and Justice Mr S. Adali 
expressed dissenting opinions on this point, on the ground that the Constitution 
did not allow the Constitutional Court to review constitutional amendments with 
regard to their substance and such a decision can not be made without substantive 
review. 
In summary,  
The Court gave a ruling as to substance, stating that the aim of the legislation was 
revealed both in the reasoning of the law and during parliamentary debate on the 
lifting of the ban on wearing the headscarf at universities. The Court reiterated 
that the prohibition on the wearing of the headscarf at universities was found 
legitimate by the European Court of Human Rights in Leyla Sahin in order to 
protect the rights of others in a Muslim majority country. The Court therefore 
ruled that lifting the ban on wearing the headscarf at universities is contrary to 
principle of secularism, and that the amendments in Articles 10 and 42 of the 
Constitution indirectly amended Article 220, which is irrevocable. Therefore, Law 
no. 5735 is out of line with Articles 4 and 148 of the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court overturned the contested provisions of Law no. 5735. 
President Mr. H. Kiliç and Justice Mr. S. Adali expressed dissenting opinions on 
this point, to the effect that the amendments were not contrary to the principle of 
secularism (Constitutional Court, App. No. 2008/16 D. No. 2008/116).  
The next month, as I mentioned before, after the headscarf amendment in Parliament, the 
Chief Public Prosecutor opened a case against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ARTICLE 2. “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of 
law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human 
rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.” 
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demanding the dissolution of the party and disbandment of its party leaders from politics in 
2008. The Constitutional Court ruled financial sanctions because of violating the secularism 
principle on the issues of “the headscarf ban in universities, the age restrictions concerning the 
Quran courses, and the coefficient limitation applied to IHLs.” 
The AKP government always condemned the Council of State’s decisions on the 
coefficient factor and the Constitutional Court’s decisions on the headscarf amendment and 
presidential elections in 2007. However, these condemnations did not change anything since the 
AKP did not have any power on the judiciary, especially on the higher courts.  
From time to time, independence of courts is among debated issues in Turkey. However, 
neutrality of courts has not found the same interest as much as independence of the court system. 
One columnist in Milliyet newspaper, Taha Akyol brought attention to this issue by comparing 
Milliyet newspaper’s coverage on independence and neutrality of courts. News related to 
independence of courts appeared 333 times while neutrality of courts appeared only twenty times 
between 1997 and 1999. This gap has been reducing lately: ten years later, between 2007 and 
2009, these numbers changed to 113 and 68 respectively. Mr. Akyol continued this examination 
on inauguration speeches of the presidents of the Supreme Court of Appeals at the beginning of 
legal years between 1969 and 2007 by omitting the term of judge Sami Selcuk between 1999 and 
2002. This nearly forty years term revealed that these presidents used independence of courts 
436 times but neutrality of courts only 49 times. Judge Sami Selcuk was an exception and 
mentioned neutrality of courts 83 times in his three years term, 1999-2002 (Akyol, Milliyet, 
01/13/2010). 
In 2010, the AKP brought several constitutional amendments to Parliament including an 
increase for members of the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK), which oversees judicial appointments. In this amendment, the members of 
the Constitutional Court increased from eleven to seventeen and Parliament had a right to elect 
three of them; the rest were appointed by the President as happened before.  
Although judges have tenure in the Turkish judicial system, HSYK controls the careers of 
judges and prosecutors through appointments, transfers, promotions, and discipline penalties. 
The amendments increased members of HSYK from seven to twenty two. Ten members of 
HSYK were chosen by votes of all judges and prosecutors, approximately 12,000, at the national 
level. The other ten members are appointed by the President, the Court of Appeals, the Council 
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of State, and the Justice Academy. The remaining two members were the minister and the under 
secretary of justice.  
Supporters of the bill welcomed the changes since in the previous system the Council of 
State and the Supreme Court of Appeals were choosing five members of HSYK. In the 
meantime, HSYK was appointing all members of the Supreme Court of Appeals and three out of 
every four members of the Council of the State. That was causing an unbroken cycle in the 
higher court system where diverse ideas could not find a place in higher judicial system. 
Therefore, the bill was suggesting a more diverse and neutral ground. 
Opponents of the bill were arguing in opposition that the government increases its 
influence on the judiciary system. Other parties in Parliament did not support these amendments 
and highly criticized the intention of the AKP.  
Parliament passed the amendments package with only the AKP’s support in 2010. The 
package got 336 votes, below the two-thirds majority to pass directly but enough to send to a 
public vote after the President’s sign. The amendment package went to public vote on September 
12, 2010, in the 30th anniversary of the September 12, 1980 military coup. The government had a 
few more selling points for the amendment package that included removing judicial immunity 
for the leaders and top officials of the September 12, 1980 coup as well as those civil and 
military bureaucrats serving under the military regime: removing “the decisions of the Supreme 
Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review,” limiting military courts’ scope to 
military related issues, and opening other cases to civil courts including coup attempts.  
The amendment package got 58% of the vote with 74% participation threshold and it was 
constitutionalized.  In result, the composition, powers, and structure of higher courts were 
changed considerably by the constitutional amendments in 2010. After that point, the AKP 
would be both “in power” and “able to use this power.” In 2011 elections, the AKP increased its 
votes to almost 50% and solidified its power by being the first party that increased its votes 
during three consecutive elections in Turkey. After these developments, the YOK removed the 
negative effect of coefficient factor for IHLs on November 30, 2011. The Council of State did 
not rule stay of implementation of the decree for plaintiffs and was still examining the changes as 
January 01, 2013. In 2012, the government re-opened closed middle-level sections of IHLs 
(known as 4+4+4) that were closed during the February 28 process. Enrolled students to IHLs 
started to increase again which gave the first impressions that IHLs would return to their old days 
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as before 1997. The government did not make any legal changes for the headscarf ban in 
universities, but the headscarf ban in universities disappeared de facto.  
As a consequence, some scholars and commentators interpreted these changes as the 
erosion of the secularism principle. However, these changes indicate more friendly interpretation 
and implementation of the secularism principle rather than an alarming future. Since the early 
Republic, the Turkish state embraced an assertive, Jacobin, authoritarian, and French type of 
secularism; however, this secularism has evolved to libertarian and American types of passive 
secularism under the AKP government since 2002 (see Kuru 2013). Perception of religion as a 
threat for the state is diminishing and religion is being accepted as a part of social reality that is 
also a part of the state. In that way, the state is relieved from seeing a component of its entity as a 
threat to other components.  
As with every social change, this change was also slow and unpleasant. In a general rule, 
upper classes are open to new ideas and lead social changes. On the other hand, lower classes are 
more inclined to resist the change. However, in the Turkish case, this was the opposite for 
changes in the secularism principle. There was a social pressure to change the understanding of 
secularism, but upper classes were resisting it. This resistance made the change harder than other 
social changes. I mentioned Bourdieu’s cultural capital as a possible reason for resisting this 
change previously. Georg Simmel’s upper class taste would give some insight for this resistance 
also. Simmel noted that fashion is a product of class distinction and a way emphasizing 
separation of classes. 
Social forms, apparel, aesthetic judgment, the whole style of human expression, 
are constantly transformed by fashion, in such a way, however, that fashion-i.e., 
the latest fashion-in all these things affects only the upper classes. Just as soon as 
the lower classes begin to copy their style, thereby crossing the line of 
demarcation the upper classes have drawn and destroying the uniformity of their 
coherence, the upper classes turn away from this style and adopt a new one, which 
in its turn differentiates them from the masses; and thus the game goes merrily on. 
Naturally the lower classes look and strive towards the upper, and they encounter 
the least resistance in those fields which are subject to the whims of fashion; for it 
is here that mere external imitation is most readily applied. The same process is at 
work as between the different sets within the upper classes, although it is not 
always as visible here as it is, for example, between mistress and maid. Indeed, 
we may often observe that the more nearly one set has approached another, the 
more frantic becomes the desire for imitation from below and the seeking for the 
new from above (Simmel 1957: 545).  
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Even in fashion, this class distinction is rigid and imitation by lower classes is 
unacceptable. When demarcation of this line disappears, the upper class looks for new styles. 
This is an easy way to draw a demarcation line in fashion; change fashion every year and 
become free from the lower classes. However, what is there to do about other things that the 
upper class cannot change as easily as fashion and should share the same taste with the lower 
classes? Or more painfully, what is there to do if the lower classes start to earn the same income 
as the upper classes and become new upper classes; and then, the previous upper classes should 
share everything without any demarcation with these new upper classes? These definitely cannot 
be acceptable to the upper classes. As a quick conclusion, IHLs helped to break this demarcation; 
then, the graduates of these schools are not welcomed by the upper class. 
TESEV reports shows that IHLs increased schooling of female children. Especially 
before the 1990s, conservative families have an inclination to not send their female children to 
school after elementary schools. There were several sociological reasons for these decisions 
including raising them as future housewives, wearing headscarves in adolescence, and so on. 
IHLs broke this tendency. Most female students would be able to wear their headscarves during 
their high school education until 1997 without much incident. However, these female students 
did not want to stop their education after high school while seeing their male peers continue to a 
university education. Conservative families became more tolerant to their female children’s 
higher education since they became used to it during children’s high school education. When the 
number of veiled students started to increase in universities, it increased reactions of secularists. 
Veiled students’ demands never ended. First, they demanded high school but it did not stop 
there. Later, they asked for universities, jobs, and participating in leisure activities such as 
driving expensive cars, eating in expensive places, and shopping in famous brands. Their 
visibility increased enormously in the upper class lifestyle.  
Also one more thing changed; conservative families left their old moderate life style. 
Naturally, there were conservative families that had high income as much as the upper class 
previously. However, these families did not participate in the lifestyle of the upper class so they 
were invisible to the upper class. Their children, especially after university education, did not 
want to stay inside of their circle but instead have entered the secular upper class’s lifestyle 
circle: in malls, coffee shops, beaches, five star hotels, on planes, visiting European states, 
having the best education, and going to better schools. This list never stopped. The secular upper 
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class wanted to treat them as they used to because they still saw them as people from the lower 
classes, but this treatment started to fail since they were not shepherds on mountains; they knew 
their civil rights. Also AKP government’s power accelerated appearance of conservative life 
style in the public sphere along with modernization, globalization, and economic, historical, and 
political conditions. However, this appearance in the secular public sphere does not indicate an 
increase in religiosity of the Turkish public, just that old housewives’ daughters refused to sit at 
home.  
Changing fashion was an easy way to put boundaries between classes but it was not easy 
to put a boundary between the same income level people. You can upgrade from an economy 
seat to a business on a plane but still might find a veiled woman next to you. In a capitalist 
market, every customer has the same value before a clerk. While you try your new season Chanel 
high-heels, you realize that a veiled woman buys the same pair next to you in the Istinye Park 
Mall. Fashion changes and these veiled women follow the fashion. A veiled woman likes a cup 
of Starbucks coffee at Bosporus while looking at two continents as much as a secular person in 
the same coffee shops. The beautiful sights of Bosporus and Istanbul would not be only available 
for old elites anymore. I gave veiled women examples since they are easier to identify but the 
same is valid for conservative males.  
One of my interviewees, Retired Colonel Ertugrul Oner mentioned how he was feeling 
when he saw a veiled woman in these sights before, “In the past, when a veiled woman entered a 
coffee shop while we were sitting there, we were leaving the place if we cannot say anything. 
Sitting in a public transportation with them [veiled women] was hard for me. However, it seems 
we are used it now.” He mentioned a similar story when he talked about neighborhood pressure 
in both devout and seculars, “[in the issue of neighborhood pressure] it is not necessary to touch 
physically or being arrested by police. You can make it with a glance or an attitude. We did it to 
veiled women once. I said ‘they are permitting everybody to enter in here!’ [by bullying in a 
coffee shop] (onune geleni de buraya aliyorlar). Girls left the place. If I saw them now, I 
apologize. It was anger of that time…” (Oner, personal interview). 
The demarcation intention was one reason among several for secular reactions.  Power 
struggle between center and periphery groups seems a more prominent reason among them. 
Simmel explains the upper classes’ resistance to change with their fear of loosing their 
privileges;  
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The upper classes, however, were most intensely affected and transformed by new 
influences, just as the upper branches of a tree are most responsive to the 
movements of the air. The highest classes, as everyone knows, are the most 
conservative, and frequently enough they are even archaic. They dread every 
motion and change, not because they have an antipathy for the contents or 
because the latter are injurious to them, but simply because it is change and 
because they regard every modification of the whole, as suspicious and 
dangerous. No change can bring them additional power, and every change can 
give them something to fear, but nothing to hope for (Simmel 1957: 555). 
The upper classes had a fear of loosing their power in the state. This power included both 
administrative power in the state and economical power by exploiting state opportunities and 
facilities. Incentive funds of the state would not be available to only a few particular groups 
anymore. Taking advantage of state funds is ending and those state funds should be shared with 
new incoming conservatives. It might be wondered how IHLs cause these outcomes. Certainly, 
simple high school graduates would not cause these outcomes, but IHLs were the first step to 
these outcomes. The wealthy secular regime wanted to nip these perceived threats in the bud. 
If IHL students never pursued their careers in universities and state apparatuses, there 
would be no harsh precautions on these schools. If the reader remembers one of then-President 
Sezer’s veto reasons for the IHL bill, President Sezer said,  
Vocational schools were founded to provide blue-collar workers for the industry 
sector. Encouraging their graduates to apply to universities instead of fulfilling the 
mission of their schools [being a blue-collar worker for industries, for example] 
wastes resources and reduces the educational quality of the universities. For these 
reasons, this bill does not carry out the principle of ‘being appropriate for the 
common good’ that should be the general purpose of every law (TBMM records 
06/01/2004).  
Sezer was saying as long as you stayed as blue-collar worker, there is no problem but 
please do not pursue more. Don’t try to share administrative and economical power of the state.  
During my interviews I felt the tenseness of power struggle sometimes. Several 
interviewees questioned if I was an IHL graduate. Most of this questioning might be considered a 
part of general conversation. When IHLs or religious education related questions came up, it 
would be natural to ask if I was a graduate from one of these schools. However, in one instance, I 
could not pass without mentioning one of my experiences.  
I demanded an interview from one of the city representatives of the Association of 
Kemalist Thought (ADD) in Istanbul. I talked with the person on the phone and explained that I 
am doing research on changes between state and religion relations during the last decade. He 
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accepted my interview demand and I went to his office at the scheduled time. After a few 
greeting words, just before the interview started, he asked to get to know me more. He already 
knew my research subject and the university where I am doing my Ph.D. He took a notepad and 
pencil and started to write down this information and, while writing, he repeated loudly to 
confirm it. I confirmed that he was right. His second question to get to know me more and in 
more detail was surprising.  He asked me which high school I went to. I replied I went to high 
school in Istanbul. He repeated the question “which school?” He never asked me my 
undergraduate education or M.A. thesis before or after this question; only about high school. A 
high school was more than enough to know a person. There was no need for further query. He 
later demanded to see the interview questions. Long story short, eventually he did not want to 
participate in the study. I thanked him for his time and left.  
When I went outside of the office, I recorded a voice memo of myself posing questions 
about the reasons of asking a Ph.D. student about his high school without asking any more 
questions about his education or research. One of the interviewees, Oktay Eksi, MP from CHP, 
even asked me my elementary school. However, I did not find it strange since he asked my 
complete educational history without omitting any step.  
Why is questioning high school education important? What has been taught in these 
schools? IHLs are state-run schools. The state decides their curriculum and appoints their 
teachers. 60% of their curriculum is similar to general high schools while 40% of the curriculum 
is related to vocational courses such as Quran and Hadith. In other vocational high schools this 
ratio is the opposite, where courses related to the vocation almost get 70% of the curriculum 
while 30% of the curriculum is related to general course work (TESEV 2004: 99). That means 
that IHLs have the least vocational training among all vocational schools. This is also another 
sign that these students mostly do not have any intention to continue in this field but would like 
to have a few extra elective courses related to religion.  
Secularist people are against IHLs on two bases. First, as was mentioned among 
President Sezer’s veto and court decisions, it is assumed that IHLs would harm the unification of 
education reform. Educating children under two types of education, where one is related to 
religion and the other is totally secular, would cause a clash between these individuals. The other 
most common argument is that IHLs cause most of the problems related to religion in Turkey 
	  	  
118	  
today and form a background for Islamists or, at the least, a background for conservative parties 
and other Islamist movements.  
These fears have some validity but are not a hundred percent correct and include some 
exaggerations. For instance, an interviewee was relating PM Erdogan’s rhetoric talent to his IHL 
education by saying there is a rhetoric course in these schools. This example suggests that some 
people have a fear that every graduate of an IHL has a potential for being another Erdogan.   
IHLs cause most problems is also a vague argument. IHL graduates’ tendency for 
supporting Islamist and conservative parties would be correct. However, is this a problem by 
itself? Since mostly conservative families send their children to IHLs, it is likely that these 
students have conservative tendencies.  This tendency is not because of school education but 
because of family values. In Turkish politics, secular parties have a 20-25% vote capacity. 
Where do the other 80% of voters get their high school education? Not in IHLs and they are still 
voting for moderate and conservative parties. Then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer mentioned 
IHLs have around 500,000 graduates since their establishment in 1924. Let’s assume none of 
them died and all of them voted for the conservative AKP. The AKP got almost 21,500,000 
votes in the 2011 elections. Where did these other 21 million voters graduate?  
Other problem allegations are vague also. Nobody has shown a scientific study that IHLs 
by themselves cause problems. For instance, only one interviewee, Prof. Umit Ozdag, gave a 
concrete example for IHL related problems:  
We, a few social scientists and a psychiatrist, did research on violence in schools, 
including IHLs. A school is in a wealthy neighborhood; there is no problem. A 
school is in a poor neighborhood; again there is no serious problem in the issue of 
violence. A school is between these economical neighborhoods; it is like 
dynamite waiting to explode.  You see these kinds of profiles. A student has a 
potential for violence if his/her parents were divorced and [the student] failed the 
class for one year. When we almost completed the study, psychiatry Prof. Erol 
Goka, who is an important intellectual, suggested to look at IHLs also. We looked 
at IHLs and saw an enormous violence tendency. We could not believe it. We 
asked teachers and they confirmed the results.  Later, we saw another study on 
Catholic (rahip) schools. These schools also have this violence tendency. The 
reason for this violence is that 14, 15, 16 years olds form their sexuality just like 
how in science-fiction movies a thing changes its shell; this is a similar era for 
them. While they are forming their sexuality, it has been continuously said that 
this is a sin, this is immoral, don’t do something. These wear them out 
psychologically without any doubt. This causes the potential for violence. This is 
not related to Islam. This is that a biological process and a spiritual process come 
across (Ozdag, personal interview) 
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I couldn’t confirm Prof. Umit Ozat’s surprise about violence in IHLs in the literature. 
Prof. Erol Goka and others had a research about violence in the family and in public on behalf of 
the Prime Ministry Institution of Family Research in 1997 by using a violence scale that was 
improved by Prof. Goka et all on violence in secondary education. This study was looking at 
middle schools and showed that violence in imam hatip schools (2,32 units in total) are lower 
than all other state schools (2,42) including vocational schools (2,50) and girls’ schools (2,40). 
The violence in imam hatip schools was only above private schools (2,20) (GOKA et all. 1998: 
169). Later studies also show that violence in IHLs is significantly lower than all other high 
schools (see Efilti 2008: 219-224).   
It would be possible that, when Prof. Ozdag referred to his surprise in finding more 
violence in IHLs than he expected, he might not have meant this violence was more than in other 
schools. My point is not questioning Prof. Ozdag’s statement’s validity but I would like to draw 
attention to the fact that he was the only person giving a concrete example without any ambiguity 
that IHLs are sources of some problems.    
While class-related power struggle between new and old power groups continued, almost 
always old power groups continued to lose their strength. In this power game, prominent actors 
were the government, presidency, military, judiciary, media, universities, and prominent business 
associations. Before the 2002 elections, all of these actors were composing one group against 
religious education and headscarf banning.  
This group lost its first prominent actor in the 2002 elections. The AKP won elections 
with an overwhelming majority. The national ten percent threshold helped this victory. The AKP 
did not need any coalition to build its government. In a coalition government, other coalition 
members would restrict actions of the government. Being in governmental power alone brought 
discussions about tyranny.  
Indeed, it is hard to claim that there was a tyranny of the majority in the issue of religious 
education and lifting headscarf banning in Turkey. First of all, the AKP has been in power since 
2002 but had not been able to implement its power mostly until the 2010 constitutional 
amendments that passed by the public vote. Second, Tocqueville (1997 [1899]) was suggesting 
implementing justice for the sake of the majority of mankind instead of the majority of people to 
prevent the despotism of the majority. It would be very hard to claim that the majority of 
mankind is against admitting veiled students in universities or the majority of mankind supports 
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discriminating high school students based on their few elected religious courses during their 
university application. Third, establishing a tyranny of the majority is very hard in Turkey since 
Turkey has a multiparty democracy and most governments came to power in coalitions. 
Coalition partners should share the power of the government. Most coalitions end by deciding to 
go for early elections. Turkish voters’ loyalty to one party is also questionable. For instance, the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) got 22% of the votes in the 1999 elections with the highest vote 
percentage in that election and became the ruling party with the support of two other parties in a 
coalition government. Just three and half years later in the 2002 elections, DSP’s vote was 1%. 
The majority made a ruling party disappear from Turkish politics in three years. How is it 
possible to talk about a tyranny of the majority for an electoral vote with constantly changing 
voter tendency? Ali Carkoglu’s study on profiling ideological and economical pragmatism of the 
Turkish voters in the 2007 Parliament elections reveals that economic pragmatism appears more 
significant than ideological predispositions, especially for the AKP constituency. According to 
him, if the AKP government continues its economical success, it would be continuously 
rewarded at the polls. However, if it fails, then it would be swiftly punished by voters (Carkoglu 
2008). Ersin Kalaycioglu also has a similar conclusion for the 2007 elections. Accordingly, 
voters chose the AKP as a reward for its past economic performance as well as expected 
economic stability. The AKP voters do not support the AKP on religious grounds any more than 
supporters of another right-wing party. The economy has played a more important role in the 
2007 elections than cultural, primordial, and ideological factors (Kalaycioglu 2010). Fourth, 
changes in IHLs’ coefficient factor or lifting headscarf banning in universities do not mean that 
every student should go to IHLs and should wear a headscarf. If the majority wanted to 
implement going to IHLs or wearing headscarves compulsory, these would be considered a 
tyranny of the majority. Giving options to people who would freely choose is not totalitarianism 
but a requirement of the democracy.  
Supporters of IHLs’ coefficient factor and headscarf ban assert that allowing headscarf in 
universities would cause peer pressure on non-veiled students to being veiled. One of my 
interview questions was on “neighborhood pressure” a term that was coined by Serif Mardin to 
express social pressure.  
During adolescence, peer groups help socialization of young people and influence their 
decisions by creating a sub-culture. Young people might feel pressure to adjust their behavior to 
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align with youth culture. This can be called peer pressure. Secularists argued that since the 
majority of Turkey is Muslim, allowing the wearing of headscarves would cause this peer 
pressure among students and they would feel obligated to be veiled. This is a possibility. 
However, the opposite has the same possibility that veiled female students would feel peer 
pressure to take off their headscarves. If there is no physical pressure to wear or not to wear a 
headscarf, this peer pressure should be considered under democratic diversity. Also, secularist 
arguments missed two other facts of peer pressure in adolescence. First, youth culture challenges 
adult and social values of society and creates a distinct taste in music and clothes. In this case, 
the peer pressure does not influence students to wear headscarves but opposite, since it is the 
practice of the majority. Second, peer pressure does not influence all adolescent segments in 
society. Peer groups are divided by class and education, and their influence is limited inside of 
their groups. Also, any peer pressure does not clear away free will—or agency—completely. If a 
person follows a particular behavior only because of peer pressure, the person leaves it after the 
group has dissolved or she/he has changed the group.  
Last but not least, the opponents of IHL and wearing headscarf in universities are missing 
another social reality that education and religiosity are inversely correlated. Many studies 
support that when education increases, religiosity decreases (see Figure 1; Inglehart 1997: 151-
159; Norris and Inglehart 2007: 25). If IHL students and veiled students had a tendency for 
religious fundamentalism or any kind of religiosity that the Turkish state would not welcome, 
impeding them from entering universities would not solve problems but increase them because 
of lived disappointments. If the state has a fear of their religiosity, allowing them in higher 
education is the best way for reducing that religiosity. Through these educations most students 
leave behind the dogmas that they held at the beginning.  
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Figure 1: Relationship Between Education Level and Importance of Religion 
Source: World Values Survey (1995, 2000, 2005). 
 
C. 1. 2. Religion and Ethics Courses 
 
Teaching of religion in primary and secondary education in public schools has been another 
prominent issue in the teaching of religion by the state. Private schools have been limited with 
the same rules as the public schools, except religious minority schools. All changes have affected 
them the same as public schools. 
As we saw in the IHLs issue, the early Republic had a similar attitude against teaching of 
religion in public schools. When the Republic was proclaimed in 1923, there were courses 
related to religion in every level of education.  
After the acceptance of the Unification of Education Law in 1924, that year all religion 
related courses were left out from high school curriculums. One-hour religion courses in the 
middle schools continued for a while but were left out in 1927. In elementary schools, religion 
courses gradually decreased and eventually disappeared. In 1924 they were two-hours; in 1927 
one-hour; in 1929 still one-hour but without any credit; in 1930 half-hour, elective, and only 
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available for fifth grades. This elective course was left out later, except in village elementary 
schools until 1939 (See Yucel 1994 [1938]: 139-227; Ocal 2011: 449-456; Ayhan 2004: Akin 
2011: 198-204).  
Former Education Ministry, 1938-1946, Hasan Ali Yucel published a detailed history of 
education in the late Ottomans and the early Republic in 1938. In his book, Yucel showed every 
program change in curriculums and their reasoning. However, he did not explain changes in 
religion courses. His only explanation for changes in religion courses was that “after 
proclamation of secularism [in the constitution], religion courses had not been under 
responsibility of the state anymore.” In fact, secularism was constitutionalized in 1937; but still, 
there was no explanation for previous changes before secularism was constitutionalized. At the 
end of the chapter about program changes he gave a clue for changes in the teaching of religion: 
Although curriculums might give an impression that they are only a list of 
courses, in reality, they are an expression of educational understanding in letters. 
By examining them, you can understand those times’ cultural understanding and 
how it was wanted to raise young and [future] elites (Yucel 1994 [1938]: 226-
227).  
In other words, the early Republic did not want to raise a religious generation. Eighty-
four years later after former ministry of education Yucel’s writing, PM Erdogan said raising 
devout generations is a part of his party’s mission, in February 2012 (Hurriyet Daily News 
02/02/2012).  
In the early Republic, the state was not only against the teaching of religion in schools 
but also in public life. In 1943, an official document from the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
prohibited distribution of a book which was named Prophet Muhammad, “anyway, we are not in 
favor of creating a religious atmosphere and blooming a religious identity for the young by 
religious publications” (from Ayhan 2004: 111-112).  
Teaching of religion returned back to public schools in 1949 and increased gradually. In 
1949, the Ministry of National Education permitted voluntary religious instruction in the fourth 
and fifth grades of elementary schools two hours weekly. These courses were out of curriculum 
without any academic credits and outside of regular school hours, which means very early or late 
hours. Parents or guardians of students should sign a petition to send their children to these 
classes. In that way, the state was assuming that very few students would participate in these 
classes. However, the participation was over 99% (see Reed 1955: 152; Ocal 2011: 459-460; 
Ayhan 2004: 144; Akin 2011: 210-222).  
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Howard Reed pictured the response of the public to these changes in his ethnographic 
study: 
These classes met with a quick and enthusiastic support from the public, 
especially in many villages where lots of children, particularly girls, had 
previously simply stayed away from school in spite of the law requiring their 
attendance, and the efforts of local teachers, sometimes even supported by the 
gendarmerie, to encourage or even force them to come to school. By I953 
teachers were able to report that the reintroduction of religious education classes 
in the primary schools had been a very potent factor in stimulating increased 
attendance throughout the country in the villages (Reed 1955: 152).  
As this quote explains, even a simple elective religious introduction course found an 
enthusiastic support among the public. Similarly to IHLs, as I mentioned before, religion related 
courses helped conservative families to send their children to schools, especially female children.  
In 1950, religion courses in elementary schools became part of curriculum. In 1956, 
religion courses returned back to sixth and seventh grades, as elective courses. This time parents 
or legal guardians should authorize if they did not want their children to participate in these 
courses. In 1967, religion courses returned to high schools as elective courses again (Ocal 2011: 
465-470).  
After the 1980 military coup, the 1983 Constitution (which had 91% of the public vote) 
made religion and ethics courses compulsory for primary and secondary education students, 
except religious minorities. Teaching a school course entered into the Constitution once and for 
all in Turkey. Left, right, and communist fights before the coup were an important reason for 
making religion courses compulsory. The courses have become compulsory starting from the 
fourth grade. If these courses were not constitutionalized, seeing some changes for their status 
would be possible again, especially during and after the February 28 process in 1997. The related 
article of the Constitution states, 
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall 
be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious 
education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in 
the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives (Article 24 of 
Turkish Constitution).  
Between 2002 and 2012, there was no change in the status of these courses. The only 
change happened in the issue of teaching of religion in public schools in 2012. Two more 
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elective courses, Quran and life of the Prophet (Muhammad) were added to primary and 
secondary school curriculums by law.  
Although there were no legal changes for the status and hours of religion and ethics 
courses, the government made some adjustments according to demands in their syllabi.   
In the issue of religion and ethics courses, the biggest critiques were that syllabi of these 
courses mostly concentrate on Islam, especially Sunni Islam, instead of having a balance 
between all religions and teaching different understandings of Islam, as happens in Alevism, 
which has some similar views with Shia. Also memorizing of a few surah of Quran for prayer 
has been among these critiques. In this view, religion and ethics courses should be based only on 
teaching without any practicing. If these demands find a response in syllabi, most critiques 
would disappear.  
On the other hand, some groups are totally against the teaching of religion by the state in 
any way. Some groups only support elective courses but against compulsory religion and ethics 
courses. The most prominent group against religion and ethics courses was Alevis since their 
Islamic understanding did not find any place in these courses. However, Alevi opposition to 
compulsory religion and ethics courses has reduced in some way since Alevi beliefs found a 
bigger place in these courses’ syllabi in 2011.  
In the case of religious minorities, religion and ethics courses had not been required in the 
curricula of religious minority schools since these courses were constitutionalized in 1983. For 
students of minority religions in public schools, exempting them from these courses had been a 
general rule, with rare exceptions.  
Actually, Article 24 of the Constitution states “Instruction in religious culture and moral 
education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools” and does not 
make any exemption for religious minorities in public schools. In that case, compulsory religious 
education in public schools is an obligation for every student in public schools. However, 
nobody, with few exceptions, has tried to implement a compulsory religion and ethics course for 
religious minorities in public schools. When their parents or legal guardians applied to schools to 
be exempt, they have been welcomed.   
In one incident on the news in 2004, a private school required a later converted 
Presbyterian Turgay Ucal’s child in fifth grade to enter religion and ethics courses. When Mr. 
Ucal objected and wanted to be exempted as it happened during the previous year in his child’s 
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fourth grade, the school did not grant this permission. Mr. Ucal mentioned that other schools 
were not requiring the same and brought a Ministry of National Education notice from 1990 that 
said Christian and Jewish students are not required to attend religion and ethics courses. In the 
case that they are willing, they have to sign a petition. In return, the school presented Article 24 
in the Constitution that required every student to participate in these classes and one later notice 
by the Ministry of National Education in 1992 mentioning a change in syllabi that gave a fair 
place for Christianity, Judaism, and other religions. The notice mentioned that Islam had more 
place in syllabi since 99% of the public were Muslim. The notice also detailed that Christian and 
Jewish students were not required to memorize Quran chapters or learn about Islamic practices 
such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage (Radikal 10/24/2004).  
Although the school administrators brought up these arguments, they did not hold back 
from raising the issue with a higher authority in the ministry organization. The family’s lawyer, 
Erol Dora, also submitted a petition to the Ministry of National Education and explained, “many 
Christian families are having unjust treatments and being forced to discuss with school 
administrators” because of arbitrary school decisions (Radikal 10/24/2004). The ministry solved 
the issue in two months and ruled that religious minorities are not required to take religion and 
ethics courses (Hurriyet 12/24/2004).   
The family’s lawyer Erol Dora was elected as being the first Syrian Christian parliament 
member in the 2011 elections. In my interview with Mr. Dora, I asked his opinions about 
compulsory religious education. He expressed “having a compulsory religious education in the 
Constitution is not acceptable” while also referring to some Alevi groups’ demands. According 
to him, since there are different orders in the same religions, religious education should be 
dependent on parents’ decisions. When I asked his opinion about syllabi of religion and ethics 
courses, he stated, “you know that Christians are exempt from religion [and ethics] courses. They 
are not required to attend these classes. However, Alevis have some complaints about this issue 
and even went to the European Court of Human Rights.” Following, I asked Mr. Dora if he ever 
followed any case as a lawyer about these issues. He recalled the incident in 2004 without 
mentioning it specifically: 
For instance, some [religious minority] students were entering religion [and 
ethics] courses. I encountered this situation a few times. You know that religion 
courses are a constitutional requirement. A school principle was saying these 
courses are a constitutional requirement. [On the other hand], there was a 
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[Ministry] notice that religious minorities are exempt from these courses but since 
the Constitution is the highest law, [some principles] were resisting the exemption 
by referring to the Constitution. This happened a few times. However, when we 
applied to the Ministry of National Education, these problems were solved (Dora, 
personal interview).   
The other religious minorities among my interviewees did not mention any negative 
experience to follow religion and ethics courses in public schools, although some of them are 
against compulsory religious education and think religious education should be optional (Sag; 
Yakan, personal interviews). Even the spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Father 
Dositheos Anagnostopoulos supports a compulsory religious education as long as it is related to 
students’ religion instead of letting them be fed from wrong sources. Also he mentioned a part 
about Christianity in one of the books from these courses and confirmed that he found it useful,  
I have never seen books of religion [and ethics] courses. I do not know what they 
are teaching. The only thing I know is that there is a section about Christianity in 
the latest books. Somebody sent this section to me by email and I read it. I found 
it useful since it explains Christianity to a Muslim student in an objective way 
(Anagnostopoulos, personal interview).   
Yusuf Altintas from the Jewish community confirmed that they are not required to take 
these classes: “Religion and ethics courses are not a constitutional requirement for religious 
minorities… in the places where we do not have a [minority] school, when Jewish children went 
to public schools, if they do not want to take religion [and ethics] courses, they do not take 
them.” Since this statement suggested that some Jewish students take these courses, I asked if 
there is social pressure to take these classes. Mr. Altintas denied social pressure in this issue, 
“No. I went to a [public] elementary school. I got these classes. However, if we do not want to 
take them, we do not take them.” He added that this was almost 62 years ago (Altintas, personal 
interview). In that case, he got these classes at the beginning of the 1950s, when they were 
reintroduced after a long time as elective courses. The Parliament reports in the 1950s also 
confirmed that religious introduction courses found support even among religious minorities. 
Most of them sent their children to these classes (see 1953 MEB 5th Education Meeting 1991: 
408).21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 MEB statistics show that in the 1949-1950 academic year 4th and 5th grade students numbered 414,777. 
Only 2797 Muslim and 3002 non-Muslim, in total 5799 students that consist around 1% of 4th and 5th 
grade students, did not participate in religion courses. In the 1950-1951 academic year, 1437 Muslim and 
1598 non-Muslim, in total 3035 students that consist 0.7% of students, did not participate in religion 
courses. (1953 MEB 5th Education Meeting 1991: 408). 
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Even today some religious minorities request to send their children to these classes. 
When I was a teacher in public schools, I witnessed it. In elementary schools, families’ fear that 
their children would be excluded by their classmates would be one possible explanation among 
others for this request. However, in high schools, requesting to attend religion and ethics courses 
is more related to students’ interest. Some students also would prefer religion and ethics courses 
while completing their required course credits since these courses have a reputation of being 
easy. If one of a student’s parents is Muslim and the other is non-Muslim, students would have 
an adjustment problem. Some prefer to take the class; some not. Some take it but drop it later. 
Also some religious minority students drop it later because they find it hard to understand some 
topics if they take it in a high school for the first time.  
Religious minorities had been granted exemption from religion and ethics courses but not 
any other groups. Alevi groups have been the most prominent group against these classes. The 
Erdogan government initiated a seven-step workshop, “Alevi opening,” to understand and deal 
with Alevi problems. Once a month between June 2009 and January 2010, under the 
organization of the Ministry of the State, seven workshops discussed Alevi problems. The 
workshops incorporated the following: 1) Representatives of Alevi associations and foundations, 
2) Academics, 3) The Department of Religious Affairs and theology professors, 4) Syndicates, 
business associations, civil society organizations, and human rights organizations, 6) Politicians, 
and 7) Presentation of the findings to the government. The Ministry of the State published all 
discussions in these workshops and prepared a final report (see Alevi Calistaylari Nihai Raporu 
2010).  
As the report showed, compulsory religion and ethics courses were among one of the 
most prominent issues that Alevis objected to. There were three different types of responses to 
this issue. Some Alevis defended that the state should not teach religion. Some declared, if the 
state would like to involve religious education, it should be elective. In the third opinion, if there 
is no way to remove it or make it optional, then, as being a mutual Alevi agreement, this course 
should represent every religion and different understandings in the same religion equally, and it 
especially should not sound like it is protecting Sunni Islam (Alevi Calistaylari Nihai Raporu 
2010: 141).  
The report mostly supported Alevi opinions on making religion and ethics courses 
elective and arranging their syllabi with an inclusive approach to every religion and sect. On the 
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other hand, the report was not totally against teaching of religion by the state. The report 
mentioned that 43 states in the Council of Europe among 47, as of 2010, teach religion in public 
schools. 25 of these states required a compulsory religion course. 10 states would give an 
exemption from these classes under some circumstances. The report also pointed out that giving 
exempt status for Alevis under compulsory religion and ethics courses would harm their 
constitutional rights by forcing them to reveal their Alevi identities (Alevi Calistaylari Nihai 
Raporu 2010: 133-139). 
In the issue of teaching Sunni Islam, the report also reminded that even Sunni Muslims 
criticize these classes based on their syllabi being superficial and some Sunni Muslims demand 
the teaching of practical issues and performance of them (Alevi Calistaylari Nihai Raporu 2010: 
141). Then these classes are not Sunni as much as Alevis claim. At the very beginning of this 
chapter I mentioned that the state has an intention to teach religion but this intention has never 
been to increase religiosity, but rather to create a moderate religion for itself. This moderate 
religion was not Sunni Islam but was a “national Islam” that leaves most practices out and keeps 
the religion only for cultural purposes to build a national identity.  
Teaching of a superficial religion issue came up during my interviews also. Mehmet Akif 
Cec from the Felicity Party (SP) stated,  
Religion and ethics courses might not be compulsory courses. Even if they were, 
there is no harm since the majority is Muslim in this country. However, religious 
minorities or people who are not defining themselves as Muslim would be 
exempted from these classes. We do not have any objection to this… However, is 
the content of the books of religion and ethics courses positive?... under the name 
of EU amendments or globalization, all religions are being combined and 
standardized as equal. For instance, some statements are being removed such as 
Islam being the right religion and other Abrahamic religions were distorted. In 
fact, this is Muslims’ belief. This belief should be presented in these books in 
some way (Cec, personal interview). 
 After the Alevi workshops, the government established another commission, including 
Alevis, to prepare content for Alevis to use in religion and ethics course programs. Beginning in 
the Fall of 2011, Alevi beliefs and practices entered syllabi of religion and ethics courses in all 
grades from fourth to twelfth. Also two other small groups’ beliefs, Jaafari and Nusayri, entered 
the books.  
Although there are still some complaints, Alevis expressed that they found these 
developments encouraging. Two Alevi group representatives among my interviewees 
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participated in these workshops: Dogan Bermek as representing the Cem Foundation and Metin 
Tarhan as representing the Alevi Associations Federation. Both of them expressed that they 
found the workshops useful especially on the issue of entering Alevism in books as a result of 
these workshops (Bermek; Tarhan, personal interviews).  
 The Judiciary response to compulsory religion and ethics courses had changed several 
times between 2002 and 2012 but eventually the verdict was that there could be compulsory 
religion and ethics courses by considering the 2011 (and a previous change in 2008) changes in 
the contents of these courses. Several Alevis filed lawsuits against the state to be exempted from 
religion and ethics courses.  
In one instance in 2001, an Alevi father requested an exemption from religion and ethics 
courses for his daughter in seventh grade. The Provincial Directorate of National Education 
refuted the application, stating it is impossible because of the constitution. The father pursued the 
case in a district court, alleging that the compulsory classes in religion and ethics were 
essentially based on Sunni Islam and that no teaching was given on his own Alevi faith. In 2001, 
the district court dismissed the case, referring to compulsory religion and ethics courses in the 
Constitution. The applicant furthered the case to higher court, the Council of the State. The 
Council of the State also dismissed his appeal in 2003. The plaintiff applied to the European 
Courts of Human Rights (ECHR). In its October 2007 decision, the ECHR ruled against Turkey 
(ECHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04).  
In the decision, the ECHR accepted diversities about religious education among states 
and showed that 43 of the 46 Council of Europe member states have religious education and 25 
of them required this education:  
In Europe, religious education is closely tied in with secular education. Of 
the 46 Council of Europe member States, which were examined, 43 provide 
religious education classes in state schools. Only Albania, France (with the 
exception of the Alsace and Moselle regions) and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia are the exceptions to this rule. In Slovenia, non-confessional 
teaching is offered in the last years of state education. 
In 25 of the 46 member States (including Turkey), religious education is a 
compulsory subject. However, the scope of this obligation varies depending on 
the State. In five countries, namely Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and 
Turkey, the obligation to attend classes in religious education is absolute. All 
pupils who belong to the religious faith taught in the classes are obliged to follow 
them, partially or fully. However, ten States allow for exemptions under certain 
conditions. This is the case in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, 
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Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, and the United Kingdom. In the 
majority of these countries, religious education is denominational. 
Ten other countries give pupils the opportunity to choose a substitute lesson in 
place of compulsory religious education. This is the case in Germany, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Serbia, 
Slovakia and Switzerland. In those countries, denominational education is 
included in the curriculum drawn up by the relevant ministries and pupils are 
obliged to attend unless they have opted for the substitute lesson proposed. 
In contrast, 21 member States do not oblige pupils to follow classes in religious 
education. Religious education is generally authorized in the school system but 
pupils only attend if they have made a request to that effect. This is what happens 
in the largest group of States: Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Spain, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, the Czech 
Republic, Romania, and Ukraine.  
Finally, in a third group of States, pupils are obliged to attend a religious 
education or substitute class, but always have the option of attending a secular 
lesson. 
This general overview of religious education in Europe shows that, in spite of the 
variety of teaching methods, almost all of the member States offer at least one 
route by which pupils can opt out of religious education classes (by providing an 
exemption mechanism or the option of attending a lesson in a substitute subject, 
or by giving pupils the choice of whether or not to sign up to a religious studies 
class) (ECHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04). 
After mentioning different practices for religious education in public schools of member 
states of the European Council, the ECHR convicted Turkey not because of compulsory 
education but because of the content of the classes. The ECHR pointed out the contradiction of 
implementing the compulsory religious education to Muslims but not religious minorities. This 
difference suggested that even the Turkish state implicitly accepts that these courses teach a 
particular religion and they do not have an equal standing for every religion, “if this is indeed a 
course on the different religious cultures, there is no reason to make it compulsory for Muslim 
children alone. Conversely, if the course is essentially designed to teach the Muslim religion, it is 
a course on a specific religion and should not be compulsory, in order to preserve children's and 
their parents' religious freedoms.” The ECHR examined the contents of religion and ethics 
course books and concluded that they are not representing a pluralist manner, “the religious 
diversity which prevails in Turkish society is not taken into account. In particular, pupils receive 
no teaching on the confessional or ritual specificities of the Alevi faith” (ECHR, Hasan and 
Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04).  
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 After the ECHR’s 2007 rules, in 2007 and 2008 verdicts, the Council of the State in 
Turkey confirmed that contents of religion and ethics courses did not present different beliefs in 
a neutral way. In its verdict in December 2007, the Council of the State found an Alevi plaintiff’s 
reasons acceptable to exempt his seventh grade child from compulsory religion and ethics 
courses. While the court accepted that religion and ethics courses are compulsory courses 
bounded by the Constitution, it ruled this compulsory education should be limited to instruction 
of religion. In the case of forming syllabi according to a particular religious understanding, these 
courses go beyond their introductory intention and transform to religious education and training. 
These courses should neutrally present all religious beliefs (The Council of the State App. No. 
2006/4107, D. No. 2007/7481). The Council of the State found another plaintiff right who 
objected to the compulsory religion courses with a claim that these courses are not suitable for 
his religious and philosophical beliefs and demanded an exemption for his child in fourth grade 
without looking at which religion he believes. The court ruled in favor of him for similar reasons 
as in the previous court decision in 2008 (The Council of the State App. No. 2007/679, D. No. 
2008/1461).  
The problem of these court decisions was that they only bounded the plaintiffs and 
granted exemption status for only their children. Every individual who had similar reasoning 
would have to file a lawsuit. The nature of the problem was mostly coming from the Turkish 
state identification (ID) cards. The state ID cards show a person’s religious affiliation. When 
parents demand an exemption from religion and ethics courses for their children, the school 
administration checks the student’s ID card. If the card states the religious affiliation is Islam, 
then the school cannot grant this permission. In the case of Alevis, Alevis cannot write this Alevi 
affiliation since Alevism is considered under Islam but not another religion. In fact, everybody 
has a right to leave the religious affiliation section empty but this is not a common practice and 
would not be known by some people. According to schools, while their ID cards showed these 
students were Muslim, giving permission to exempt them from these classes would be abused.  
In one case when an Alevi person wanted to replace the inscription of ‘Islam’ with 
‘Alevism’ in his ID card by claiming Alevism is another religion, not a part of Islam, the Turkish 
courts denied this request. The plaintiff’s demand was on the way of deleting ‘Islam’ from his ID 
card and writing ‘Alevi.’ The court deleted the ‘Islam’ inscription but did not grant inscription of 
‘Alevi.’ As a quick note, the majority of Alevis see Alevism as an interpretation of Islam but not 
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a belief outside of Islam. The district court asked about the issue to the Department of Religious 
Affairs as a legal expert. In its legal opinion, the Department of Religious Affairs argued that the 
word ‘Alevi’ designates a sub-group within Islam that was influenced by Sufism and has specific 
cultural features but could not be considered a separate religion or a sect (mezhep) of Islam. As a 
result, indicating religious interpretations and subcultures in the religion box of ID cards is not 
appropriate. The district court dismissed the case based on the legal opinion of the Department of 
Religious Affairs, giving an example from Christianity. For Christians, the religion boxes in ID 
cards do not show their sub-groups, such as Catholics or Protestants, but only as Christian. The 
court ruled indicating sub-groups or interpretation of religions is not appropriate in religion 
boxes in 2004. Since the plaintiff also demanded removing of the word ‘Islam’ from his religious 
affiliation box, this was granted. The person carried the case to the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
The higher court also rejected the case for the same reasons in 2004.  
Until 2006, when a person had wanted to remove or change religious affiliation in an ID 
card, the person has to apply to courts. The AKP government changed it in 2006. The Civil 
Registry Services Act was changed to say, “Any information concerning an individual’s religion 
shall be entered, amended, deleted or omitted in accordance with that individual’s written 
statements” (Law No. 5490, Article 35). Requests for amendment or deletion of data relating to 
religion shall be subject to no restrictions whatsoever. Since then anybody could make these 
changes in a few minutes without showing any reason in any civil registry services.  
In the meantime, the Alevi plaintiff brought his case to the ECHR. Although he merely 
applied to Turkish courts to replace the word ‘Islam’ with ‘Alevi,’ he added an objection to have 
a religious affiliations section in ID cards. The ECHR ruled against Turkey that indicating a 
citizen’s religion in ID cards is incompatible with the freedom not to disclose one’s religion. 
Although the court was aware that Turkish citizens had a right to leave the religious affiliation 
section empty, the Court observed that deleting this information based on application would 
disclose information concerning an aspect of the individual’s attitude to religion and leaving that 
section blank inevitably has a specific connotation. Since ID cards have frequent use in everyday 
life, the person discloses his religious beliefs against his will every time he uses it. Therefore, 
“the Court observes that the breach in question arises not from the refusal to indicate the 
applicant’s faith (Alevi) on his identity card but from the problem of the indication – whether 
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obligatory or optional – of religion on the identity card” in February 2010 (ECHR, Sinan Isik vs. 
Turkey, App. No. 21924/05). 
When PM Erdogan commented the ECHR’s verdict, he said, “I do not see the ECHR’s 
decision as abnormal. This [religion box] would be removed from there. It is not so important” 
(Sabah 02/04/2010). Turkish newspapers interpreted PM Erdogan’s statement to mean religion 
boxes are being left off of ID cards. However, there has been no change since then as of January 
2013. Turkish government will replace all ID cards with new smart ID cards in the summer of 
2013. Therefore, there is still a change to remove these religion sections from incoming ID cards. 
However, the AKP does not want to be called a government that removed religion information 
from ID cards by itself. Removal of the religion section from ID cards has to be with a consensus 
with other parties in Parliament.  
If we remember the Council of the State’s evolving decisions on compulsory religious 
education, the court dismissed an exemption application in 2003. A few years later, the court 
gave this permission for an Alevi applicant in 2007 and another applicant in 2008. In the 
meantime, the AKP government carried out an “Alevi opening” with several workshops in 2009 
and 2010. As a result of these workshops, the content of religion and ethics course books was 
changed and Alevi belief and practices found a place in these books in 2011. There was a 
previous change that has been effective since 2008. In that change, syllabi had more inclusive 
approaches. Despite these changes, lawsuits against compulsory religious education did not stop. 
However, after the changes in content of books, the attitude of the Council of the State changed 
against these courses. In its decision in August of 2012, the Council of the State ruled that since 
changes in 2008, these courses are not considered as giving a religious training anymore but only 
an introduction to religion (Hurriyet 08/31/2012).  
These discussions would be seen as important but they were never regarded as similar in 
importance to the imam-hatip issue. These discussions could be grouped as follows: 1) Totally 
against all kind of religious education, compulsory or not, in a secular state; 2) Religious 
education would be but the content should be neutral to all religions; 3) No compulsory religious 
courses, but there should be optional religious education; and 4) Religious education may be 
compulsory or optional, but the content should be intensified. In these discussions, it seems that 
the majority of the Turkish public supports compulsory religious education in public schools by 
86% (Carkoglu and Toprak 2006: 54).  
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Among these options, leaving religious education to individuals and removing the state 
from involvement in kind of religious education would be seen as the most appropriate way to 
diminish religious education disputes. One of the interviewees, Prof. Ahmet Turan Alkan, 
supports this idea: 
Compulsory religion courses are against the definition of secularism in my mind. 
But, but, but [sic], the state should give a right of choice for students’ religious 
education. In other words, it is required that removing compulsory religious 
education and giving a right of choice and allowing people to found their own 
religious education institutions (Ahmet Turan Alkan, personal interview).  
Ahmet Turan Alkan’s suggestion to leave religious education to individuals is reasonable 
but not enforceable in Turkey. First, the state does not want to allow a religious education that is 
not under its surveillance. Second, the secular establishment fears uncontrolled religious 
education by religious groups. I will examine Quran-based courses, including state-run and 
private, later. The most rigid critics observed private Quran-based courses among all religious 
education models. In the issue of IHLs, even the strictest opponents would overlook a few IHLs 
as long as their numbers are limited. However, this was not the case for private Quran-based 
courses.  
Adjusting the syllabi of religion and ethics courses and adding Alevi beliefs might be 
seen as important, especially by the Alevi; but the impact of these changes on society was 
limited. The most prominent change in the teaching of religion in public schools came in 2012. 
The AKP government reopened the middle-level section of IHLs that was closed during the 
February 28 process. Before 1998, primary and secondary education systems had three steps: 
five-years of elementary school, three-years of middle school, and three-years of high school. 
After the five-year elementary school education, students were able to attend to IHLs’ middle-
level sections. Also an important number of students were attending Quran-based courses after 
five-year elementary school education. After having one to three years of education in these 
Quran-based courses, most students proceeded to IHLs or other public schools. In 1998, 
elementary and middle school education programs were combined and renamed as elementary 
school. Eight-year compulsory education was mandated without any break. At that time, the 
middle-level sections of IHLs were closed. The establishment of eight-year compulsory 
education significantly reduced attendance in Quran-based courses.  
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In March 2012, the AKP government, with support of the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP), changed the related articles of education law to reopen middle-level sections of IHLs. 
This law, publicly known 4+4+4, raised compulsory education to twelve years and included a 
right to break this education, such as allowing attendance to Quran-based courses between any 
two of the three steps. After the first four-years education, students are qualified to attend 
middle-level sections of IHLs. 
The bill also suggested opening several elective religion courses in the middle and high 
schools, initially without mentioning their names. During the discussions of this new system in 
Parliament, before the bill passed, MHP members, especially parliament member (MP) Prof. 
Ozcan Yeniceri, who was among my interviewees, suggested naming three of these courses 
explicitly instead of leaving them to the discretion of the current or future Ministry of National 
Education. Courses suggested were: elective Quran, the prophet Muhammad’s life, and 
principles of Islam (ilmihal) courses (TBMM records 03/28/2012).  
This suggestion found a support among the AKP. The names of two elective courses 
entered the law: Quran and the Prophet’s life. The bill was legislated as Law no. 1739 the article 
25 “…elective courses are being constituted. Quran and our Prophet’s (peygamberimizin) life 
courses are elective courses in the middle schools and high schools. All other elective courses are 
decided by the Ministry” (Law no. 1739). The bill passed Parliament with support of MHP, by 
306 to 85 votes in March in 2012.  
One of the discussions in this bill was that using “our prophet” term instead of 
Muhammad. It was argued that using a possessive determiner, which has a sense of belonging, 
for the prophet inside of a law would harm non-Muslim citizens’ rights. However, the bill passed 
without any change and used our prophet term.  
Both of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) MPs, Oktay Eksi and Recep Gurkan, 
among my interviewees expressed their concerns about these elective courses. Since both of 
them were in the commission where this bill first shaped, they followed discussions on this bill 
from very beginning. They recalled that adding elective religious course names were suggested 
by the MHP even though the AKP did not have a similar idea in its mind, at least at the level of 
expressing them explicitly in the bill. According to them, immediately, the AKP embraced this 
idea and offered almost the same proposal by rejecting the MHP’s offer. Oktay Eksi named this 
“political smartness (siyaset cakalligi)” and interpreted it as “exploiting religion for political 
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gain” and by referring the Constitutional Court’s financial sanctions on the AKP in 2008, he 
added this is how the AKP exploits the religion for its political gain (Oktay Eksi, personal 
interview). They also expressed how it was wrong to add a course named our prophet in the law. 
For instance, Recep Gurkan articulated the wrong in using “our prophet” term in a secular 
country’s law,  
Dear Selman, let me ask you. I am a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. I am doing 
all my citizen duties. However, [hypothetically] I am a Christian. What do I 
understand from ‘our prophet’ term in this law? Do I understand Jesus? Don’t I 
suppose to understand like that? Or I am a Jewish citizen. Don’t I suppose to 
understand Moses? (Recep Gurkan, personal interview).   
In 2012 elective course list, published by the Ministry of National Education, dropped 
this value-laden term and used Muhammad’s life instead of our prophet’s life as dictated in the 
law (MEB notice 08/31/2012).  
If the reader remember discussions about unfair coefficient factor for IHLs that was 
mentioned previously, adjusting a simple coefficient factor got more than nine years between 
2002 and 2011 during the AKP government. Opening middle-level sections of IHLs and adding 
elective Quran and the life of Muhammad courses took only several weeks and they were 
implemented following Fall 2012 semester. This is the biggest sign that how state and religion 
relations evolved during this ten years on the issue of teaching of religion by the state. There is 
no doubt that there were objections against these changes but they were not even close to 
compare to the previous discussions and far away to cause any state crisis. Furthermore, even 
conservative side was surprised to see these rapid changes. For instance, former Istanbul Mufti 
Prof. Mustafa Cagrici criticized the AKP government for the hasty changes in the issues on 
opening middle-level section of IHLs and adding elective religious courses to primary and 
secondary education levels without discussing widely and receiving opinions of professors in 
theology faculties who educate teachers related to this field (Cagrici, personal interview). 
Another speculated issue was how many students would choose these elective religion 
courses. Since it was the first year of the new system, it was exercised for the first year students 
of middle and high schools, fifth and ninth grades. MEB did not release any statistics for high 
schools but only fifth grades in the middle schools. According to Fall 2012 statistics, the MEB 
offered fifteen courses for fifth grades. Two of them were Quran and the life of Muhammad. 
MEB also offered one more course related to religion, Basics of Religion. Students were required 
to choose four classes to complete their credits. Changes were not only about elected religion 
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courses, but also the government added an elective Kurdish class that was the first time in the 
Turkish history (see MEB notice 08/31/2012).  
 
Table 4: Fifth Grade Elective Courses and Enrolled Students in 2012 
Elective course name Enrollment* Elective course name Enrollment* 
Applied Mathematics 593 Applied Science 161 
Foreign Language 495 Mind Games 138 
Quran 480 Fine Arts 101 
The Life of Muhammad 305 Music 72 
Sports and Physical 
Activities 300 Writing Skills 68 
Reading Skills 259 Drama 57 
Information 
Technologies and 
Programming 221 Kurdish 25 
Basics of Religion 180   
Source: Milliyet 10/02/2012.  
* Multiply by 1000.  
Statistics (Table 4) showed that elective Quran and the Life of Muhammad courses found 
popularity but their popularity was lower than Applied Mathematics and Foreign Language 
courses. Elective Basics of Religion course was coming late but still had an important number of 
enrolled students with 180 thousand.  
The statistics for the popularity of elective religion courses would be interpreted as a 
public support for this change. But still, learning mathematics and a foreign language were more 
important than learning the religion. On the other hand, if there were only one elective course 
related to religion, its popularity would be more than all other elective courses. Some students’ 
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interests would be divided among these three elective religion courses while there was only one 
elective course related to mathematics and one elective course related to a foreign language. 
There was another issue should be considered when interpreting these statistics that even though 
there were fifteen elective courses (MEB notice 08/31/2012) and the school should offer any of 
these courses if there is ten or more application in theory; yet, the practice was not like that. The 
average student number per class is over thirty in all education levels in Turkey (MEB Statistics 
2011-2012: 20). Most schools did not have a physical capacity to offer all of elective courses that 
had more than ten applications. Also most schools would have lack of a specialized teacher for 
some courses. Because of these reasons, school administrators were kindly asking parents to 
choose among classes that the school would offer. When interpreting popularity of elective 
courses, these obstacles should be regarded also.  
As a summary of changes in teaching of religion under the Ministry of National 
Education, there were two important elements: imam hatip high schools and teaching religion in 
public schools. In the case of IHLs, most discussions were on their university entrance. IHL 
graduates had a lack to enter university entrance exams under the same rights with other high 
school graduates until the 2012 university entrance exam. Their graduates also gain the right to 
apply Police Academy as happened before the February 28 process. In 2012, also IHLs middle-
level sections, which closed during the February 28 process, were opened back. The other 
important changes under the Ministry of National Education were adjusting Religion and Ethics’ 
courses syllabi by adding Alevi beliefs and practices along with an inclusive approach to all 
religions. Also, two elective courses, Quran and the Life of Muhammad, entered middle and high 
school curriculums as specified in the law. In Fall 2012 elective course list, one more elective 
course related to religion, Basics of Religion, also found a place. High registration for IHLs and 
elective religion courses would be read as public support to these changes. Although there were 
complaints mostly from secular establishment, these complaints were not strict as they were 
before. There were two important reasons for reducing the strict complaints. The first one, the 
AKP government consolidated its rule during three consecutive elections by increasing its votes 
and showed it’s the only power in executive branch of the state and did not have any intention to 
share this power with other state institutions by all means. The second one, the content of strict 
secular state institutions has changed gradually since 2002.  
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In the next section, I will examine the changes related to the Department of Religious 
Affairs.  
 
 
 
C. 2. THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 
 
In the first part of my study, I examined the changes in religious education under the Ministry of 
National Education. Another prominent actor in the area of the state teaching religion is the 
Department of Religious Affairs. This department was founded on March 3, 1924, by the 
Unification of Education Law, when the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations was replaced by the 
Department of Religious Affairs (TBMM records 03/03/1924). This department’s duties and 
venue have evolved over time, but in general it runs mosques and their imams, controls what is 
preached in mosques especially in Friday prayers, and directs Quran-based courses. According to 
Article 136 in the Constitution, “The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the 
general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance 
with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at 
national solidarity and integrity” (Turkish Constitution, Article 136). 
Teaching religion happens in several ways under this department’s control. The most 
common practices are year-long Quran-based courses, summer Quran-based courses for students, 
and preachings. 
 
C. 2. 1. Quran-Based Courses 
 
There are two types of Quran-based courses in Turkey: state-controlled legal Quran-based 
courses, and non-legal private Quran-based courses run by individuals and NGOs. Although 
there have been some recent changes, Quran-based courses are mostly focused on teaching the 
reading of the Quran from Arabic scripts and memorizing the Quran, rather than offering a 
general religious education. Therefore, they have been harshly criticized. In distinction to IHLs 
(religious vocational high schools) or religion courses in public schools, Quran-based courses 
never been officially closed; at least one of them has always been open (see Ocal 2011: 513-518 
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for various statistics and sources on this issue). In the 1930s their number was around ten. This 
figure increased gradually, to around 50 in the 1940s, over 100 in the 1950s, and over 400 in the 
1960s. There was a dramatic increase in their number in 1970s, with over 2000 in 1980, around 
5000 in 1990, and a peak in the 1990s of over 5200 courses, with nearly 200 thousand enrolled 
students just before the February 28 process. At that time, their number decreased dramatically to 
about half of what is was at the peak, retreating to around 3000 courses with some 100 thousand 
students at the beginning of the 2000s. During the AKP government, the number of Quran 
courses and students enrolled in them increased gradually. In the first year of the AKP regime in 
2002, there were 3664 Quran courses, with over 100 thousand students. In the second term of the 
AKP in 2007, this figure was around 6000 courses with approximately 200 thousand students. In 
the third term of the AKP in 2011, there were nearly 9000 courses with over 300 thousand 
students. The numbers of students in summer Quran-based courses were a few times more than 
those of the regular students (Ocal 2011: 514-528).  
These figures apply to legal Quran courses that were controlled by the Department of 
Religious Affairs. Besides these, there have been non-legal Quran courses since the time of the 
early Republic. Official state reports show that the state developed a negative attitude towards 
these courses. Thus, an official report prepared by the Ministry of National Education in 1980 
stated that they trained students to be reactionary in religion, to become enemies of the Republic 
in politics, and to serve as a human source for religious orders. In 1981, a report by the 
Department of Religious Affairs also questioned the intent of the non-legal Quran-based courses, 
arguing that there were abundant legal religious education offerings, including legal Quran-based 
courses: so why was there a need for non-legal Quran-based courses? The report concluded that 
illegal Quran courses aimed to exploit political, ideological, and economic powers (Ayhan 2004: 
495-507).  
The most prominent change in the legal status of Quran-based courses was implemented 
during the February 28 process along with other changes related to religion. Compulsory primary 
education increased to eight years without any break. In 1997 students were required to complete 
eight years of primary school before being admitted to Quran-based courses. This policy 
decreased the number of students in Quran-based courses dramatically. Also, in terms summer 
and weekend Quran-based courses, students were not allowed to enroll before completing fifth 
grade (Official Gazette No. 23086 08/20/1997). Moreover, in 1998 the Council of State forbade 
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all students from attending weekend or summer Quran-based courses before completing their 
primary school education (Hurriyet 02/03/1998). In that way, since state-controlled Quran-based 
courses were the only legal offerings of religious education, having a formal and legal religious 
education before completing primary school education – in other words, until fifteen years of age 
– became impossible. Parents had to wait until then for their children to receive a religious 
education outside the family, at least legally. The state outlawed illegal Quran courses, but did 
not provide a legal alternative.  
At the end of August of 1999, Parliament allowed summer Quran-based courses to 
resume for students who had completed the fifth grade (TBMM records 07/22/1999; Official 
Gazette No. 23777 08/05/1999). These courses were restricted to two months duration per 
summer, three days per week. Daily course work could last three “hours,” or 120 minutes: two 
hours (80 min.) for the Quran and its meaning, and one hour (40 min.) for all other religious 
topics (Official Gazette No. 23982 03/03/2000). The following year, in August 2000, the three-
days-a-week restriction was replaced by five days a week (Official Gazette No. 24153 
08/27/2000).  
The first legal attempt after 2002 to rearrange Quran-based courses happened at the end 
of 2003. In November 2003, a new notice was released designed to remove some restrictions on 
Quran-based courses. The two-months limit for the summer Quran-based courses was left in, but 
these courses might now be open from one week after the closing of the public schools to the 
beginning of the fall semester. The notice also removed the limit of three hours of education per 
day. The use of dormitories was allowed during the summer, which meant that summer Quran-
based courses could be offered in boarding schools. Another important change in this notice was 
the opening of evening Quran-based courses for working people (Official Gazette No. 25299 
11/24/2003). However, the life of this notice was little more than a few weeks. The secular 
establishment showed an enormous reaction to these changes, especially in terms of boarding 
students (offering boarding to students of school age was prohibited during the February 28 
process in the late 1990s). Because of these reactions, the notice was never implemented, and a 
new notice revoked it the following month (Official Gazette No. 25325 12/23/2003).  
The next heated debates about Quran-based courses occurred in 2005. Although current 
laws prohibited offering the Quran or any other kind of religious education, there were plenty of 
non-legal Quran-based courses for students, especially during the summer before they completed 
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the fifth grade. The relevant section of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) listed six months to 
two years of prison time for administrators of any illegal educational institutions, including 
Quran-based courses (TCK Article 261). The AKP and the CHP adjusted the Turkish Criminal 
Code by consensus in 2005, when a new bill passed the TBMM commissions and came to the 
Assembly for voting. The new penalty listed a prison term from six months to three years for 
administrators, plus workers and teachers, in illegal educational institutions. Thus both prison 
time and types of responsible people were increased. Also, according to TCK, a sentence of more 
than two years of prison time could not be postponed or converted to a monetary penalty. In that 
case, any teacher, worker, or administrator working in an illegal Quran course would serve up to 
three years of prison time. After lobbying by conservatives, the AKP adjusted the bill just before 
voting in Parliament. The newest version stated that any person who opened or administered an 
illegal educational institute would serve from three months to one year of jail time or would 
receive a judicial fine (TCK Article 263; TBMM records 05/26/2005).  
As might be guessed, this change led to an enormous reaction from the secular elements 
in Turkey. Opponents interpreted the bill as encouraging the establishment of illegal Quran-
based courses. Then-President Sezer returned the bill to Parliament. However, the AKP passed 
the same bill and the President could not veto it a second time (TBMM records 06/29/2005). The 
case went to the Constitutional Court, which refused to annul the change in its verdict delivered 
in 2009 (Hurriyet 03/05/2009).  
Deputy of CHP Oktay Eksi recalled this incident during our interview. He noted that he 
had no objection to the Department of Religious Affairs running legal Quran-based courses, 
since they were responding to a social demand and their existence was reasonable, legitimate, 
healthy, and necessary. However, according to him, the balance has been lost on this issue, 
especially by the reduction in criminal penalties for illegal Quran-based courses. Particularly in 
Anatolia, these illegal Quran-based courses were being run under different names, such as a 
“charity association,” by religious orders. These orders trained students for their own purposes. 
There were at least two thousand such illegal institutions. MP Eksi added, “These have been 
designed to undermine the secular state. They have been set up to prepare an infrastructure to 
bring the Iranian mullah system to Turkey” (Eksi, personal interview). 
The early intention to reduce the age restrictions for attending Quran-based courses found 
a place in a 2008 lawsuit aimed at removing the AKP from politics. The Constitutional Court 
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regarded this issue as evidence against the secularism principle in its verdict, which implemented 
financial sanctions for the AKP: 
Although the Court accepted that there was social demand for the removal of the 
headscarf ban in universities, the age restrictions concerning the Quran courses, 
and the coefficient limitation applied to Religious Vocational High Schools 
[IHL], it found that the defendant party did not carry out its political struggle on 
these issues in line with the choice crystallized in the concrete rules of the 
Constitution (Constitutional Court App. No. 2008/1 D. N. 2008/2). 
The last important issue related to removing the age restriction on enrolling in Quran-
based courses. Two legal changes in September 2011 (KHK no. 653 in Official Gazette No. 
28057, 09/17/2011) and April 2012 (Official Gazette No. 28257, 04/07/2012) removed that 
restriction. In contrast to previous changes, reactions to this change were limited. As mentioned 
above, when the AKP government made a similar change in 2003, it had to withdraw it within a 
month because of opposition from the secular establishment. Eight years later, the AKP 
government was able to pass a similar change and remove the age restriction on attending Quran-
based courses. This is another important example showing how state-religion relations developed 
in the years 2002-2012. 
 
C. 2. 2. Other issues related to the Department of Religious Affairs 
 
A similar tendency for objections related to the Department of Religious Affairs to be reduced 
may be seen in the issue of increasing the number of staff. Although the then-President of the 
Department of Religious Affairs, Prof. Ali Bardakoglu, in the context of the department’s 
problems with staffing, stated that “staffing problems and all other problems regarding the 
Department of Religious Affairs are outside any political discussion and are solved by consensus 
[of all political parties]” and “We find all kinds of support from all political parties” in one of his 
press releases in 2007 (Hurriyet 05/13/2007), if we remember the discussions above, it is clear 
that the statement of consensus on department-related issues was not true – at least, not always. 
Bardakoglu’s explanations would be considered more as an expression of his intention to keep 
the department outside politics. Re the issue of staff increases, in 2003 the AKP government 
wanted to provide fifteen thousand new staff positions in the Department of Religious Affairs. 
The CHP’s response to this plan was firm. The CHP MPs declared that filling these positions 
would cause “tension in the country” and “the exploiting of religion” for political purposes. They 
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interpreted it as “an election campaign” and “setting up public offices in a war against 
secularism” (Hurriyet 06/24-26/2003). A similar bill came to the parliament in 2010; in this 
instance, the bill called for almost eighteen thousand new staff members in the Department of 
Religious Affairs. This time, the CHP, as party policy, did not object and supported the bill. One 
of the CHP MPs said in his Parliament speech, “We, the CHP, consider that any staff demand of 
the Department of Religious Affairs should be filled. If there is a shortage of staff, then religious 
orders can meet this demand instead of the Department of Religious Affairs. That is why we 
think that this staff shortage should be corrected” (TBMM records 07/01/2010).  
The interviewees from the Department of Religious Affairs, noting that there were 
additional issues to consider, mentioned the consensus among political parties in Parliament on 
this recent change and the passage of the Department of Religious Affairs Organization Law, 
which had been waiting for adjustments for decades. They expressed their delight in seeing 
support from all four political parties in Parliament to change the bill (Uzum, personal 
interview), adding, “This consensus showed that the Department of Religious Affairs is 
supported by all parties in Turkey” (Aksoy, personal interview).  
Officials in the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA) were excited to see a consensus 
among political parties across the spectrum in dealing with their staff-related and institutional 
problems. However, my previous example suggests that this consensus was not developed 
spontaneously. The secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP) was totally opposed to a similar 
staff increase in 2003, even seeing it as a source of “tension in the country” and a form of 
“exploitation of religion.” Seven years later, the same political party welcomed the new staff 
demands of the DRA, although this time the proposed staff number was three thousand more 
than previously. How was that possible? 
In an earlier section, I outlined how the reactions of state institutions have evolved since 
2002 regarding state/religion interaction. The AKP government was the leading instigator of the 
changes in this relationship. Such changes became possible when the AKP increased its 
influence on the military, the judiciary, the universities, and other state institutions. In addition, 
new appointments in the upper levels of the bureaucracy made this move more likely. On the 
other hand, some people criticized this change by alleging that it was a sign of governmental 
pressure on other state institutions. The increasing power of the AKP government is not deniable. 
Some people even named this power as authoritarianism. However, if we try to explain changes 
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in state/religion relations solely by the AKP government’s authoritarianism, we cannot explain 
the dramatic changes in politics of the main opposition party, the CHP. Then how do we interpret 
changes in the CHP? The simplest explanation seems the most reasonable one, namely, that the 
CHP aligned its politics according to public demand.  
The time period under review, 2002-2012, shows a constant struggle between the secular 
center and the conservative periphery. In this struggle, the Republican People’s Party (the CHP), 
the armed forces, and the higher judiciary have represented the centrist coalition, while the AKP 
has established itself as the main representative of the periphery (Ozbudun 2012: 48). In the 
centrist coalition, secular state institutions have significantly shifted from assertive toward 
passive secularism, especially after 2007. The CHP has remained the only representative of the 
secular center during this shift.  
Public reaction against the implementation of assertive secularism spread among 
members of the centrist coalition before. Since other state institutions have stopped defending 
strict secularist politics, the CHP has been the only target left facing public reaction. These 
developments have provided a political foundation for the CHP to rearrange its policies 
regarding its interpretation of secularism.  
In the meantime, a political opportunity came up for the CHP to adjust its politics 
according to this new political environment. The long-standing leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal 
(1992-1999 and 2000-2010), had to resign from his post because of a video on the internet, 
which allegedly documented a relationship between Baykal and a female member of parliament 
from the CHP. Following Baykal’s resignation in 2010, Kemal Kilicdaroglu was elected party 
chairman. He was regarded as a symbol of change in the CHP (Uysal 2011: 132). 
The new chairman adopted softer politics regarding secularism. It would be hard to claim 
an ideological change in the CHP, but under the new administration, this party has experienced 
clear changes relating to its previous secular and elitist attitudes. In earlier years, other secular 
state institutions and the media backed up the strict secularist politics of the CHP. However, 
during the second half of the AKP rule, the CHP has widely lost this institutional support as well 
as media support. In this new era, the CHP has had to rely only on public support. Therefore, the 
CHP rearranged its policies regarding the understanding and implementation of secularism. This 
was a sign that state/religion relations have not only improved on the institutional level but also 
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on the public level. Even secularist parties have to compete against the AKP to gain conservative 
votes.  
How much the CHP really changed can be argued. However, at least on the theoretical 
level, the 2011 election manifestos of the new CHP emphasized personal liberties rather than 
secularism, which had always been emphasized during earlier elections. This was a major 
discursive shift for the CHP (Uysal 2011: 135). Public response to the change was welcoming: 
the CHP increased its proportion of the votes to 26% in the 2011 elections – 5% higher than in 
both the 2002 and 2007 elections.  
In short, improving relations between the state and religion on the institutional level 
under the AKP government made the CHP and other staunch secularists reconsider their 
assertive secularist policies. The CHPʼs support in 2010 for an increase in staff in the 
Department of Religious Affairs was one of the earliest signs of this change.  
 
 
 
C. 3. THEOLOGY PROGRAMS IN UNIVERSITIES 
 
Theology programs in universities are another way for the state to teach religion. The Unification 
of Education Law in 1924 declared, “The Ministry of Education will found a school of theology 
under Istanbul University to train experts on religious affairs.” This program was opened in 
1924, but, like all other state-taught religions, its life was not long. The program was replaced by 
the Islamic Research Institute under the Literature Department in 1933. However, this institute 
did not enroll any students and closed de facto in 1936. The only course related to religion, 
“Islam and Philosophy,” was taught in the Literature Department until 1941. (See TBMM 
records 01/03/1949. In that document, the date of closing of the theology school was shown as 
1941, but it referred to the course named “Islam and Philosophy” not actual theology school in 
fact that meaning the date of closing of the theology school was earlier. Also see Ayhan 2004: 
65-77, and Ocal 2011: 370-385.)  
Theology education returned to the universities with a program in Ankara University in 
1949 (Ayhan 2004: 244; Ocal 2011: 390), and the number of courses increased gradually. The 
early negative stance of the state against these programs might be explained by its inclination to 
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consider them as a kind of higher IHL education rather than seeing them as academic centers. 
The first incidents protesting the headscarf ban occurred in this school in 1966 and 1967. In 
recalling these incidents, it is important to realize that the discussions between 2002 and 2012 
were not new to Turkish politics, nor were they a product of the advent of a particular 
government in 2002.  
Examining quotas for incoming students might offer insights into the state’s attitude 
regarding theology programs between 2002 and 2012 (see Figure 1). The statistics show that 
incoming student quotas for theology programs reached a high in 1997, with over three thousand 
students. Effects of the February 28 process can be seen on theology programs also. The quotas 
for incoming students had been in constant decline until 2003, when they dropped to under one 
thousand students. There was no important change in attitudes between 2003 and 2007, although 
the number of theology students increased a little. However, these quotas have increased 
dramatically since 2008. The most important reason for this change was an administrative 
change in the Higher Education Board (YOK) in 2007.   
	  
Figure 2: Freshmen Quotas in Theology* Programs 
Source: OSYM 
* Before 1999, there was only one type of theology program. Religion and Ethics Course 
Teacher programs opened in 1999 and might be considered to be offering a theology 
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education. Also since 2010, five private universities opened theology-related programs 
under different names. These numbers include all different kinds of theology- related 
programs. 
Until December 2010, only state universities had theology programs. Since that date, five 
private universities have opened theology-related programs. The quota increase between 2002 
and 2012 seems enormous, but it did not solely depend on the interest of the state in these 
programs. In that time period, university numbers doubled overall. By 2012, total state university 
numbers in Turkey reached 103 and total private university numbers reached 65 from 
respectively 53 and 23.  The quotas for incoming undergraduate students doubled also. In 1998, 
all universities together were accepting 160 thousand incoming students in total. This figure was 
188 thousand in 2002, came to 205 thousand in 2007, and – almost doubling in five years – 
reached 406 thousand in 2012. If there had been no negative attitudes toward theology programs 
by the YOK between 1997 and 2007, and their quotas had been increased according to a 
proportion of the increase in all university program quotas, their numbers would again be similar 
to those of 2010 and 2011. Opening middle-level sections of IHLs and elective religion courses 
caused an extra demand for these programs, as accounted for in the 2012 quotas.  
YOK’s negative attitude was not only regarding quotas for these programs. YOK 
canceled compulsory one-year-long Arabic preparation classes in theology programs in fall 
1998. It also reduced the required course load for students to around 150 credits from nearly 200 
credits. In 2006, Religion and Ethics teacher programs were removed from the responsibility of 
theology schools and given to schools of education. These changes might be interpreted as signs 
of fear on the issue of religious education, especially an intensive one. Under the new YOK 
administration, these practices have mostly returned to their old situations. Compulsory one-
year-long Arabic preparation education came back in 2009. Religion and Ethics Teacher 
programs were returned to the responsibility of theology schools in 2012.  
There was no negative stance toward theology programs among my interviewees. I 
cannot say the same for the Turkish media. Some media represented the recent quota increases as 
overwhelming in their news coverage by comparing only the recent few years, without 
mentioning the facts during the February 28 process. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I examined three ways in which the Turkish state has taught religion. The first 
was under the supervision of the Ministry of National Education through imam-hatip schools, 
compulsory religion and ethics courses in primary and secondary schools, and newly established 
elective religion courses, more precisely on the Quran and the life of Muhammad. The second 
was under the supervision of the Department of Religious Affairs through year-long Quran-based 
courses, summer Quran-based courses, and sermons in mosques. The third was under the rubric 
of higher education in theology schools through programs for teachers of courses in religion and 
ethics.  
Examining the period between 2002 and 2012 reveals enormous changes in these three 
ways used by the state to teach religion. For example, there was no middle-level of imam hatip 
schools in 2002, but this began in 2012. There were no elective courses related to religion 
besides the compulsory religion and ethics courses in primary and secondary education, but two 
elective religion courses, on the Quran and the Life of Muhammad, were later added to school 
curricula by law. In addition, a third elective religion course, the Basics of Religion, found a 
place in the 2012-2013 curricula. In 2002, attending summer Quran courses was illegal before 
completing the fifth grade, and attending year-long Quran courses was not allowed before 
completing the eighth grade. In 2012, these restrictions were discontinued for summer Quran 
courses, and attending year-long Quran courses was allowed after completing fourth grade. 
There was similar support for theology programs: incoming student quotas were less than one 
thousand students in 2002, but reached almost fourteen thousand students by 2012. However, all 
these figures are misleading if the fact of the post-modern coup in 1997 and its effects are 
omitted. Most of these changes indicate a return to the situation before the February 28 process 
and reflect normalization of relations between the state and religion. The only exception to this 
rule is the offer of additional elective religion courses in primary and secondary school, which 
was a new experience in Turkey.  
One of my interviewees, Prof. Ahmet Turan Alkan, explained this normalization by the 
example of a tight shoe: 
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Actions of the government [on the issue of religious affairs] are in the direction of 
amending previous mistakes, so it is not appropriate to see them as reforms. In 
other words, you are exchanging a tight shoe for a properly fitted shoe for your 
foot. You are not replacing it with a more luxury shoe.… We had problems that 
came from the past. When they were removed, we settled down. In short, if there 
is a tight shoe, we can relax when we remove it (Alkan, personal interview).  
On the other hand, secular elites have tended not to see these changes as moving to a shoe 
that fits but to a luxury shoe. For instance, when he was talking about illegal Quran courses, 
Oktay Eksi, the MP from CHP whom I interviewed, mentioned that the balance is gone in this 
issue, especially since the reduction in the criminal penalty for offering illegal Quran courses. 
According to him, these changes have undermined the secular state and brought the Iranian 
mullah system to Turkey, although these allegations mostly lack concrete examples.  
Two terms have been coined to express these fears: neighborhood pressure, which refers 
to peer pressure or social pressure on religious issues, and anxious moderns, which refers to 
people who think Turkey is becoming an Islamic state, thereby intervening with the prior state 
commitment to the secular lifestyle.  
My interview group represented diverse elements from different strata of Turkish society. 
This diversity was reflected in the interviews. I found very different arguments that had been 
discussed in Turkish politics and academia between 2002 and 2012. On one thing, however, the 
interviewees agreed: none of them said that he or she was among the “anxious moderns.”   
Regarding the concept of neighborhood pressure, the majority of interviewees referred to 
it in terms of religious issues. Others explained it more by using “social/peer pressure” as a 
sociological term rather than a religious one. For instance, one of the interviewees, Emre Akoz 
from the Sabah newspaper, expressed this sense of peer pressure on different occasions by 
observing: “There is a fundraising campaign for Somalia right now in Turkey, and more 
specifically in our newspaper. Do you think that I can say ‘no’ to this fundraising 
campaign?”Akoz also complained that neighborhood pressure was an inappropriate term for 
social pressure, because urbanization, city life, and multi-story apartments meant mostly living 
without knowing one’s neighbors: “Is there any neighborhood left?” (Akoz, personal interview) 
The discussions of neighborhood pressure showed that some elites, as well as some 
academics, tried to explain the Turkey of the 2000s with the social realities of the 1900s. 
Supporters of banning the headscarf in universities and prohibiting religious education have 
justified their reasoning by referring to neighborhood pressure. These arguments have mostly 
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missed the social changes in Turkish society and their effect on conservative Muslims during the 
last few decades. The most appropriate term used to describe recent changes in Islamic ideology 
was coined by conservatives themselves as a self-criticism that “ex-Islamists have become 
businessmen” (eski mucahitler muteahhit oldu!). Increasing education and participating in 
business life have accelerated these changes. The first step on the way was education. During the 
early years of the Republic, conservatives tended not to send their children, especially female 
children, to public schools. Elective religion courses and imam-hatip schools have reduced this 
tendency since the 1950s. When these children had a high school and later a university 
education, their religious understanding became different from that of their parents. After they 
began to participate in business life and an upper-class lifestyle, these differences became even 
more visible.  
The participation of observant Muslims in business and the upper class has led to an 
enormous reaction among secular elites, who were not used to seeing conservatives in their 
neighborhood. The most striking example is the headscarf issue pushing into secular 
neighborhoods. Secular elites argued that there was no headscarf issue when they were young by 
referring to the 1960s and 1970s. According to them, the increase of veiled students in 
universities in the 1990s was a sign of the Islamization of the society. They accused the imam-
hatip schools of being responsible for young women wearing headscarves to justify their 
opposition to these schools. In reality, there is no indication that the imam-hatip schools helped 
to increase the number of veiled women. In Turkey, seventy percent of women wear 
headscarves, and there are no statistics showing that this figure has increased since the 1950s. If 
secular elites seldom saw any veiled women, it was basically because of their previously isolated 
lifestyle. Indeed, they were seeing veiled women in public life as housewives and blue-collar 
workers; they were just not used to seeing them as university students or white-collar workers. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to explain this discontent among the secular elites in terms of a 
power struggle between the center and the periphery, and the access of conservatives to an 
upper-class lifestyle.  
Ismet Berkan, from the Hurriyet newspaper, noted this power struggle during our 
interview. He mentioned how secular elites were not used to see a female headscarf in their 
neighborhoods. Mr. Berkan named them as second—or third-generation secularists who saw 
headscarves only on their grandmothers or on family servants. He noted that wearing a headscarf 
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is not a requirement for a job qualification. On the other hand, he was opposed to the idea of 
leaving people out of the job market because of their headscarves. He mentioned that there are 
1500-2000 workers at the headquarters of Hurriyet newspapers, where his office also is located, 
but “there is no single woman who wears a headscarf! Actually, there are some but they come in 
after office hours to clean offices or work in the kitchen.” He defined this situation not only by 
economic class but also by cultural class. According to him, it is not possible to explain this class 
struggle by Marxist economic class theory. Emphasizing that it is a “cultural class” struggle is 
more appropriate. He explained his position by using a metaphor: 
When you make a class analysis with a Marxist terminology, you cannot explain 
this [having no veiled women in the Hurriyet newspaper building] in terms of 
income or productive forces. There is a cultural difference. I want to explain this 
with a metaphor. There was a doorman in our apartment building. His wife and 
daughter were wearing headscarves. You know, only a doorman. In a while, let’s 
say in twenty years, we, residents of the building, have gradually retired and our 
income has decreased or we have become lazy in our business. However, at the 
same time, the doorman and his family have been working hard. In the meantime, 
they have bought a few apartments in the building. They have become the 
administrators of the building. We, old residents of the building, were thinking 
that the building belonged to us. However, now, we have been obliged to share 
the building with the doorman; moreover, we have to consent to his 
administration. This metaphor explains the lack of conformity and the 
disturbances related to the AKP in Turkey (Berkan, personal interview).  
Ismet Berkan’s explanations of cultural differences and possible reasons for the 
disturbances related to the AKP politics help clarify the center-periphery framework of this 
study. Accordingly, subtle and long-term socio-historical differences based on cultural divisions 
in Turkish society are still valid. 
Examining discussions on state-taught religion helps to show how people in different 
social situations experience, understand, and evaluate what has happened in state/religion 
relations between 2002 and 2012. As a general conclusion, there is widespread satisfaction with 
this change, as indicated by election results. The AKP government was the leading instigator of 
the change in state/religion relations. If there were a strong disagreement with AKP politics, the 
public vote would show it in some way during elections. But the AKP got 34% of the vote in 
2002, 47% in 2007, and 50% in the 2011 elections. It was the first party in Turkish history to 
increase its votes during three consecutive elections. Surveys in 2012 showed that it continues to 
have the same public popularity. Although the AKP’s success was more related to economic 
issues (see Carkoglu 2007; Kalaycioglu 2010) and its capacities as a professional party (see 
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Kumbaracibasi 2009), if there were a strong disagreement with its politics on state-taught 
religion, this would elicit reactions in the elections or during the latest surveys. The second 
indicator of this support can be seen in the popularity of the imam-hatip schools, after the effect 
of the unfair coefficient factor was removed and middle-level sections of these schools were 
reopened. The popularity of elective religion courses is another sign of public support for these 
changes.  
It is hard to claim that the secular establishment has been satisfied with these changes. 
However, this secular establishment has clearly changed its standpoint and softened its reactions. 
Before the February 28 process, in all discussions related to religious affairs, conservatives were 
supporting their standpoint with religion, while secularists were supporting theirs with 
secularism. During the February 28 process, conservatives learned that they should base their 
arguments on universal values. They added new points to these discussions such as human rights, 
education rights, and different understandings and implementations of secularism by the state. 
The secular elites did not need to make a change in their standpoint, since they held the power. 
When the secular elites started to lose this power, their early reactions were rigid until 2008, but 
they have relaxed since then.  
There are three possible explanations for this change. The first one can be described by 
the psychological term, “learned helplessness.” The secular elites had lost elements of their 
power one by one between 2002 and 2012. In just ten years, their power in the government, the 
universities, the media, the judiciary, and the military had diminished. They learned—as in 
“learned helplessness”—that their strict opposition based on secularism did not change anything 
but only hurt their feelings, shook their authority, and diminished the rest of their power. One of 
my interviewees, retired Colonel Ertugrul Oner, was showing this desperation when he talked 
about the future of the AKP, saying, “The AKP will be the ruling party for one thousand years” 
(Oner, personal interview). The second approach was for the bureaucrats to identify with the 
group that had the power. When I asked my interviewees if religiosity was increasing among 
bureaucrats, in one voice they said that was indeed true. However, they generally added that this 
religiosity was not sincere, but was a way to secure their positions by representing themselves as 
having ideas similar to those of the ruling party. The third reason for reducing their strict 
opposition was that some of the secular elites realized that they had gone too far on issues related 
to religious rights in the name of secularism.   
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Examining the frequency of news related to the most discussed issues in Turkish politics 
would provide another opportunity to depict the political and social environment. Newspaper 
coverage is a good resource to picture the political and social environment in a certain time 
period. I used the frequency of news related to sharia and secularism to depict the political 
environment between 2002 and 2012, culled from these newspapers’ internet search engines. 
When I used the frequency tables, I did not elaborate the content of the news but only looked at 
how many times the key words appeared. 
Examining media coverage between 2002 and 2012 reveals the intensity of these 
discussions. I looked at the coverage of two top-selling newspapers on issues of secularism 
(laicism) and sharia, since they were the most used words in discussions on religion/state 
relations. Hurriyet is a mainstream secular newspaper, while Zaman is a mainstream 
conservative newspaper. The results showed that there had been almost a constant increase in 
this news until 2008, the year when the lawsuit disbanding the AKP occurred. Since that date, 
there has been an opposite tendency (Figure 3). I also examined news related to headscarves, 
especially the frequency of the word türban in the Hurriyet and Zaman newspapers, since it has 
political connotations. News related to the headscarf has a similar tendency, increasing until 
2008 and declining since then. This news coverage is another sign of normalization on the issue 
of state/religion relations. 
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Figure 3: News Coverage on Sharia and Secularism, 1997-2012 
Source: Hurriyet; Zaman.   
The current literature acknowledges the polarization in Turkish politics during the 2000s, 
depicted in Figure 3 above (see Bayramoglu 2006; Carkoglu 2007; Yavuz and Ozcan 2007; 
Baran 2008; Cook 2009; Kalaycioglu 2010; Keyman 2010; Warhola and Bezci 2010). The 
electoral success of the AKP has polarized secular discourses since 2002, although the AKP has 
employed a right-based paradigm when defining the place of Islam in a secular society and 
softened the divide between Islamic and secular discourses in Turkey (Kanra and Ercan 2012). 
During the 2007 and following elections, the AKP utilized institutional polarization, which I 
covered widely earlier, and adopted a populist strategy to keep alive polarization on the public 
level in order to gain binary opposition that would divide society into the people and the elite 
(Dincsahin 2012; Tombus 2013). In this division, not only the AKP benefited by keeping its 
grass roots alive, but also the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Both 
parties profited from the binary politics. Although this situation did not help the CHP come to 
power, it helped to keep it as the main opposition party, secure its votes, and gain more support 
from opponents of the AKP. However, since binary politics did not bring the secularist CHP 
much electoral success, it has softened its policies on secularism under its new administration 
since 2010.  
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In the early 2000s, the movement of the periphery towards the center of society produced 
tensions and polarization. As the level of cohabitation increased, so did the intensity of conflict. 
Increasing direct and indirect contact of the secular segment with the Islamic segment or its 
actors intensified this conflict (Bayramoglu 2006). However, the 2000s center-periphery 
cleavage is different from that of the 1950s, which Serif Mardin described. In the previous 
cleavage, cultural, educational, religious, and economic differences were profound. However, the 
current movement of the periphery is represented by the middle class AKP constituency that 
shares more views with the center on issues such as democracy, freedom, and human rights (see 
Bayramoglu 2006: 145). Cultural and educational gaps have closed during the last two decades 
between secular and conservative segments, especially for the younger generation. Religion has 
maintained its importance in this cleavage. However, new definitions and the implementation of 
secularism on the state level have helped limit the influence of religion in this cleavage. 
State/religion relations have significantly shifted in the direction of passive secularism. This 
moderation has helped provide a political foundation for coping with the deepening polarization 
within Turkish society (see Warhola and Bezci 2010: 453; Kuru 2013).  
The intensity of news coverage on secularism and sharia supports my argument on this 
issue also. The words secularism and sharia were the most used words in this investigation of 
polarization. There is a constant increase between 2002 and 2008 in news highlighting these 
words. This can be read as a sign of polarization in both politics and society. Since 2008, this 
figure has decreased, eventually retreating to its 2002 level by 2012.   
Examining rights of religious minorities might give another opportunity to understand the 
nature of the relationship between religion and the state in the examined time period 2002-2012. 
In the next chapter, I will examine rights of religious minorities.  
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IV. RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN TURKEY, 2002-2012 
 	  	  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this study, I examine the nature of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey in 
the years 2002-2012 and how people in different social locations experience, understand, and 
evaluate this relationship. I focus on two main cases to explore and follow the trend of this 
relationship: the teaching of religion by the state and the rights of religious minorities.  
In the previous chapter, I examined the state-taught religion. This chapter revealed that 
the AKP government was constantly trying to amend problems of the vocational imam-hatip 
schools (IHL) and Quran-based courses, while other state apparatuses were strictly against these 
amendments. The attempts to remove the age restrictions concerning Quran-based courses and 
the coefficient limitation applied to the imam-hatip schools almost caused the disbanding of the 
AKP from politics by the Constitutional Court in 2008. The Court, which was one vote short for 
dissolving the party, ruled for financial sanctions. During the following years, the AKP 
government increased its power on the other state apparatus. Eventually, the Turkish state’s 
negative stance regarding religious education was significantly reduced, especially since 2010. 
As a result, the problems of the imam-hatip schools and Quran-based courses were mostly solved 
by 2012. Surprisingly, new elective courses related to religion entered the curricula of primary 
and secondary education. Public support, which can be measured by enrollment in these elective 
religion courses and the imam-hatip schools in the 2012-2013 school year, suggests that the 
majority of the population welcomed these amendments. 
Examining only the state-taught religion is not sufficient to lead to a general conclusion 
on the nature of the state/religion relationship. Removing obstacles in front of religious education 
might be interpreted as a necessity of civil rights; on the other hand, supporting only one 
religion, Islam in the Turkish case, might be a sign of an oppressive relationship between the 
Turkish state and the religious minorities.  
	  	  
159	  
The time period examined, 2002-2012, reveals two different patterns for the state vis-à-
vis religious education. In the early years, the state had wanted to restrain religious education. In 
the later years, this restraint has evaporated, especially towards the end. The amendments 
brought some new questions to mind: Does the state have the same approach to the religious 
education of religious minorities? Were these changes a part of a general amendment based on 
civil, human, and religious rights, or the promoting of one religion, especially Sunni Islam? Are 
religious minority rights going along a positive or a negative path? How do religious minorities 
interpret the changes? This section will help answer these questions.  
As a general thesis, I expected to see a positive change on the issue of religious minority 
rights, based on my interpretation of the recent changes in Turkish politics as a transformation of 
Turkish society. In this transformation, previously marginalized or excluded groups from politics 
have become more capable of representing its values in the state administration. Since these 
groups have been oppressed for decades, it would be likely, once they came to power, to show 
more respect for other disadvantaged groups, including the religious minorities. Since the AKP 
government mostly represented these groups in the state, it would be expected that it would be 
more tolerant vis-à-vis minority rights. On the other hand, I expected to see skepticism toward 
the AKP among religious minorities because the AKP leaders are strong adherents of Islam.  
In fact, religious minority rights have not been discussed much in Turkish politics, since 
these minorities are less then one percent of the Turkish population and do not have meaningful 
political power. Current unofficial estimates show the non-Muslim population standing at 60,000 
Armenian Orthodox; 20,000 Jews; 20,000 Catholics; 20,000 Syrian Orthodox; 3,000 Greek 
Orthodox; 2,500 Protestants; 2,000 Syrian Catholics; 2,000 Armenian Catholics; 500 Armenian 
Protestants; and 300 Chaldean Catholics (EU Progress Report, 2004: 35). My religious minority 
interviewees confirmed these numbers to some extent by their estimates of the populations of 
their communities.  
In addition to non-Muslim communities, the Alevi group, which constitutes over ten 
percent of the population in Turkey, has been a part of the discussion of religious minority rights. 
Although the overwhelming majority of Alevis consider themselves Muslim, they have some 
distinct and different practices compared to Sunnis. The Sunni majority has mostly ignored these 
along with the right of Alevis to implement these practices freely. In addition, some Alevis 
interpret Alevism as a separate religion outside Islam as well as a separate culture. Because of 
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these different interpretations, it is worth examining Alevi rights in the context of religious 
minority rights in Turkey.  
Indeed, examining changes in religious minority rights allows us to interpret the main 
reasons behind the changes on the issues of headscarf and state-taught religion during 2002-12, 
and whether these changes were a part of a general amendment based on civil, human, and 
religious rights versus the promotion of one religion, namely, Sunni Islam. Therefore, as my 
second case, I will examine the rights of religious minorities. Before looking its historical and 
current processes, it would be helpful to explore minority and rights concepts. 
From a sociological perspective, a minority is a group of people who have unequal and 
inferior treatment or at least they believe so because of their different sense of belonging 
including but not limited to race, gender, ethnic, or religious background from the dominant 
majority of a population. In addition, a minority group should present minority consciousness. 
Without awareness of the minority consciousness, a minority group cannot build an identity and 
exist (Oran 2004: 17; Akgonul 2013: 4).  
On the issue of religious minority rights, the “minority rights” concept refers both equal 
natural/negative/positive rights and positive discrimination. In the first step, this concept aims 
prevention of discrimination and providing an equal treatment for every group. In the next step 
on positive discrimination, it exercises a differential treatment in order to preserve basic 
characteristics of the minority group that distinguishing them from the majority of the 
population. The UN and the UNESCO Declarations provide a legal base for both equal and 
positive discriminatory rights (see Thornberry 1993: 18-19). Providing equal rights for every 
group in a democratic country might be out of question. However, providing positive 
discriminatory rights does not have a similar welcome. Most discussions on religious minority 
rights are related providing them more favorable treatment than the majority. In that case, the 
concept of minority rights does not necessarily mean a positive connotation by itself or refusing 
these rights are not always bad as it sounds. They are part of social discourse on politics. 
Therefore, beginning with the historical process of these rights would provide a better 
understanding of the current changes.  
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B. NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES  
 
1. History 
 
When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, it inherited a legacy of tradition from its 
Ottoman past, a tradition which for centuries was molded by Islamic culture (Toprak 1981: 1). In 
Ottoman times, religion was the center of life and identity issues. The Ottoman political system 
considered the religious communities of Christians, Jews, and Muslims as legitimate social 
entities deserving of respect and status. Calling such communities millet, they respected and 
treated them as legal and social entities. Each religious community (millet) was permitted to 
preserve its own peculiar institutions, to continue practicing its own style of religious and social 
rites, to preserve its educational and vocational practices, and to practice its own standards of 
conflict resolution through its own legal systems (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu 2007: 6). The 
Ottomans brought their highly varied populations through this organized millet system—a kind 
of citizenship. The millets were the major religious groups that were allowed to establish their 
own communities under Ottoman rule. 
The Ottoman State had established its legal, social, and political structure on this notion 
of millet, not on ethnic identity. For this reason, depending on their religion, a Turk or an Arab or 
a person of a different ethnic background could belong to the millet of Muslims, or the millet of 
Jews, or the millet of Rums (Christians).  
The rise of nationalism in Europe under the influence of the French Revolution extended 
to the Ottoman State during the 19th century. This new trend influenced nations that were under 
the rule of the Ottomans. These nations wanted some privileges and eventually to leave the 
Ottoman Empire. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, nationalism 
increased among the Turks to inspire them to hold the state together.  
Because of this background, Islam and Turkishness become two major identity references 
in Turkey. To understand the gravity of these factors on political life, we can look at the 1923 
Turkish-Greek exchange of populations:  
As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of 
Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, 
and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. 
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the 
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authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government 
respectively (Lausanne Peace Treaty).  
Under the terms of the treaty, a compulsory exchange of the approximately 150,000 
remaining (after the war of independence) Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox religion in 
Turkey and approximately 350,000 Greek nationals of the Muslim religion remaining in Greece 
would commence immediately (bringing the total to around 3 million refugees from both sides, 
including those from WWI). The treaty excluded the Greek inhabitants in Istanbul and the 
Muslim inhabitants in Western Thrace. Many of the refugees on the Turkish side had little or no 
consciousness of being Greek, and those on the Greek side had little or no consciousness of 
being Turkish. Turks’ expulsion generally was based on their adherence to Islam rather than 
ethnicity, and Greeks’ expulsion generally was based on their adherence to Orthodox 
Christianity rather than ethnicity as such (Triadafilopoulos 1998).  
The Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 also aimed to protect the rights of religious 
minorities staying in Turkish territory. The treaty recognized only non-Muslim communities as 
minorities and granted them equal civic and political rights―to freedom of religion, travel, and 
migration, to use their own language, and to establish religious and social institutions, including 
schools (see Appendix E for related articles of the treaty).   
This treaty is still a binding law in the Turkish legislation system and is often referenced 
during discussions on religious minorities. Article 37 of the treaty states:  
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Article 38 to 44 shall be 
recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action 
shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor 
official action prevail over them. 
Some of my interviewees addressed this treaty when they talked about religious minority 
rights. In Turkish politics, it has sometimes been argued that the Turkish state has not 
implemented all the requirements of the treaty. Another important discussion about the rights 
given in the treaty is that the Turkish state has not granted the same rights to all religious 
minorities. Articles 37 through 44 of the treaty mention the word “non-Muslim” to refer to 
religious minorities without mentioning any specific minority names. However, the Turkish state 
has restricted these specific religious minority rights only to Greek, Armenian, and Jewish 
religious communities since signing the treaty. Other religious minorities have not had the same 
rights such as establishing schools. It could be claimed that the Turkish state had a negative 
stance against Greek and Armenian minorities in the early years of the Republic, on account of 
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the allegations that the Greek and Armenian minorities helped the enemies of Turkey during 
WWI and Turkey's War of Independence. On the other hand, the Jewish communities did not 
experience this negative stance and were even welcomed. In the 1930s and 1940s Turkey readily 
accepted Jewish immigrants. Indeed, when compared to other countries in Europe, Turkey 
treated local and foreign Jews favorably. Before WWII, at a time when almost no country in 
Europe offered Jews a safe place, Turkey allowed Jewish immigrants to come to Turkey, since 
there was relatively no anti-Semitism (Cagaptay 2006: 155).  
The importance of the rights granted by the Lausanne Peace Treaty might be better 
understood if we compare the rights of the ethnic groups and the Muslim population on the issue 
of teaching Islam. While religious minorities enjoyed teaching their language to their children in 
their schools, ethnic minorities, such as the Kurdish population, did not have this right. The only 
available elective Kurdish course entered the curricula of public schools in 2012. There was a 
similar situation concerning the teaching Islam in schools. While religious minorities have the 
right to teach their religion in their schools, Islam could not be taught in public schools, as I 
explained the history of teaching religion in the Turkish state part of this study. 
For instance, when the issue of elective religion courses in public schools was discussed 
at the fifth National Education Meeting in 1953, a Jewish high school principal noted that 
religious minorities taught their religion in their private schools, 
I am participating the [National Education] Meeting as the principal of a Jewish 
high school and a member of the committee. I am greeting everybody with all my 
respect.  
While the issue of religion is being debated, I would like to add that religion 
courses have been taught in our high school for a long time. There is no complaint 
on this issue. Students regularly take these classes…. Also, I have classes in 
public schools. I teach mathematics. I have been asked sometimes “Do you have 
religion courses in your school?” I reply, Yes, we have. That is all I would like to 
say (The 5th National Education Meeting, 1953 1991: 426). 
Indeed, religious minorities had the freedom to teach religion in their schools, but the 
Muslim majority lacked this right. Howard Reed noted this contradiction in his ethnographic 
study in the 1950s: “Some Turkish writers have even complained that non-Muslim Turkish 
citizens enjoy greater religious freedom than the Muslim majority” (Reed 1954: 278). 
In the chapter on state-taught religion, I explained that, if a state should feel a threat 
against its sovereignty from a religion, it would most likely prohibit its teaching in schools or try 
to control religious education by instituting its own curriculum. Even though autocratic regimes 
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are more apt to feel this type of threat, democratic regimes experience similar fears from time to 
time. In the case of minorities, in the early years of the Republic, the Turkish state had fears 
related to religious minorities because of the incidents in WWI and the War of Turkish 
Independence. However, these fears have faded in time, as religious minorities have lost political 
and economic power as well as experiencing a diminution in their population compared to the 
Muslim population. The only exception to this gradually thawing relationship came in the form 
of allegations of missionary activities in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. 
 
2. Missionary Activities 
 
 There were allegations that missionary activities by Christians increased in the late 1990s, 
especially after the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, which devastated the lives of thousands of 
people. Missionaries worked to spread their beliefs during human relief efforts. It was also 
argued that the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey opened new opportunities for missionary 
activities and those missionaries abused the economic situation of Muslim families in that 
vulnerable time. In addition, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were regarded as another opportunity to 
spread Christianity in this time period.  
There was, indeed, an increase in missionary activities in Turkey. Increasing pressure on 
Islamic teaching and activities during the February 28 processes increased fears of conservatives 
in that time period. It was perceived that the state utilized missionary activities by closing 
middle-level sections of imam-hatip schools and discouraging enrollment in these schools, at the 
same time it was making it more difficult to attend Quran-based courses during the compulsory 
eight-year elementary school education and also persecuting illegal Quran-based courses. These 
fears continued in the early years of the AKP government, because it gave more rights to 
religious minorities under the name of legal reforms necessary for EU membership; however, the 
fears have gradually faded. Even some secularists, such as Rahsan Ecevit, the founder of the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the wife of the former PM Bulent Ecevit, condemned these 
reforms by claiming that Turkey was “losing religion” (Hurriyet 01/02/2005).  
It would seem surprising to see support for Islam among these secularists. Actually, most 
secularists confirm their Islamic identity by stating, “We are Muslim too!” in their public 
speeches. On the other hand, according to them, religion should be a matter of private life and 
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not involve the public sphere. For instance, a Muslim female can wear a headscarf in her private 
life, but cannot do the same when she attends school, since the school is a public sphere. In other 
words, these secularists prefer an Islamic understanding that is distinct from its practices, or seen 
as living as a culture in the wider society. In that sense, Islamic identity, deprived of its practices 
in public, is to be enjoyed as a cultural building block in society.   
On the other hand, negative reactions of secularists to missionary activities would be 
interpreted as a part of the political opposition to the ruling AKP government. Depicting the 
AKP government as allowing missionary activities and leading Turkey to become a Christian 
country would cause the AKP to lose conservative political support. The AKP government, 
therefore, perceived the reactions of secularists as political opportunism. For instance, when 
then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was asked to comment about Rahsan Ecevit’s concerns 
related to missionary activities, Gul stated, “I just remembered that when her party DSP was in 
power [1997-2002], how imam-hatip schools and Quran-based courses were closed, and how all 
institutions and centers which represent Islam were weakened” (Milliyet 01/04/2005). Indeed, 
Abdullah Gul was right that Islamic teaching was strictly restricted during 1997-2002. In other 
words, the AKP government did not find the reactions of the secularists to be sincere.  
In that environment, several Christian figures in Turkey were killed. A Catholic priest, 
Andrea Santoro, and an Armenian-Turkish journalist, Hrant Dink, were killed respectively in 
2006 and 2007. Both of their murderers were younger than 18 years old. Furthermore, three 
Christian missionaries were killed in 2007 (Hurriyet Daily News 03/05/2011). Most AKP 
supporters alleged that these murders were part of a plot to reduce the support of Western 
countries for the AKP government.  
An investigation of the clandestine Ergenekon network, a shadowy organization whose 
suspected members were accused of being nested within the state bureaucracy and working to 
overthrow the democratically elected AKP government, revealed some connections between the 
priest murders and this network (Today’s Zaman 09/19/2011). The Ergenekon trial still continues 
in 2013.  
Surprisingly, the spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Father Dositheos 
Anagnostopoulos, mentioned the Ergenekon network when I asked him about negative 
experiences encountered by his community since 2002.  
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There were some negative experiences at the beginning [of the 2000s]. I came to 
Turkey in 2003. Once or twice a year, there were some protests against the 
Patriarchate in front of the Patriarchate until this Ergenekon network was 
revealed…. The protestors were chanting old-fashioned slogans such as “Go to 
Greece, this is our land.” Even some groups were collecting signatures to expel 
the Patriarchate from Turkey…. After the Ergenekon [case], all of these stopped. 
Furthermore, even some journalists who had a negative stance against us or were 
shy to contact us previously, made an opening by asking questions…. After the 
Ergenekon case and Hrant Dink’s murder, something happened that had never 
happened before: approximately 500 students from the universities came in front 
of the Patriarchate and revealed their support. These [supporting demonstrations] 
were unusual for Turkey (Anagnostopoulos, personal interview).  
On the other hand, explaining the reactions of secularists to missionary activities as based 
only on political opportunism would be unfair. The secularist reaction to the missionaries did not 
start after the AKP came to power in 2002. Even before this date, in 2001, missionary activities 
came to the attention of the Turkish state. For instance, the military, which was purely a 
secularist institution, showed its concern about missionary activities, defined in 2001 by the 
military dominating the National Security Council (MGK) as a threat to the Republican 
regime(Cinar 2010: 117).22 As a personal experience, I attended one of the military seminars 
about the harmful activities of missionaries in 2005, when I served in the army.23  
Some MPs brought the missionary issue to the Parliament, requesting an official 
explanation from the government. Indeed, in terms of Turkish law, there was no difference 
between spreading Islam and any other religion. When reading statistics against missionary 
activities, it should be kept in mind that there were similar persecutions against Islamic groups, 
especially after the 1997 post-modern coup. Statistics showed that 104 people in 1998, 137 
people in 1999, 46 people in 2000, and 5 people in 2001 were detained on allegations of 
missionary activities. More than half of these people were not Turkish citizens and came to 
Turkey only for missionary activities (TBMM records 02/12/2002).  
Foreign missionaries elicited a reaction from my interviewees. For instance, Mehmet 
Akif Cec from the Felicity Party (SP) made a distinction between missionary activities and 
religious minority activities: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cinar did not reference any source for the decision about missionary activities in the NSC meeting 
in 2001. The NSC did not publically announce its decision on missionary activities. The Turkish press 
covered this news, and the NSC did not deny it. See Radikal 04/20/2007.  
23 Every male Turkish citizen has to perform mandatory military service in Turkey.  
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The difference between missionaries and religious minorities should be regarded. 
Religious minorities have been living in this country for centuries and they belong 
here. However, missionaries are coming from outside of the country. They have 
abused the weakness of people with immoral ways such as offering money. 
Especially, missionaries utilized the political situation of Turkey during the 
February 28 process when [Islamic] religious education was restricted and 
prohibited. For instance, attending a Quran-based course or a summer Quran-
based course in mosques is still illegal24 in Turkey. These kinds of people, who 
are utilizing this political environment and doing missionary activities with 
immoral ways, should be considered [when talking about religious minority 
rights] (Cec, personal interview).  
Also, the spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Father Dositheos 
Anagnostopoulos, expressed that foreigners, especially Protestant Americans, have carried out 
missionary activities in Turkey,  
Christian churches, including Armenian and Greek, or Catholics in Turkey, do not 
have a missionary duty. The persons who distribute free Bibles on streets are 
foreigners coming from the U.S. They are Protestants. We do not do a similar 
activity. We do not do it because we have a Christian community and our duty is 
making missionary activities among our community, especially for teaching the 
religion to Christian children. However, we do not make a missionary activity for 
converting a Muslim or a Catholic or a Jew to another religion [Orthodox 
Christianity], but Americans do (Anagnostopoulos, personal interview).  
Just before the AKP came to power, the previous government in May 2002 requested the 
Department of Religious Affairs to inform Muslim citizens about missionary activities (TBMM 
records 7/7517). Imparting this type of information by the Department of Religious Affairs 
continued in the early years of the AKP as well. This department organized several public 
seminars and conferences, issued related publications, and mentioned these activities in sermons 
(see TBMM records 03/24/2004 and 03/10/2005). The Department of Religious Affairs approved 
a statewide Friday sermon about missionary activities in March 2005. The EU harshly criticized 
the 2005 sermon and interpreted it as a sign of hostility against missionary activities (EU 
Progress Report 2005: 31).  
In 2004, another official response regarding the missionary activities showed that the 
state was tolerating endeavors that aided in the spreading of a religion by its members, while at 
the same time continuing to make a distinction regarding “proselytizing.”  Proselytizing was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This interview was conducted before the 2012 changes related to Quran-based courses. Since that 
date, elementary school students may attend summer Quran-based courses.  
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regarded as abusing the weakness of people for political and economical gain (TBMM records 
01/20/2004). In reality, proselytizing was a vague term.  
In 2004, while the issue was still hot, Prof. Ali Kose was explaining conversion in terms 
of sociological reasons rather than solely examining theological explanations. According to him, 
if a young person chooses to be a Christian, he/she chooses being “western,” not Christian. If 
Christian missionaries in Turkey came from African countries, they would never catch the 
attention of Turkish youth (Kose 2004: 407). While the Turkish economy gained strength and the 
state’s hostile attitude against Islamic endeavors diminished under the AKP government, fears of 
missionary activities faded also. Official records showed that 338 people converted from Islam to 
Christianity and 6 people converted to Judaism between 1997 and 2004. In the same period, 232 
people converted to Islam (TBMM records 03/08/2005). Turkish ID cards have a section for 
religious affiliation, so these numbers show only official changes. Unofficial changes would be 
more. For instance, a dissertation on Muslim converts to Christianity between 1990 and 2010 
estimated approximately 5000 converts in 20 years. However, the researcher, Sinan Zavalsiz, 
concluded that the majority of converts already had Christian parents. In other words, he did not 
see them as Christian converts (Zavalsiz 2011).25  
Official reports showed that there were 69 illegal churches in 2003 (TBMM records 
03/24/2004) and 88 in 2004—including different places of worship (TBMM records 
03/08/2005). This increase would be a sign of tolerating missionary activities by the state in 
some way.  
One of my interviewees, Oktay Eksi, was complaining about how the AKP government 
tolerated illegal Quran-based courses. According to him, there were at least two thousand such 
illegal institutions in Turkey. So it is important to note that the AKP government was tolerating 
not only illegal Quran-based courses but also illegal churches, even when criticisms were at their 
peak about missionary activities.  
Examining frequency of news related to missionary activities in the national media would 
give us another opportunity to depict political and social environment in that days. I used 
frequency of news related to missionary activities to depict the political environment between 
2002-2012. I used these newspapers’ internet search engines to find related news. When I used 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  The reader can check Dinler Tarihcilerinin Gozuyle Turkiye’de Misyonerlik (2005) for detailed 
information about missionary activities in different regions of Turkey.  
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the frequency tables, I did not elaborate the content of the news but just looked how many times 
these key words appeared in news. This examination revealed that news coverage about 
missionary activities in the national media reached its peak around 2005 but faded gradually 
since then. I examined coverage of two top-selling newspapers on this issue: Hurriyet is a 
mainstream secular newspaper, while Zaman is a mainstream conservative newspaper. Both of 
them are the top-selling newspapers in Turkey. Since Zaman is a conservative newspaper, it was 
likely to have more coverage about missionary activities than Hurriyet. The results showed that 
news related to missionary activities reached its peak in 2005 and had been declining since then 
(Figure 4). This was also another sign that fears about missionary activities have diminished in 
society.  
	  
Figure 4: News Coverage on Missionary Activities, 1998-2012 
Source: Hurriyet; Zaman.  
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3. Changes Related to Rights of Religious Minorities 
 
In the examined time period between 2002 and 2012, the problems of non-Muslim religious 
communities might be subsumed under the categories of legal personality, property rights, the 
training of clergy, and the management of their foundations (EU Progress Report 2005: 109).  
One of the prominent legal changes related to religious minorities was ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) in June 2003. This covenant, which 
was signed in August 2000, had been waiting in front of the Parliament since then. Although 
Turkey ratified the document, she expressed some reservations related to Article 27, which stated 
religious minority rights as follows:  
In those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language. 
In its reservations, Turkey stated, 
The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to interpret and apply the provisions of 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
accordance with the related provisions and rules of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 and its 
Appendixes. 
In other words, at the beginning of the 2000s, the Turkish state did not intend to provide 
religious freedom to religious minorities beyond the boundaries of the Treaty of Lausanne. Some 
people interpret the amendments related to religious minorities between 2002 and 2012 as only 
giving rights to these groups that were already provided by the Treaty of Lausanne. In this 
opinion, religious minority rights had been confiscated unjustly during the early years of the 
Republic. They argued that what is happening in Turkey now is only fixing the old mistakes. 
Some others, while accepting the early mistakes, are more generous in their appreciation of the 
current amendments.  
For instance, one of the interviewees, Prof. Ahmet Turan Alkan, while criticizing the 
Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) attitude against religious minority rights, expressed that 
the Turkish state has not provided new rights to them but only given their previous rights back: 
It is not possible to accept the attitude of the MHP against [religious] minorities. 
Why is it not possible?... [Because] we are not providing new rights to [religious] 
minorities but only returning their previous rights that were stated in the 1923 
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Lausanne Treaty. The Turkish state is implementing necessities of an 
international treaty merely now (Alkan, personal interview).  
In contrast, some groups saw the demands of non-Muslim communities as abundant and 
unacceptable, beyond the terms of the Lausanne. According to them, the minorities already had 
every right. These demands were an imposition of Western countries, including the U.S. For 
instance, one of the interviewees, Dr. Ahmet Metin, representing the Association of Kemalist 
Thought in Istanbul and the Thrace region, expressed his concerns on this issue, especially 
regarding the non-Muslim community demands on Ecumenism and the Greek Orthodox schools. 
According to him, the minority issue was resolved in the Treaty of Lausanne: “Dealing with 
Ecumenism is scratching the wound. Who did not accept and sign the Lausanne Treaty among 
countries? The U.S. It still does not recognize it. These [demands] are a part of its game” (Metin, 
personal interview).  
Another interviewee, Dogan Bermek from the Federation of the Alevi Foundations, 
stated there has been no change in reality but in name only. Mr. Bermek referenced a report 
prepared by the Federation about problems of religious minorities, Turkiye’de Inanc Gruplari: 
Sorunlar ve Taleplere Yonelik Yeni bir Cerceve. He stated there is no change by giving an 
example regarding the issue of legal personality:  
On the issue of religious minorities, you can read from this report how much 
religious minorities have problems. They [the AKP government] are smiling upon 
you now. They do not have the state’s despotic—I do not give!—attitude. Even 
this smiling makes religious minorities happy. However, there are no rights given 
to them. For instance, you are the Armenian Patriarch. You are one of two people 
who have a legal right to wear religious attire. However, you cannot ask the 
Patriarchate to buy an official car for your service, because the Patriarchate does 
not exist [legally]. It does not have a legal personality. The only way is for one 
Armenian to buy a car and give it to the service of the Patriarch. The Treaty of 
Lausanne gave this right to the Patriarch, but you do not implement any 
requirements of the treaty. It is the same for the Orthodox Patriarch. First, the 
world accepts that he is the Ecumenical Patriarch. But we do not accept 
ecumenism. Who cares if you [the Turkish state] accept it or not? Second, without 
regarding whether or not you accept his ecumenism, he is the Patriarch! The 
Patriarchate, which has existed since [Sultan] Fatih [year of 1453], does not exist 
[legally], does not have a legal personality. The Patriarchy pays utility bills, but 
when it buys a book, it cannot write its name on the receipt. It was the same 
before 2002 and the same after 2002. In other words, nothing changed (Bermek, 
personal interview). 
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Religious minorities also stated the legal personality problem as an important issue 
during the interviews. For instance, the spokesman of the Orthodox Church, Father 
Anagnostopoulos Dositheos, stated: 
Currently, neither the Orthodox Church, nor the Catholic Church, nor the 
Armenian Church, nor the Jewish community has a legal personality. We 
[Orthodox Church] do not have a legal personality. Turkish politicians and 
newspapers say the Patriarchate is a Turkish institution, but it is not [as it does not 
have a legal personality]. This is our main and the first problem—that of not 
having a legal personality, vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. If we were recognized 
as having a legal personality, our bureaucratic relations would be easier. For 
instance, you cannot send an official letter to the prime ministry or the president 
in the name of the Patriarchate. If you write, it does not have any official 
recognition. However, the Patriarch, the head of the Orthodox Church, has been 
recognized as a person. Isn’t this weird? The Patriarch is recognized, but the 
Patriarchate is not recognized. Everybody knows that the Patriarchy is here. 
Everybody comes here to give us a notice…. If you do not have a legal 
personality, you have many problems. For instance, you, [as a person], can hire an 
assistant for your housework. You pay his/her salary. However, the Patriarchate 
cannot do it because the Patriarchate does not exist legally. Since it does not exist 
legally, it cannot appoint anybody [to work here]. You can ask how we solve this 
problem. It is solved, but it is not the solution. Inside this area there are the 
Patriarchate and its church. The church is a foundation, but the Patriarchate is not. 
We are hiring workers [including religious clergy] in the name of the [church] 
foundation. This is not a suitable way (Anagnostopoulos, personal interview). 
The Jewish community expressed similar problems related to legal personality and 
mentioned it among its primary problems. Yusuf Altintas, the secretary general of the Chief 
Rabbi of Turkish Jews, stated the Turkish Jewish community does not have a legal personality. 
The Turkish state recognizes only the Chief Rabbi of Turkish Jews. This is their primary 
problem: 
Regretfully, we do not have a legal personality. This is our entire problem. We, a 
community that has twenty thousand people, do not have a legal personality. Only 
the Chief Rabbi has official recognition.  
[For instance], when I go to a state office and introduce myself as Yusuf Altintas, 
the secretary general of the Chief Rabbi, and request something in the name of the 
Chief Rabbi, they do not say “No” and may even buy me a coffee. However, this 
situation totally depends on official people’s understanding. In other words, I do 
not have a legal right to request something in the name of the secretary general of 
the Chief Rabbi. I cannot demand my legal rights but have to solicit a favor. I do 
not have any more priority than any other Turkish citizen. Even if the official 
people show more respect and kindness [than they do to others], the request does 
not have any [legal] difference from other Turkish citizens’ requests (Altintas, 
personal interview). 
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Also, the Latin Catholic community leader, Istanbul’s Vicar Apostolic Monsignor Louis 
Pelatre, mentioned the legal personality issue. He noted that the Catholic community has more 
problems with this issue, since the Turkish state recognizes only Greeks, Armenians, and Jews as 
minorities according to the Treaty of Lausanne (Pelatre, personal interview). Although Greek, 
Armenian, and Jewish communities do not have official recognition either, at least their 
community leaders, the Orthodox Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch, and the Chief Rabbi of the 
Turkish Jewish community have official recognition. In the case of the Catholic Church, even 
their church leader has no official recognition.  
As can be seen above, there were practical solutions. The demands of the religious 
minorities were not denied just because they did not have legal personalities. However, these 
attitudes were not solidified by legal changes. The religious minorities fear that, if one day a 
person who has a negative stance toward religious minorities comes to lead some related 
departments of the state or the government, they would not experience similar treatment. Thus it 
is important to have these rights under the legal system instead of leaving them to the decisions 
of individuals. In short, rights should not be based on arbitrary decisions but should be protected 
by laws. In addition, protecting rights by laws prevents or at least makes unlikely negative 
changes in the future.   
It should be noted here that, while religious minorities are having some problems, the 
Sunni majority was not free of them either. It has not enjoyed total religious freedom, as I 
explained in the chapter on state-taught religion. Some religious minorities were aware of it and 
noted it while mentioning their problems. For instance, Yusuf Sag, the Turkish Syrian Catholic 
Deputy Patriarch Chorepiscopus, mentioned several problems of religious minorities in our 
interview. He noted they were aware that not only did religious minorities have problems, but the 
Sunnis did too. That is why he found recent changes useful and appreciated the endeavors even 
with their shortcomings: 
I cannot say all problems of Christians were a hundred percent solved. We still 
have problems. You have to be cruel to be kind (dost aci soyler). When I say I 
love Turkey more than you, I am not exaggerating. That is why I have to say it. I 
am not living off the fat of the land (bir elim yagda bir elim balda degil). 
However, this should be respected because everybody has problems including 
Sunnis and Alevis. Their problems have not been solved either. It is not like the 
Sunnis have solved their problems, or that the Kurds or the Alevis have solved 
theirs and that it is only a small number of Christian minorities that have not 
solved their problems. However, there have been endeavors to solve these 
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problems. We are saying the same thing to Europe: Don’t you have any 
problems? [For instance], you have problems in Germany…. The important thing 
is intention. If we have goodwill for each other, these problems will be solved in 
time. There is nothing falling into someone’s lap (bir gunde pis, agzima dus) in 
just one moment. The problems are being solved in time (Sag, personal 
interview).   
As was clearly stated, the legal personality issue was not solved between 2002 and 2012. 
There was no legal solution in the issue of the training of clergy either. Then how is it possible to 
explain the good faith of some religious minorities in the AKP government?  
Before conducting my interviews with members of religious minorities, I had a 
hypothesis that I would find no support for the AKP government among them. While I was 
defining the AKP as a conservative party, I was aware that there were plenty of people who were 
asserting that the AKP was an Islamic or at least a pro-Islamic party. These kinds of comments 
were causing me to question my conclusion about the AKP. I had a simple idea that, if religious 
minorities thought the AKP was an Islamist party, they would show no support for its politics. 
Sixty years ago, Seymour Martin Lipset was stating, “many ethnic and religious minorities 
suffering social or economical discrimination support the more left parties in different countries” 
(Lipset 1963 [1959]: 261). This political inclination has not changed since Lipset’s time. 
Therefore, seeing support among religious minorities for the AKP government surprised me.  
One of these surprises was that I saw photos of PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President 
Abdullah Gul, along with the Pope’s picture, on the wall of the office of the Syrian Catholic 
church leader Yusuf Sag where we conducted the interview. I asked about the pictures near the 
end of the interview. Chorepiscopus Sag explained them to me. There was a picture of the Pope 
in the middle, where Sag was bowing and holding the hand of the Pope to show his respect. On 
the right of this picture was the one of President Abdullah Gul. Gul was in the middle of the 
picture, with Yusuf Sag on his one side and the Armenian Catholic church leader on his other. In 
the third picture, PM Erdogan was posing with several religious minorities after a luncheon 
gathering in August 2009. Yusuf Sag added that he has a few more pictures with President Gul,26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 At the time of writing this chapter, another church leader, Yusuf Cetin, the Patriarchal Vicar of the 
Turkish Syrian Orthodox Church, accompanied President Abdullah Gul during an official visit to Sweden 
in March 2013. This was the first time that a representative of a Turkish religious minority group was 
invited to join a presidential visit abroad (Hurriyet Daily News 03/11/2013). 
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which his family members keep in their homes and offices. He also noted that it is the first time 
that a prime minister’s picture has been hanging on his wall.  
Although there was no question about religious minorities’ party preferences among my 
interview questions, I asked the spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Father 
Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, about party preferences of the Christian minorities while he was 
talking about attitudes of political parties towards religious minorities. He explicitly said that 
Christian minorities support the AKP. He recalled the Armenian Patriarch’s statement by adding 
that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch never made a statement like that (Anagnostopoulos personal 
interview).  
The Armenian Patriarch II Mutafyan lent his community’s support to the AKP just before 
the 2007 elections, when he talked to the German weekly Der Spiegel. He said the Armenian 
community would prefer the AKP to the social democrat Republican People’s Party (CHP). He 
noted that the approach of the AKP to minorities is coherent and less nationalist. He concluded, 
“Our choice for the upcoming elections is Erdogan” (Hurriyet Turkish Daily News 06/05/2007. 
See, in German, Der Spiegel 06/01/2007). It can be argued that a religious minority group leader 
did not want to conflict with the ruling party. However, this could not have been the case during 
the 2007 elections. Only one month before the Patriarch Mutafyan’s statement to Der Spiegel, 
the Turkish military released a statement against the AKP government, later termed an e-
memorandum. In the political environment of those days, the AKP was prevented from selecting 
its presidential candidate in Parliament and pushed to announce early elections. The secular 
establishment was organizing marches against the AKP. No research center’s opinion polls were 
predicting enormous support for the AKP in the 2007 elections. Only one research center, 
KONDA, estimated 48% for the AKP just a few days before the elections (Radikal 07/19/2007). 
This guess was harshly criticized in the Turkish media (see Radikal 07/24/2007). The AKP did 
get 47% in that election, but it was not likely that Patriarch Mutafyan would have predicted it.  
In the interview, Father Anagnostopoulos confirmed the reason behind the Armenian 
Patriarch’s support that the AKP was dealing with the problems of religious minorities. He also 
added that religious minorities do not vote for the Republican People’s Party (CHP). They 
thought that all the problems of minorities began when the CHP was the ruling party or when 
Ismet Inonu [CHP leader] was a part of the coalition government. That is why religious 
minorities hesitated to vote for the CHP (Anagnostopoulos, personal interview). 
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After seeing the support of some Christian minorities for the AKP, I could not resist 
asking the same question to the Jewish community, even though I added that this was not among 
my original questions and respondents should feel free not to respond. Yusuf Altintas, the 
secretary general of the Chief Rabbi of Turkish Jews, said the Jewish community is not 
homogenous in the issue of politics. However, he added that Islamism is not the most important 
factor in the AKP’s fifty percent vote. Economic progress and other factors should be regarded 
as more significant. He also compared his previous experience with the 2002-2012 period, 
noting, “When I go to Ankara now, I feel relieved by comparing previous experiences [in 
bureaucracy]. It is said that [PM] Menderes [in the 1950s] and [PM] Turgul Ozal [in the 1980s] 
opened this way. However, I am seeing it now” (Altintas, personal interview). 
How has the AKP secured the support of the religious minorities? Most legal reforms 
related to them occurred under the name of adjusting to EU norms. There was both public and 
state support for EU membership in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Public 
support for the EU membership increased after the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey. Most people 
saw the EU as a way of economic relief. Most conservative people did not show support for EU 
membership until the February 28 process. It was assumed that participating in the EU would 
harm Muslim religious identity. However, the 1997 post-modern coup changed Islamic groups’ 
perspective against the EU. When the state harshly suppressed Islamic groups, they saw EU 
membership as a road toward religious freedom. In that environment most people were 
supporting EU membership for different reasons and supporting the necessary legal reforms by 
2002. The AKP was strongly in favor of EU participation before it came to power in 2002. In its 
early years in power, the AKP showed its commitment on the matter by utilizing steps toward 
EU membership to legitimize its power in the eyes of the secular establishment. The AKP was 
aiming to show that it was not a successor of the previously banned Islamic parties, all of which 
opposed EU membership. Supporting EU membership and doing substantive actions in this 
direction were drawing a line between the AKP and the Islamist parties. The commitment of the 
AKP to EU membership was supported in the international arena. Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
personally needed this support as well. He was under a political ban that prevented him from 
being elected to Parliament in the 2002 elections. When the ban was lifted few months later, he 
won a seat in Parliament in local elections and then became the prime minister in 2003. Also, the 
AKP reformed laws to reduce the power of the military in the state, such as reducing the 
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influence of the National Security Council (MGK) and annulling some military appointments in 
the Higher Education Board (YOK) and judiciary. Therefore, the early amendments related to 
religious minorities might be linked to the desire for EU membership, especially between 2002 
and 2007. While the AKP secured its power, the Turkish economy gained strength and the EU 
stalled in providing membership; as a result, both public and state demand for EU membership 
has faded since 2007. Thus EU pressure alone cannot explain amendments related to religious 
minorities, especially after 2007.  
A few constitutional amendments since October 2001 and several “reform packages” 
since 2002 have passed Parliament to align with EU standards. In their articles related to 
religious minorities, Article 33 of the Constitution facilitated establishing foundations in the 
2001 amendment. Legal personalities gained a right to establish foundations or be members of 
them (see TBMM records 09/26/2001). In the framework of constitutional amendments in 2004, 
the superiority of international treaties was added to the Constitution. Article 90 stated:  
International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of law. No appeal to 
the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the 
ground that they are unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between 
international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put 
into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the same 
matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail. 
The reform packages came to be a term of reference for a collection of amendments to 
different laws or codes designed since February 2002 to align with EU standards. The third 
reform package, which entered into force in August 2002, addressed the legal conditions 
pertaining to real estate held by non-Muslim community foundations. Non-Muslim communities 
were allowed to acquire and dispose of property regardless of whether or not they had the status 
of foundations. Furthermore, these communities were entitled to register the property they 
actually used as long as they could prove ownership. The implementation of this amendment was 
subject to a number of conditions, including that permission had to be obtained from the Council 
of Ministers for the purpose of acquisition and disposal of new property (Official Gazette 
no.24841 08/09/2002; EU Regular Report 2002: 38; Oran 2004: 117; Political Reforms in Turkey 
2007: 8).  
Regarding the property rights of non-Muslim communities, the fourth reform package, in 
January 2003, simplified bureaucratic procedures by removing the need for obtaining permission 
	  	  
178	  
from the Council of Ministers. The Department of Foundations was put in charge of this 
procedure instead (Official Gazette no.24990 01/11/2003).  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (dating from 1966) was ratified 
with some reservations in June 2003. In the meantime, the sixth reform package, in July 2003, 
extended the deadline for registration of religious minority foundations from six to eighteen 
months. In this package, the Law on Public Works was amended to replace the word “mosque” 
with the phrase “places of worship,” meaning that churches and synagogues would be covered in 
public works and benefit from the same rights to build their places of worship. The Civil 
Registry Law was amended to remove some restrictions on the registration of names given to 
children by their parents. The reference to “politically” offensive names was removed from the 
law (Official Gazette no.25173 07/19/2003). 
The seventh reform package reduced the penalty for insulting Turkishness and the state 
organs from one year to six months at the lower limit, and clarified in August 2003 that 
criticizing without intending to insult did not call for any penalty (Official Gazette no.25192 
08/07/2003). The upper limit of the penalty was reduced from three years to two years in the 
2004 amendments (Official Gazette no.25611 10/12/2004). The vague term of “Turkishness” 
was also replaced by “Turkish nation.” This amendment introduced a requirement in 2008 for 
permission to be obtained from the Justice Minister in order to launch a criminal investigation 
(Official Gazette no.26870 05/08/2008). These repetitive changes show that the judiciary has not 
aligned with the same speed as the rest of the government to promote rights in some cases, as the 
government now requires its permission to follow a legal case on the issue of insulting the 
Turkish nation or the state.  
I did not reference all the changes in the aforementioned reform packages but only 
prominent changes. Other reform packages have brought about additional changes related to 
religious minority rights. Passing laws in Parliament happened in a relatively short time; 
however, implementing these amendments would take longer in practice.  
The most comprehensive law related to foundations and properties of non-Muslim 
communities passed Parliament in November 2006. However, former President Ahmed Necdet 
Sezer vetoed it (Hurriyet Daily News 11/30/2006). The AKP government brought the same law 
back to the Parliament after President Sezer’s term ended. The Law on Foundations then passed 
Parliament in February 2008 despite the strong opposition of the CHP and the MHP. One of the 
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Parliamentary sessions happened in a closed session at the demand of the MHP. Both the CHP 
and MHP argued that the principle of reciprocity in the Treaty of Lausanne was being harmed. 
Before making these amendments, Turkey should have demanded equal rights for the Turkish 
minority in Western Thrace. Turkey risked paying staggering amounts of compensation to 
minority foundations (TBMM records 02/13-14/2008). President Abdullah Gul approved the law 
without incident. Then, the CHP applied to the Constitutional Court to annul the Law on 
Foundations, but that court did not do so in its verdict of June 2010 (Constitutional Court App. 
No 2008/22, D. No. 2010/82).  
The Law on Foundations addressed a large number of issues faced by religious minority 
groups in the management and acquisition of property. In particular, with the new law, property 
previously seized from non-Muslim foundations was to be returned according to the 1936 
declaration if they appealed within eighteen months. Foreigners could form new religious 
foundations with the principle of reciprocity. Non-Muslim community foundations could own 
property and manage it without prior permission; become partners of companies; engage in 
international activities; receive financial aid from organizations outside Turkey; register previous 
donations and purchases to the Land Registry that were not registered because of prior 
restrictions; transfer, lease, or change the use of properties that are no longer used; and benefit 
from tax incentives for donations, repair, restoration, and landscaping of cultural properties that 
belong to them. Furthermore, the law established the Foundations Council as the highest 
decision-making body for foundations. Non-Muslim foundations were to send representatives to 
this new body. 
In August 2011, the AKP government published a decree to consolidate the changes. This 
decree stated that the market value of foundation properties currently registered with third parties 
would be paid if they were seized and sold to other third parties by the state, since the 1936 
property declaration (Official Gazette no.28038 08/27/2011). A later official notice arranged 
these regulations in October 2011 (Official Gazette no.28071 10/01/2011).  
I conducted most of my interviews with religious minorities just after these legal changes, 
which clearly had a positive effect on the thinking of those with whom I spoke. Even though 
there had been some amendments related to property rights since 2002, religious minorities had 
not been allowed to carry several cases related to their properties to domestic courts. When they 
lost these cases in Turkey, they took them to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
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where several verdicts were issued in favor of religious minorities. These verdicts encouraged 
the government to take some forward steps in property rights. Otherwise, the Turkish 
government would have to deal with every case taken to the ECHR. Yet the effects of the ECHR 
verdicts on property rights seemed limited in the Turkish state, so they cannot be the only 
explanation of the policy changes there.  
To my surprise, I heard about a few incidents from religious minorities indicating that, 
although they had not requested the return of some of their previous properties since they did not 
have a record of them and were not aware that they had more properties a few decades ago, the 
Turkish state had offered them back to these communities after examining official state records.  
By August 2012, the application deadline ended for the return of properties. According to 
official information, 108 community foundations applied for the return of 1,568 properties. By 
September 2012, only the return of 58 properties had been completed. The Turkish state offered 
compensations for eight properties that were in the hands of third parties. Applications for 53 
properties were not found eligible. Investigation of the remaining 1,449 applications has been 
continued (EU Progress Report 2012: 30). 
As I said, the ECHR decisions on the property rights of religious minorities cannot be the 
only explanation of the policy change of the Turkish state. In the case of the ECHR verdicts, the 
AKP government never held back to explain its opinions if they did not agree with the court’s. 
For instance, the ECHR ruled in November 2005—on upholding the headscarf ban in Turkish 
universities—that the ban on wearing headscarves in universities does not violate freedom of 
religion and conscience (ECHR Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey). The AKP government harshly criticized 
this decision. Even PM Erdogan said, “On this [headscarf] issue, the court has no right to speak. 
That right belongs to the scholars of Islam” (Hurriyet Daily News 11/17/2005).  
Whereas the EU pressure to expand religious minority rights cannot fully explain the 
Turkish state’s policy changes, that pressure has covered all problems related to legal 
personality, the training of clergy, property rights, and the management of foundations. On the 
issues of legal personality and training of clergy, however, there has been only a little progress. 
On the issues of property rights and the management of foundations, the most prominent legal 
changes happened in the February 2008 Law on Foundations, which was initially vetoed in 2006 
by former President Sezer, and in the August 2011 decree. The AKP government has a 
commitment toward EU membership, but this commitment was at its lowest level between 2005 
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and 2008. Even the Chief Prosecutor noted this situation in 2008 in the dissolving lawsuit against 
the AKP. In its reply to the court, the AKP government implicitly accepted that there was a 
slowdown on the path to EU membership by stating that this happened because of the deadlock 
on the Cyprus issue in 2006 and 2007 (Constitutional Court App. No 2008/1 D. No 2008/2). 
Even though there has been a gradual increase in the level of this commitment since 2008, it is 
not back to its height in the early 2002-2005 period. Therefore, EU pressure alone cannot explain 
the prominent legal changes in 2008 and 2011.  
A third explanation would be that of gaining the electoral support of religious minorities. 
However, the electoral power of religious minorities is very limited in Turkey. They have a 
population of about 100,000 who are eligible to vote. In the 2011 elections, the number of 
registered voters was over fifty million in Turkey, which means that the electoral power of 
religious minorities was 0.02% among all voters. This percentage is not high enough to persuade 
a mainstream party to shape its politics accordingly. Any changes intended merely to gain the 
support of religious minorities would cause a greater decline in the nationalist vote.  
So how can this policy change in the state be explained? First of all, the Turkish state has 
stopped seeing religious minorities as a threat to its unity. Turkey was no longer in a condition of 
political instability as it was in the aftermath of WWI. In addition, religious minorities lacked 
much of their previous political, economic, and demographic power.  
Any previous changes would have stumbled in confrontation with Turkey’s reciprocity 
principle. Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne stated, “The rights conferred by the provisions of 
the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by 
Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.” As I mentioned above, opposition parties 
brought this reciprocity argument to Parliament during discussions on the bill relating to 
foundations. The Turkish state practically halted seeking reciprocity for the rights of religious 
minorities. This was another sign that Turkey no longer feared Greece or saw that country as a 
serious competitor in the international arena. Also, this was an important step in Turkey’s 
beginning to see religious minorities as equal citizens of the nation, rather than as citizens of 
foreign states who happened to be living in Turkey. The only concern was the issue of Christian 
missionary activities that occurred in the beginning of the 2000s. Because the Turkish economy 
has gained strength since 2002, these concerns have diminished also.  
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In this policy change, there were two components: the government on one side, and other 
state apparatuses on the other side. The AKP was claiming to be the party of all Turkey, boasting 
an inclusive approach that also found a response in religious minority rights. In addition, the 
AKP was arguing for religious freedom for everybody by reminding the country of universal 
values. Its early intention was to provide religious freedom for the wearing of headscarves in 
universities and remove obstacles in front of the imam-hatip schools (IHL). While claiming 
universal values for Islam, it acknowledged that it would not be fair to exclude other living 
religions in Turkey. These reasons helped the AKP government to initiate some amendments 
related to religious minority rights. Other state apparatuses did not show a strong reaction to 
these changes, as had happened on the issue of Muslim rights, including issues around 
headscarves, IHLs, and Quran-based courses. This silence could be interpreted as reflecting the 
readiness of the state to make these changes. In fact, former President Sezer vetoed the first 
foundation law in 2006, although his reaction would be interpreted as personal rather than 
representing the state.  
On the other issues, outside property rights, some amendments were offered between 
2002 and 2012. A common problem for religious minorities was how to train clergy, both in 
terms of providing an adequate number of priests or pastors to lead religious services for the 
community and teach the religion to younger generations, and in terms of having an adequate 
number of spiritual leaders for the Patriarchate to continue its work. The Orthodox Church, 
especially, was worrying about the future of the Patriarchate. CNN covered news that Patriarch 
Bartholomew, the 270th patriarch of Istanbul, could turn out to be the last patriarch of Istanbul 
for pointing out the problems of the Patriarchate (CNN 08/27/2010). The Patriarchate was run by 
a synod of 13 archbishops, of whom the Patriarch was one―“first among equals.” Since the 
Greek community had a small population in Turkey and did not have a school to train future 
religious leaders, this community had difficulties in provide the necessary number of spiritual 
leaders.  
According to spokesman Father Anagnostopoulos, the Orthodox Church closed this gap 
by bringing in priests from Greece:  
Heybeliada (Halki) Seminary has been closed for forty years. The official 
language of the Church is Greek. Therefore, the Church needs people who went to 
a Greek theology school or seminary. Since we do not have any other option, we 
bring them from Greece (Anagnostopoulos, personal interview). 
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However, importing spiritual leaders from a foreign country has legal obstacles. The 
Patriarchate does not have a legal personality; therefore, legally the Patriarchate cannot bring in 
any priests. These people were coming with tourist visas and had to exit from Turkey every few 
months and then come back. In fact, tolerating these priests to work under the Patriarchate with 
tourist visas might be interpreted to be against the spirit of the exchange of populations between 
Turkey and Greece called for by the Treaty of Lausanne. According to this treaty, even these 
immigrants “shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of 
the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively” (Lausanne Peace Treaty 
1923). For instance, the exchange of populations committee, controlled by the League of 
Nations, ruled that an archbishop, Konstantin Araboglu, of the Greek Orthodox Church, should 
leave Turkey according to the treaty. He was not an inhabitant of Istanbul before 1918 and 
should have left according to the exchange of populations. In the meantime, the synod of the 
Church appointed him as Patriarch in December 1924. Although he was officially chosen by the 
synod, the Turkish state deported him in January 1925. (According to Turkish laws, the Patriarch 
should be a Turkish citizen and a newly elected patriarch should be recognized by the state 
before he claims the post). After the deportation, Greece sent a diplomatic note to Turkey. This 
shows just how tense the political environment was during those days. Turkish Parliament 
records showed how much the Turkish state committed to this issue (TBMM records 
02/04/1925; also see Erdal 2004 for reflections in the press at this period). Eventually, Patriarch 
Konstantin Araboglu resigned from his post after a few months and later died in Greece in 1930. 
Eighty-six years after the death of Patriarch Araboglu, the Turkish government allowed the 
return of his body to Turkey. It was brought back from Greece in 2011 and reburied near the 
tombs of other patriarchs in Istanbul (Hurriyet 03/07/2011).  
Accepting Greek nationals who worked in the Patriarchate with tourist visas was another 
sign of the consolidation of the relationship between non-Muslim religious communities and the 
Turkish state.  In 2008, the Turkish government took the additional step of providing work 
permits for foreign clergy who wished to work in Turkey. Spokesman Father Anagnostopoulos 
said that these working permits were for one year but could be extended every year without 
obstacle. During our interview, he said there were 17 fathers in the Patriarchate, 11 of them 
Greece citizens. Before obtaining these work permits, they were staying in Turkey with tourist 
visas. In other words, their presence was illegal. As a further step, the Turkish government 
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started to offer citizenship to Orthodox Church members. The Patriarchate is being run by the 
synod, which has 13 archbishops, all of whom are required to have Turkish citizenship. Father 
Anagnostopoulos said that they currently have 17 members in the synod, but most of them are 
over 75 years old and are not in the best condition physically to work. Therefore, the church 
needs to bring in some metropolitans from abroad. He added that, when the Church explained the 
situation to PM Erdogan, Erdogan said that, if the Church wanted to bring these metropolitans to 
Turkey, the government would provide them with Turkish citizenship if they applied for it. 
Anagnostopoulos added that it was the first time that a Turkish PM had promised such a 
transaction; moreover, he eventually kept this promise. At the time of the interview, 27 priests 
had applied for Turkish citizenship, and the Turkish authorities had granted citizenship to 14 of 
them. For others, the examination of their applications was continuing. Anagnostopoulos also 
noted that all the applications had not been completed at the same time (Anagnostopoulos, 
personal interview; also see EU Progress Report 2009: 20; EU Progress Report 2010: 22). 
All of these are signs of progress in the relationship between the Turkish state and non-
Muslim communities. Anagnostopoulos also recalled PM Erdogan’s speech in Athens in 2010, 
when he said he did not object to the use of the ecumenical title of Patriarchate. The Turkish 
state had been strictly against using the ecclesiastical title “Ecumenical” since 1923. The 
Orthodox Church had been recognized by the Turkish state only as a local church. For instance, 
when the US Embassy in Turkey used the title “Ecumenical” in an invitation to a reception in 
2004, over a hundred MPs wrote protest messages to the Embassy. Following these protests, the 
Prime Ministry banned the attendance of representatives of public institutions at the reception. 
Even the Patriarch did not participate, in order not to cause a further crisis (Today’s Zaman 
12/02/2004).  Surprisingly, during his visit to Athens in 2010, PM Erdogan replied to a question 
about ecumenical titles by saying that these titles do not annoy him: “[These titles] do not bother 
me. They did not bother my forefathers [referring to Ottomans]; they do not bother me. 
However, they would bother some people in my country.” Erdogan said the same when he 
returned to Turkey (Radikal 05/16/2010). The 2012 EU Progress Report stated that the Patriarch 
is free to use the title of “Ecumenical,” referring to statements by Turkish authorities. However, 
since the Patriarchate has never received any official indication of this policy, it is still using the 
name of the local church in its Turkish letterhead (EU Progress Report 2012: 24). 
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The other problems of the non-Muslim communities also were widely discussed over the 
period, 2002-2012, especially near the end. On the issue of training clergy, the most discussed 
aspect was reopening the Heybeliada (Halki) Greek Orthodox Seminary on the shores of 
Istanbul. This seminary was closed in 1971 in accordance with a law combining all education 
under state control. At that time, the Greek Church did not want to open the seminary to state 
control, so it was closed. Currently, the government remains wary of reopening the seminary, but 
discussions continue on its legal status. Other non-Muslim communities are waiting to see 
progress regarding the Orthodox seminary before they decide to follow the same path.  
There has been also some progress on issues that have symbolic values for religious 
minorities. The most prominent among them is allowing religious services once a year since 
2010 in the Orthodox Sumela Monastery in the Black Sea province of Trabzon and in the 
Armenian Holy Cross (Akdamar) Church on the Akdamar island in Lake Van. They had not had 
religious services there for around 90 years. Both buildings have museum status currently. The 
religious services are being held by special permits (EU Progress Report 2012: 24). 
In short, there was prominent legal progress related to some problems of religious 
minorities between 2002 and 2012. Although other problems of non-Muslim communities had 
still not been addressed, the goodwill of the government encouraged them about the future of this 
relationship. At the same time, religious minorities also would like to secure their rights with 
legal changes.  
At the beginning of the chapter, I mentioned the assertion by the President of the 
Federation of the Alevi Foundations, Dogan Bermek, that there had been no change on the issue 
of religious minority rights. It is not possible to share Bermek’s opinion on this matter after 
considering the changes examined above. Bermek did point out an important difference between 
the current government and prior governments, in that it did not have the state’s despotic—I do 
not give in!—attitude. According to him, this attitude made religious minorities happy. On this 
issue, Bermek is definitely correct. High-level state officials now visit non-Muslim communities, 
listen to their problems, try to find solutions for these problems, and invite them to dinners, 
especially during Ramadan. This interaction is at the highest level since the foundation of the 
Republic. Non-Muslim communities see this and become hopeful for future amendments, even if 
there has been no visible progress on some issues.  
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I can explain this position of some non-Muslim groups by an example of the headscarf 
issue. Before the AKP came to power, the headscarf ban was being enforced in all state organs 
including universities. There were protests against the ban, especially in universities. When the 
AKP came to power in 2002, the protests stopped immediately, even though there was no legal 
attempt to solve the problem. The ban was enforced as before. Some people interpreted the 
disappearance of protests to mean that Islamist parties were utilizing the ban to gain political 
support. Since the AKP came to power, as an Islamist party, there was no need to continue the 
protests. According to this opinion, since there was no relief for the ban, there was no 
explanation to interpret the disappearance of protests. However, these comments missed that the 
halt of protests was related to goodwill for the AKP government. Even though there was no real 
relief concerning the ban for years, these people continued this goodwill, hoping that, when the 
AKP had more power in the state, it would solve the problem. They believed in the sincerity of 
PM Erdogan, since his wife and daughters were wearing headscarves; therefore, surely he would 
be the most likely person to end this ban. It seems to me that the AKP government received 
similar trust from non-Muslim communities.  
There has been an increasing demand for religious rights from both Muslim and non-
Muslim communities since 2010. This increase can be interpreted as one whereby the AKP 
government solidified its power and became the most prominent decision-making body in the 
state; therefore, it does not have the previous excuses of earlier governments at its disposal. 
Previous governments excused some demands by pointing to other state apparatuses. Currently, 
the AKP government does not have this excuse. This situation encourages all religious or ethnic 
groups to demand more rights.  
The number of applications to state human rights bodies has increased substantially over 
the examined time period. This supports my argument that Turkish citizens have learned to seek 
their civil rights, including religious rights. One of the state-controlled bodies, which has been 
investigating human rights violations, is the Prime Ministry Human Rights Presidency. This 
body was founded in 2001. According to its data, applications related to the violation of human 
rights have increased substantially since 2007 (Figure 5). This growth does not reflect more 
violations in human rights, but rather more awareness in seeking civil rights, including religious 
rights. The number of applications related to freedom of thought and faith between 2004 and 
2011 has fluctuated, but their ratio has diminished against total applications. They had the 
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highest number of applications in 2005, 45 in all, consisting of 3.3 percent of total applications. 
There might be a few additional applications under the discrimination category, which I omitted 
because of the small application sample.  
	  
Figure 5: Applications for Human Rights Violations 
Source: The Prime Ministry Human Rights Presidency statistics 2004-2011.  
Last but not least, some non-Muslim communities have said that they do not like the term 
“minority” to identify themselves. For instance, when I asked Yusuf Sag, the Turkish Syrian 
Catholic Deputy Patriarch Chorepiscopus, if Syrian Catholics feel themselves as strangers or a 
minority in Turkish society, he refused to use the term minority to describe his community: 
I hate the word “minority.” I love this country as much as you. Loving the country 
is not a kindness but an honor…. I have a history in this land for 5500 years…. If 
I see myself as a Turkish citizen and proud of it, then you cannot call me 
“minority.” For instance, a person is a non-religious Turk, an atheist. Is he called 
“minority”? (Sag, personal interview). 
I asked the Chaldean Catholic Church leader Monsignor Francois Yakan what their 
problems are as a minority. Before mentioning any problems, he also refused the “minority” 
word, 
I would like to be frank that I do not want to use the “minority” word. I do not 
like it. I am not a minority where I live and I am a child of that region. Chaldean 
folk are one of the oldest peoples of Turkey. The Chaldean Church is the earliest 
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church of Christianity.  
When I asked him if other church members think the same about using the word 
“minority,” he replied,  
I did not ask them, but if they think the same, it would be more appropriate, I 
think. If you learn [by asking them], let me know. Indeed, I believe that it should 
be thought like that…. The Eastern folk and church, including Turkey, Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, are very different from the Western church in both 
mundane and spiritual issues. We do not think the same things. We do not think 
like Europeans or Americans. We [Chaldeans] are the primary folk of here 
[Turkey] (Yakan, personal interview). 
Yusuf Altintas, the secretary general of the Chief Rabbi of Turkish Jews, refuted the 
minority term, too. I asked him, “Do you see yourself as a minority in Turkish society?” He said 
“No!” with surprise in his voice, 
Me? No! My name is Yusuf Altintas. My status is Turkish citizenship with Jewish 
religion. My status is that, according to both Lausanne and the Turkish state. I am 
similar to any other Turkish citizen―if it is nationalism in question, knowing the 
Turkish history, art, or language. Personally, I give thanks to God that I am 
Jewish and thanks to God that I am a Turk. If I were in France, probably I would 
say the same for France. However, I am from here. My family has lived here for 
seven or eight centuries. I am a Jewish Turk; that is all. 
I asked if other members of the Jewish community felt the same. Actually, when I asked 
Mr. Altintas a few more times to make generalizations in response to different questions, he 
abstained from doing so, but spoke with reference to a majority. With regard to this question, he 
did the same, saying, “It is not correct to make a generalization on behalf of the Jewish 
community, but the dominant majority thinks like that” (Altintas, personal interview). 
The response of the spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Father Dositheos 
Anagnostopoulos, to the minority question was also interesting. Before taking up this question, 
he compared his experiences in the 1960s to the years after 2003. He was born and stayed in 
Turkey until 1968. He mentioned some negative experiences that he had in the 1960s when he 
was in his 20s. In one instance, while he was talking with his fiancée in the Greek language on a 
ferry, a few people warned them in the summer of 1964. He left Turkey for Germany in 1968 
and said to himself at that time, “I will never return.” He noted that he returned in 2003, adding, 
“I am sitting here now.” Then I asked him if he still feels like a minority: 
If I compare it to when I was young, before I emigrated to Germany for 30-35 years, I do 
not feel it as much as I felt it before. You ask me now when I feel like a minority. Actually, I 
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have been here for eight years and in that time period I have not felt like a member of a minority 
group who was in a difficult situation (Anagnostopoulos, personal interview). 
My original interview question about this issue was, “Do you think of yourself as a 
stranger or a minority in Turkey, or as a part of Turkish society?” Interviewees’ responses to this 
question should not be understood in the legal sense of the term minority but in in terms of their 
sense of belonging to Turkish society. Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities enjoy positive 
discrimination in legal terms due to their minority status. They do not have any intention to give 
up these rights. Other non-Muslim communities do not have positive discriminatory rights, but 
they would enjoy them as much as the above-named communities if the Turkish state provided 
them with the same legal rights.  
As I explained at the beginning of this chapter, a minority group should present minority 
consciousness. Otherwise, legal definitions and social realties do not overlap. We can see the 
most striking example of this in the 2004 European Union’s Turkey Progress Report, as I will 
note in the following section. This report tended to define both Alevis and Kurds in Turkey as 
minorities; however, this designation did not find any public support from these communities. 
The following EU progress reports had to drop the term minority by adding “… there are other 
communities in Turkey, which, in the light of the relevant international and European standards, 
could qualify as minorities” (EU Progress Report 2006: 20). In that case, it would be more 
appropriate to use the term non-Muslim rather than minority to describe the religious 
communities with small populations in Turkey. I have used both of them interchangeably. 
When religious minority rights are being talked about, the Alevi issue also comes up. 
Although Alevis are Muslim, they have some different beliefs and practices from those of the 
Sunni majority. Because of these differences, they sometimes encounter problems.  
In the previous chapter, I concluded that the relationship between religion and the state 
has consolidated in some ways. However, the religion part of this relationship mostly refers to 
Sunni Islam. In this chapter, I examined the rights of non-Muslim communities, which revealed 
some progress on this issue also. Although the progress in non-Muslim rights is important, since 
they have a small population, this progress might not be considered significant at the state level. 
Concerning the issue of Alevis, they make up more than ten percent of the Turkish population. 
Examining Alevi rights might give more clues about the intention behind the changes between 
2002 and 2012―that is, if these changes were part of a general amendment based on civil, 
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human, and religious rights or intended more for the promotion of Islam, especially Sunni 
beliefs.  
 
 
 
C. THE ALEVI ISSUE  
 
Alevism, which developed in Anatolia between the 11th and 16th centuries, is based on a different 
understanding of Islam from that of the Sunni majority. Companion Ali, who was the nephew 
and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, has an important place in Alevi beliefs. That is why 
the adherents of this community are called Alevis, referring to Companion Ali. In this way, they 
have some similarities with Shias. However, because of distinct and different practices, they are 
not considered to be under Shia. Since they had a closed society during the Ottoman period, their 
interaction with Sunnis was limited (see, for Oguz/Turkmen tribe dichotomy, Turkdogan 1995: 
528; 2004: 359; 2009: 199-227; for center/periphery dichotomy, Mardin 1969: 101; 1990: 30-
66). Periodic migrations after the 1950s have opened new opportunities for interaction (Uzum 
1997: 193).  
Being a closed community mostly led to ignorance of Alevism by others. Even with the 
interactions during the last few decades, it is still difficult to find a mutual definition for Alevis 
and their demands. For instance, an empirical research with over 1600 Alevis revealed that 10% 
of them stated Alevism is a belief system that is outside of Islam; 43% described it as a sect 
under Islam; 17% described it as a lifestyle; 16% saw it as a culture; 10% defined it as a religious 
order; and 3% had other definitions (Aktas 1999: 462; see the footnote for additional research27).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ozdemir and Arici’s (2011) study with 600 Alevis showed that 36% felt that Alevism was 
essentially part of Islam, with 29% describing it as a culture, 18% a sect, 12% a way of thinking, and 7% 
a particular interpretation of Islam (Ozdemir and Arici 2011: 65). 
Ucar’s (2006) study with 400 Alevis stated that 10% of them depicted Alevism outside of the Islamic 
circle and interpretation (Ucar 2006: 125). 
Another study of over 250 Alevis showed only around two percent of respondents depicting Alevism 
as a culture or a philosophy (Unal 2001: 42). 
Cengiz’s (2000) study with 300 Alevis stated that 42% saw Alevism as a religious order, 23% as an 
essential part of Islam, 23% as a way of thinking, and 12% as a sect (Cengiz 2000: 106). 
P.S. The studies above show very different results mostly because their sampling does not cover the 
entire Alevi population but rather Alevis living in just a few cities.  
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These numbers suggest that there is a confusion over exactly what Alevism is even 
among Alevis. A similar confusion occurs among the teachers of courses in Religion and Ethics. 
A study of over 750 Religion and Ethics course teachers showed that around 88% of them 
supported teaching about Alevism in the public schools. When they were asked how to describe 
Alevism, however, 24% called it a lifestyle, 22% a political formation, 19% a branch of Shia, 
15% a sect, 11% a religious order, 1% had no idea, and 1% a religion (Kaymakcan 2009: 58). In 
other words, even religion and ethics course teachers have not a common idea of how to describe 
Alevism when they teach it to students. These differences make it difficult to respond to Alevi 
demands.  
Alevi interviewees in my group denied that there was an essential theological difference 
among Alevis, when I asked them to explain the different opinions of Alevism among different 
Alevi groups. They stated that the different Alevi groups, even those claiming that Alevism was 
outside of Islam, were marginal, even if the voices of these groups were highly respected in the 
media. For instance, Dogan Bermek, president of the Federation of the Alevi Foundations, 
attributed the claim that Alevism was outside of Islam to two sources: Western misunderstanding 
and political opportunism. According to him, when some Alevis immigrated to Europe as blue-
collar workers in the 1960s, they did not represent Alevism well. Misinterpreting these 
outcomes, Western scholars deduced that Alevism was outside of Islam. In addition, Alevi 
support for liberal politics encouraged spreading these comments, which some political 
opportunists wanted to use to discredit Alevis. Mr. Bermek added, “Alevism is univocal, not 
opposite. However, Alevists [political opportunists] would have multiple voices…. I can name 
you dozens of fraudulent (canta dernek) Alevi associations” (Bermek, personal interview). 
Other Alevi interviewees Hidir Akbay, general director of the Cem Foundation, and 
Metin Tarhan, president of the Federation of the Alevi Associations, stated that there was only 
one form of Alevism. They described Alevism with mutual agreement on the doctrine of a trinity 
in the form of “Allah, Muhammad, and Ali.” 
On the other hand, some other Alevis describe it as a secular lifestyle, supported by 
folkloristic features, not as a religious understanding that is attached to Islam. For instance, one 
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of them, Fuat Bozkurt, defines Alevism as a life style rather than a belief (Bozkurt 1990: 10). 
According to him, attaching Alevism to Islam causes erosion and assimilation of Alevism: 
For four hundred years, the Alevis have endeavored to prove to the state and their 
Sunni neighbors that they are indeed Muslims, but all to no avail. Now the tables 
are turned. Since 1990 it has been the state and the Sunni theologians who have 
been trying to prove the Muslim credentials of the Alevis, while the opposite 
opinion is being put forward by Alevi writers of the younger generation (Bozkurt 
2003 [1998]: 93). 
Defining Alevism as being outside of Islam, along with disagreement on a mutually 
acceptable definition, are unwelcome to some people. For instance, one of my interviewees 
asked me to turn off the recorder while he was talking about Alevis. He mentioned a story to 
express his discomfort on the issue of defining Alevism outside of Islam: 
There was a man who thought he was a kernel of corn. He was afraid of every 
chicken. He was thinking that chickens would eat him, since he was a kernel of 
corn. After a long treatment, he finally believed that he was not a kernel of corn 
but human. Jut before he left the hospital, he told the doctor, “OK. I know I am a 
human, not a kernel of corn, but do the chickens know that? 
As it can be understand from this story, this interviewee, although he was not an Alevi, 
was against interpretations that define Alevism outside of Islam. He saw this definition unhealthy 
and expressed his discomfort by this story.  
In addition, the interviewees from the Department of Religious Affairs expressed their 
concerns about the ambiguity of the definition of Alevism. For instance, the former Istanbul 
Mufti  (2003-2011), Prof. Mustafa Cagrici, said:  
Some Alevis describe Alevism as a religion outside of Islam. Some see it under 
Islam…. I cannot call Alevism a sect because the majority of them say “No, we 
are not a sect.” I cannot call it a religious order, because some of them are 
annoyed by this term. If I say it is a religion, you do not agree. If I say it is a sect, 
you do not agree; and so on. I use every definition in religious terminology, but 
still I receive a [negative] reaction…. When I had meetings with Alevis, I told 
them that, when we make a definition, you [Alevis] do not accept it and say, 
“Don’t make our definition.” I said, “You are right. If so, please define what 
Alevism is.” However, they do not make a definition (Cagrici, personal 
interview). 
Agreement on a mutual definition is important to respond to Alevi demands, which 
resemble non-Muslim community demands for legal personality, property rights, the training of 
clergy, and the management of their foundations. In addition to these demands, Alevis have 
demands related to religion and ethics courses and having state funding. If Alevism were 
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accepted as a religion, Alevis would be considered a religious minority group. Their demands 
would be compared to other non-Muslim communities. If they were a sect or religious order 
under Islam, the Turkey’s response would be totally different. For instance, Alevis demand that 
their places of worship, cemevi, be recognized officially. If Alevism were a separate religion, 
nobody would object to official recognition of the cemevi. However, if Alevism is under Islam, 
the non-Alevi majority says Islam has only one place of worship and that is a mosque. These 
majority people see the cemevi as a dervish lodge instead of the equivalent of a mosque. If 
cemevis are equivalent to dervish lodges, the state does not have to provide any financial aid or a 
place in the land registry.  
The EU progress reports between 2002 and 2012 reflect a similar confusion in describing 
what Alevism is. The 2002 report stated that Alevi refers to Muslim religious communities. The 
2003 report detached them from the Sunni majority by adding that they were a “non-Sunni 
Muslim community.” The 2004 report went one more step and described them as a minority, as 
in “Alevis are still not recognized as a Muslim minority.” This report also tended to describe 
Kurds among the minorities. Describing Alevis and Kurds as a minority did not find any public 
support, even among these communities. After the negative feedback, the following year’s report 
dropped the minority term for these two communities, returning in 2005 to the previous 
definition of “non-Sunni Muslim Alevi community.” This report still appeared to mention the 
term minority without specifically attaching it to Alevis and Kurds, as in: “The minorities usually 
associated by the authorities with the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians, and Greeks. 
However, there are other communities in Turkey, which, in the light of the relevant international 
and European standards, could qualify as minorities.” The 2006 report dropped the “non-Sunni” 
emphasis and mentioned the “large Muslim Alevi community.” Since that year, the EU reports 
have dropped all adjectives and stopped trying to define the Alevis. The 2007 report referred to 
them only as “Alevis,” without any explanation. The 2008-2012 reports referred to them as the 
“Alevi community” without any specific religious connotation (EU Progress Reports 2002-
2012).  
The size of the Alevi population is another conjectured issue in Alevi discussions. The 
2004 and 2005 EU reports estimated 12-20 million; Alevi interviewees in my study group 
mentioned around 20 million, especially by referring to the Alevi population in the early years of 
the Republic. Then-State Minister Said Yazicioglu estimated the Alevi population as 
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approximately 7 million in 2008 (Radikal 12/01/2008). Estimations in Alevi studies fluctuate 
between 5 and 20 million. One of the interviewees, Hidir Akbay, the general director of the Cem 
Foundation, recalled that the demography of Alevis is not important to providing civil rights 
whether they were 25 million, 5 million, 1 million, or just one person (Akbay, personal 
interview). He is right that providing a civil right should not be based on the population of a 
group. On the other hand, if there were 20 million Alevis in all, it would be fair to ask if an Alevi 
association with a few hundred members could represent all Alevis. Do all 20 million Alevis 
have the same demands, such as removing mosques and replacing them with cemevi? It seems to 
me that Alevi associations have a motive to represent the Alevi population as high as possible. 
They assume that, if Alevis were more numerous, their influence would expand. However, they 
miss the point that an association’s influence is inversely correlated to the general population of 
the group represented by the association. For instance, let us assume that all Alevi associations 
were to unite under a federation and reached a million members. This would be considered an 
enormous number to represent the Alevi community at first glance. However, if there were an 
Alevi population of 20 million, one million members represents only five percent of Alevis. 
Their demands might well be regarded as deviant in the general Alevi population.  
Claiming 20 million Alevi population out of 70 million also contradicts the literature on 
the Alevi electoral tradition. The literature portrays a leftist inclination among Alevi voters (see 
Carkoglu 2005). The left parties have 20-25% of the vote capacity in Turkey. In that case, these 
figures suggest the awkward result that all left voters are Alevis. Asserting a higher Alevi 
population also contradicts with fasting worship in Ramadan, as the majority of Alevis do not 
fast then (Uzum 1997: 99-100). According to the PEW Research Center’s poll in 2012, 84% of 
the population of Turkey fasts during Ramadan (PEW 2012). 
Another problem of the studies that insist on a more numerous Alevi population is that 
they were not supported by field researches. It seems that everybody references each other 
instead of a field study. Based on a field research project with 1500 people, TESEV’s report 
stated in 2006 that 6.1% of the participants said, “I am an Alevi” (Carkoglu and Toprak 2006). It 
seems this figure was found to be low by the researchers Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak; 
therefore, they looked for other signs of Alevism and estimated Alevis as 11.4% of the Turkish 
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population.28 Another field study, conducted by KONDA in 2007 with 48 thousand participants, 
stated that 5.7% of the population was Alevi (Milliyet 03/21/2007). 
Regardless of their numbers, let us look at what changed for Alevis between 2002 and 
2012. The Alevi community has more secular tendencies compared to Sunni groups. These 
secular tendencies have kept them out of the state’s pressure during the February 28 process. The 
Turkish state was hard on Sunni religious groups by all means between 1997 and 2002. The 
state’s unwelcoming reaction to Christian missionary activities in the early 2000s suggests that 
Christian groups were not totally free even by 2002. In that environment, it would not be wrong 
to suggest that the Alevi community was the freest religious community, as at least they were not 
subject to the persecution of the state. While I am saying that Alevis were the freest religious 
community by 2002, I do not mean they were problem-free. This freedom was only relative. 
Their remaining problems could be gathered under legal personality, property rights, the training 
of clergy, the management of their foundations, teaching of Alevism in religion and ethics 
courses, and receiving state funds.  
Among these discussions the most debated problems were teaching Alevism in religion 
and ethics courses, official recognition of cemevi as Alevi places of worship, and receiving state 
funds or abolishing the Department of Religious Affairs, thereby impeding the funding of Sunni 
beliefs.  
Alevis agree that the Turkish state financially supports Sunni beliefs through the 
Department of Religious Affairs. This department has a higher budget than even some ministries. 
In addition, the state supports and spreads Sunni beliefs by compulsory religion and ethics 
courses in the primary and secondary schools.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This estimation has many problems. The researchers said they looked for other signs of Alevism to 
reach 11% from 6%. These signs are including having pictures of 12 imams and/or the picture of 
Companion Ali in the home. Pictures of 12 imams would be strong prediction for Alevism, but one 
cannot say the same for the picture of Ali. Companion Ali is an important figure for Sunnis also. In 
addition, the research does not investigate all family members, but only the individual who participated in 
the survey. Parents, children, siblings, or spouses might have a picture of Ali in the home, which does not 
necessarily mean that the surveyed person welcomed this picture. According to research, 1.6% of 
participants explicitly say they “do not adhere to any religion,” 87.4% says they are “Sunni Muslim,” and 
1.9% explicitly say, “I am not Alevi.” In total, they represent 90.9% of participants. In that case, the 
highest Alevi membership rate would be 9.1%. However, the researchers do not trust participants’ own 
words and look for vague hints such as a picture of Ali in order to conclude that 11.4% of the participants 
are Alevis.  
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I mentioned Alevi demands, court decisions, and related changes on religion and ethics 
courses in the previous state-taught religion chapter. As a reminder, compulsory religion and 
ethics courses were one of the most prominent laws to which Alevis objected. There were three 
different types of responses to this issue. Some Alevis insisted that the state should not teach 
religion. Some declared, if the state would like to be involved in religious education, this should 
be elective. In the third opinion, if there was no way to remove it or make it optional, then, by 
mutual Alevi agreement, these courses should provide in equal measure for the study of all 
religions and different understandings in the same religion, in order not to sound as if they were 
protecting Sunni Islam alone (Alevi Calistaylari Nihai Raporu 2010: 141).  
Verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2007, and later the Council 
of the State in Turkey in 2007 and 2008, confirmed that the contents of religion and ethics 
courses did not neutrally present different beliefs. 
In the meanwhile, in 2009 the AKP government initiated a seven-step workshop titled 
“Alevi opening” to promote understanding of Alevi problems and measures to deal with them. 
As a result of this workshop, Alevi beliefs and practices found more place in the curriculum of 
religion and ethics courses by the 2011-2012 academic year.  
In general, representing Alevi beliefs and practices in education found support in the 
Alevi community despite its possible shortcomings. For other problems of the Alevis, it is hard 
to claim a prominent policy change between 2002 and 2012. Making the Alevi opening first 
suggested that the state would solve Alevi problems. This interpretation increased the hopes of 
Alevis. However, since there have been no legal changes except with regard to the curriculum of 
religion and ethics courses, the hope has turned into a total disappointment. For instance, Recep 
Gurkan, MP of CHP, named the Alevi opening as a disaster: “The PM [Erdogan] said that the 
AKP will make an Alevi opening. However, they have messed up it…. They brought people to 
conferences and made beautiful speeches. However, that is all. The result is a disaster” (Gurkan, 
personal interview).  
Indeed, Alevis were unhappy with the unchanged state policies. However, examining 
their demands reveals that, because of disagreement among Alevi groups themselves, they would 
still be unhappy even if there were some changes such as in the issue of the Department of 
Religious Affairs (DRA). For instance, some Alevis seek legal recognition of their beliefs 
through the provision of official cadres within the DRA, integration of Alevis into the DRA, 
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financial support from the budget of the DRA, and covering utility bills of the cemevi as is done 
for mosques, churches, and synagogues. Others assert that attaching Alevis to the DRA would 
mean losing their independence; a secular state should not be involved in religious affairs; and 
civil society should run its own communities (Carkoglu and Bilgili 2011: 355-356).  
Alevi arguments on these issues are not yet consolidated. Alevi interviewees in my group 
harshly criticized the DRA, its enormous budget, and its Sunni background. They argued that 
Alevis should have financial support from this department according to their population. On the 
other hand, they do not want to lose their privilege to choose their religious leaders, dede zakir, 
who run religious ceremonies. Indeed, the state financially supports mosques by paying the 
salaries of imams; however, these imams do not have chair-immunity. Even Friday sermons, the 
khutba, are sent by the DRA to imams. Imams simply read these sermons from paper. Alevis 
would like to benefit from the state’s financial support, but, on the other hand, they ignore the 
fact that this support would bind them to state control. If the state allows the Alevi community to 
choose their religious leaders for the cemevi, the same right should be granted to every religious 
order or sect. The Turkish state, which is so eager to control religion, does not provide this kind 
of independence to any religious group. In addition, while Alevis want to choose their own 
religious leaders for their places of worship, they do not support the same for other religious 
orders. They are among the most prominent groups opposed to private Quran-based courses, 
even there is no state financial support for them. Giving the right to every religious order to 
appoint its own leaders to mosques and providing them a state salary are not acceptable to 
Alevis. These mosques will run like private Quran-based courses in a while. The other option is 
that of totally halting financial support for any religion and letting civil society run its own 
religious communities. Indeed, there is almost a mutual agreement by all segments in Turkish 
society that a secular state should not have an institution like the DRA. Secularists are against the 
DRA because it provides financial support for religion. Conservatives are against the DRA 
because it controls religion. However, abolishing the DRA is not an option, since both the state 
and many groups do not want to see religion uncontrolled. Continuation of the DRA seems the 
best practical solution.  
The Cem Foundation, acting in the name of 2000 Alevi applicants, informed the Prime 
Ministry in 2005 that the DRA neglects the demands of non-Sunni groups, acts like there is no 
Alevi community, does not recognize the Alevi places of worship called cemevis, and does not 
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provide sufficient financial support for the religious needs of the Alevi community; it demanded 
that these problems be fixed. The Prime Ministry rejected the application. The Cem Foundation 
then took the case to court. Both the local court and the Council of the State ruled against the 
Cem Foundation in 2010 (Council of State 10th Chamber App. no. 2008/3098 D. no. 2010/475). 
The courts accepted the Prime Ministry’s reasoning that the DRA works above any sect and 
represents all Muslims. The mosque is the only common place for Islamic practices. Recognition 
of cemevis is not legally possible. For these reasons, no portion of the budget of the DRA could 
be allocated to cemevis.  
On another occasion, the Alevi community asked the DRA for to give the cemevis the 
status of a legal place of worship. In that way, the cemevis could apply directly to the DRA for 
funds to cover the electric bill and to the local municipalities for exemption from paying the 
water bill. The DRA rejected this application for similar reasons. The applicants carried the case 
to court where both the local court and the Council of State confirmed the DRA’s decision by 
2010. The court ruled that only a new law would create an opportunity for recognition of the 
cemevis as places of worship (Council of State 10th Chamber App. no. 2006/5564 D. no. 
2010/476; see Karahanogullari 2010 for details). 
While most decisions went against official recognition of the cemevis, there were some 
isolated cases that supported the Alevi demands. The most important of these is a local court’s 
decision. In this case, an Alevi cemevi building association described the cemevi in 2004 as a 
place of worship according to its regulations. The local authorities applied to the court for 
annulment of the association because it described the cemevi as a place of worship. The local 
court favored the Alevi association and accepted using the term of worship for the cemevis. The 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals. This higher court ruled that only mosques 
and masjids are places of worship in Islam; therefore, the cemevi is not acceptable as a place of 
worship. Then the case was returned to the local court, which insisted that its decision had been 
based on the fact that Alevis had considered the cemevi as a place of worship for centuries. 
Consequently, the case went to the plenary session of the Supreme Court of Appeals for the last 
time in November 2012 (Sabah 11/21/2012). The plenary session’s decision will be the binding 
rule for the official status of the cemevi. 
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In other isolated events, a few municipalities have officially recognized cemevis as places 
of worship. They allocated land for construction of new cemevis and exempted cemevis from 
utility costs in the time period examined (Carkoglu and Bilgili 2011: 356-357). 
The state made some symbolic gestures such as having high officials and ministers visit 
cemevis. On one occasion in 2009, President Abdullah Gul visited a cemevi, burned a candle, 
and watched a ceremony there. It was said that Gul was the first president to make such a visit 
since Ataturk. President Gul took off his shoes before entering the cemevi in contrast to most 
bureaucrats accompanying him, who preferred to use shoe covers. Taking off the shoes was 
interpreted as a sign that President Gul respected the cemevi as an Islamic place of worship 
(Radikal 11/07/2009).  
In addition, PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited a cemevi in 2007. One of my 
interviewees, Metin Tarhan, president of the Federation of the Alevi Associations, recalled this 
visit. Tarhan, being the president of the Erikli Baba Cultural Association and Cemevi, talked 
during that visit with PM Erdogan about the status of cemevis. Tarhan expressed to me that he 
found useful this kind of visit by state officials (Tarhan, personal interview). As a note, PM 
Erdogan does not see cemevis as places of worship but only as cultural gathering places. In 2013, 
one MP of the AKP, Haluk Ozdalga, offered PM Erdogan to recognize cemevis as places of 
worship. Erdogan refused this offer by stating that mosques and masjids are the only places of 
worship in Islam. He added that the cemevi is a cultural gathering place (Milliyet 02/21/2013).  
Although some government and DRA officials expressed their wish to provide a legal 
status to cemevis, they did not mean to provide one equivalent to a mosque but only to a cultural 
place (see TBMM records no.B.02.0.004/1633 12/27/2012). On many occasions, both the 
government and the DRA repeated that Islam has only one place of worship, and that is named 
mosque or masjid. For instance, an MP from CHP, Huseyin Aygun, applied in 2012 to the 
National Assembly (TBMM) to open a cemevi inside of the TBMM. The Presidency of TBMM 
refused the application for the same reason, namely, that a cemevi is not a place of worship 
(Radikal 07/09/2012; see Radikal 12/10/2012 for more details).  
The Turkish state does not officially recognize cemevis but allows opening and running 
them, as I mentioned in the case of illegal Quran-based courses and churches. There were 
approximately 600 cemevis in service by 2012. Half of these cemevis were opened in the 
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examined time period, 2002-2012. 106 cemevis were built before 1990, 163 between 1990 and 
2000, and 329 between 2000 and 2012 (TBMM records no.B.02.0.004/934 07/16/2012).29 
The place where I conducted the interview with Hidir Akbay, the general director of the 
Cem Foundation, was a cemevi, named the Pir Koca Ahmed Yesevi Cem Cultural Center, in 
Istanbul. It is a four-story building and everybody in the neighborhood knows that it is a cemevi. 
I asked Akbay, “If cemevis are not recognized officially as a place of worship, how do you have 
permission for use of the building? Do you encounter any difficulties in getting construction 
permits? ” He replied: 
We do not have permission under the name of cemevi. This is only a building, not 
a cemevi. It is known [that this building is a cemevi]. However, the authorities do 
not make any trouble. Of course, they do not give legal permission under the title 
of cemevi. We open new cemevis. They also are known. Even governors and 
ministers come to groundbreaking ceremonies. We open these places with the 
participation of state officials. On the other hand, these places do not have an 
official recognition [as cemevi]. These are strange situations! (Akbay, personal 
interview). 
If the reader remembers the statement above by the spokesman for the Orthodox Church 
Anagnostopoulos on the legal personality issue of the Patriarchate, he mentioned, “The Patriarch 
is recognized, but the Patriarchy is not recognized. Isn’t this weird?”30 Also, Akbay finds the 
dichotomy of the state against the cemevis weird. The state shows every sign with its actions of 
accepting cemevis, but does not recognize them to the letter, as happens for the Patriarchate. The 
state’s action vis-à-vis the Patriarchate is more understandable. Not recognizing the Patriarchate 
was a matter of honor for the new Republic, which wanted to prove its sovereignty to the Allies 
of World War I since the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey wanted to consider the Patriarchate as a 
local church. Even thought the Turkish state is no longer bound by the political environment 
when the Lausanne Treaty was signed, there is a habit which has developed over 90 years. The 
state resists breaking this habit.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Carkoglu and Bilgili (2011) stated that Alevis face obstacles when attempting to build new cemevis, 
adding that approximately 100 cemevis exist in Turkey by referencing the U.S. Department of State’s 
International Religious Freedom Report 2008. My reference from the TBMM showed detailed 
information about how many new cemevis were built every year. The details also include information for 
every province. These suggest that the aforementioned sources have the wrong information regarding the 
number of cemevis.  
30 Anagnostopoulos used the word tuhaf, and Akbay used the word garip, Turkish terms to describe this 
dichotomy. Both of them can be translated into English as weird.  
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On the issue of cemevis, providing them a legal status encounters two obstacles. The state 
may provide a legal status for cemevis as a place of worship that is equivalent to the mosque, or 
a status that is equivalent to that of dervish lodges. The first option is not acceptable by the 
majority, especially by conservatives, since it would mean that Alevism is another religion. The 
second option is not implemented, because it violates the Reform Laws that were instituted by 
Ataturk. The dervish lodges were closed and banned by Ataturk in 1925. Secularists do not 
tolerate abolishing any Reform Laws. They do not want to open a way for even Reform Laws to 
be changed, since if one of them were changed, all of them might be changed in time. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Constitution protects the Reform Laws by stating, “No 
provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the 
Reform Laws.” One of these Reform Laws is “Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) on the 
Closure of Dervish Lodges and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs, and the 
Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles.” Changing a Reform Law also is totally against the 
Turkish state’s official teaching for almost nine decades. These laws have been introduced as a 
way “to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization and to safeguard the 
secular character of the Republic,” as stated in the Constitution. Any change in these laws would 
harm this legend.  
In that case, the most practical path for the state was not to recognize them formally but 
to overlook the opening of cemevis under the name of different associations or gathering places.  
One more incident worth mentioning as a good gesture of the state is that of confiscating 
the infamous Madimak Hotel in Sivas province and transforming it to a cultural center in 2011. 
In this hotel, 37 people, mostly Alevis, died in an arson attack in 1993. Alevis demanded that the 
state make this place into a museum. After the Alevi opening in 2009-2010, the Turkish 
government confiscated the building and converted it to a cultural center after a massive 
renovation costing several million dollars. A part of the center was designed as a memorial to 
those who lost their lives in the fire (Hurriyet Daily News 5/24/2011). 
Last but not least, I asked Alevi interviewees if they encountered any negative reactions 
because of being an Alevi in Turkish society. Although they mentioned some negative instances 
during the interviews, their general response to this question was that the problem is between the 
state and Alevi citizens, not between Alevis and society. Alevi interviewees mentioned a lack of 
Alevi governors or high-level state officials in the state to prove their point that the state, 
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including the AKP government, has a negative stance against them. According to them, the AKP 
government initiated an opening but did not carry out the requirements for it to be meaningful. 
They criticized the fact that the AKP has no Alevi MP, which makes Alevis feel insecure about 
this party. According to Metin Tarhan, the president of the Federation of the Alevi Associations, 
if the AKP claims to be the party of all segments of Turkey, it should nominate Alevi people 
even if they bring no vote to the party (Tarhan, personal interview). 
In summary, regarding the issue of Alevi rights, there was some progress between 2002 
and 2012. Alevi beliefs and practices found more place in the compulsory religion and ethics 
courses. In the case of Alevis who do not consider themselves Muslim, omitting data related to 
religious affiliation on the national ID cards has become easier since 2006. People would delete 
the data indicating their Islamic affiliation in a few minutes without showing any reason in civil 
registry services. After deleting these data, their children would be exempted from compulsory 
religion and ethic courses if they demanded it. The state has not provided a legal status to Alevi 
cemevis yet, although tolerating their existence and the opening of new cemevis. Even some 
Alevis appreciate these changes that occurred between 2002 and 2012, while not totally satisfied.  
 
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I examined the rights of non-Muslim and Alevi communities to help explore the 
nature of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey in the years 2002-2012. The 
previous chapter on state-taught religion suggested that the state had two patterns against 
religion, specifically Islam. In the early years, the state was harsh on religious education but 
gradually changed this attitude near the end. In this chapter, I examined whether the state had the 
same pattern for non-Muslim and Alevi communities. In addition, I had a hypothesis that, since 
the AKP government has represented oppressed Islamic groups in the state, it would provide the 
same relief for other disadvantaged groups, including non-Muslims and Alevis. Also, I was 
assuming I would not find much support for the AKP government among non-Muslim 
communities because of the AKP’s conservative approach. My hypothesis was only partly 
confirmed.  
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On the issue of non-Muslim rights, the pattern of the state’s attitudes was similar to that 
concerning the religious rights of the Muslim majority, with the exception of the Alevis. In the 
early years of the 2000s, the state was still seeing the non-Muslim community as a threat to its 
sovereignty, resting on its experiences in WWI and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. During the 
last few decades, these fears have been declining, since non-Muslims did not have much political 
or economic power. However, reactions to the missionary activities in the 2000s proved that the 
Turkish state was not totally free from these fears. These activities even came to the attention of 
the National Security Council (MGK) in 2001. Governments requested that the Department of 
Religious Affairs (DRA) inform citizens of the missionary activities. The DRA issued a 
statewide Friday sermon in 2005 to warn about them. However, the number of converts 
suggested that these fears were exaggerated. Only a few hundred people officially converted to 
Christianity. Even unofficial numbers did not suggest more than a few thousand converts. In 
addition, the Ergenekon trial suggested that some groups abused some issues related to non-
Muslim communities to gain political power against the AKP government.  
Since the fears regarding the missionaries have declined, the state has become more 
generous on the issue of non-Muslim rights in the second half of the examined period. There was 
much progress on property rights and the management of non-Muslim foundations. The issue of 
training clergy via a non-Muslim school education has not yet been solved, but the state provided 
working permits and granted Turkish citizenship if non-Muslim communities wanted to import 
clergy from abroad. On the issue of legal personality, there was not much progress either. 
However, the state showed its goodwill on this issue by listening to their problems, inviting 
religious leaders to official dinners and travels, and allowing special permits for religious 
ceremonies on the religious sites that currently have museum status.  
All the above-mentioned changes have pleased non-Muslim communities. Some of them 
have even explicitly lent their support to the AKP in politics, since the AKP led the push for 
these amendments. On the other hand, some groups have criticized them. CHP and MHP harshly 
condemned the Law on Foundations, which provided many rights for non-Muslim properties. 
There were still some fears regarding missionary activities on the conservative side. Nationalists, 
neo-nationalists, and Kemalists were leery of reviving the Ecumenical title. They also thought 
that the government went beyond the boundaries of the Treaty of Lausanne without considering 
the principle of reciprocity. Among all groups, Alevis were the most open in mentioning non-
	  	  
204	  
Muslim community problems sincerely. Alevis demanded solving problems of non-Muslim 
communities as much as their own problems. This solidarity can be explained by two 
disadvantaged groups supporting each other. In addition, the Alevi community has problems 
similar to those of non-Muslims such as the lack of a legal personality. Having similar problems 
has helped these groups to have sympathy for and a better understanding of each other. 
The examination of a public survey reveals that the overwhelming majority of the 
Turkish population supports equal rights (84%) and showing respect (91%) to all religions (see 
Figure 6). The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted this survey in 43 countries 
in 2009.  The ISSP did not involve Turkey in its previous surveys in 1991 and 1998, so I am not 
able to compare results over time. Another shortcoming of the survey is that Turkey is the only 
country with a Muslim majority population. This also made it impossible to make a comparison 
between Turkey and other Muslim majority counties. However, comparing Turkey with the other 
42 countries surveyed revealed that the Turkish people are statistically significantly more 
generous toward minority rights than the world average (one-way Anova test, p < 0.1). On the 
other hand, the percentages supporting a relative who marries a person from another religion or 
granting political support to people from different religions are considerably below the world 
averages. In these cases, less than 50% of respondents said they would support them. Some 
restrictions on marriage with non-Muslims in Islam would be a possible explanation for the lack 
of support for a marriage outside Islam. The issue of lack of support in the political arena for 
non-Muslims should be examined in more detail, which is not the scope of this study.  
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Figure 6: Religious Minority Rights 
Source: International Social Survey Program 2008: Religion III (ISSP 2008). 
On the issue of the Alevi community, even there was some progress, it did not reach a 
level of satisfaction for the Alevis. Yet by 2002, the Alevi groups were not under state pressure 
as much as other Islamic groups or non-Muslim communities. The effects of the February 28 
process were on stage for Islamic groups by that time. The secularist tendencies among Alevi 
groups kept them away from the persecution of the state in that time period.  
The AKP government in 2009 initiated a seven-step workshop, “Alevi opening” to 
understand and deal with Alevi problems. As a result of this workshop, Alevi beliefs and 
practices found more place in the curriculum of religion and ethics courses by the 2011-2012 
academic year. In 2011, the government also showed a good gesture by buying and transforming 
the Madimak Hotel into a cultural center for the memory of Alevis who died in an arson attack in 
1993. When Alevis demanded a legal status equivalent to that of mosques for their cemevis, the 
government did not respond positively; instead, it stated that Islam had only one place of 
worship, but at the same time it implicitly allowed the building of cemevis. There were 
approximately 600 cemevis in service by 2012. One half of these were opened in the examined 
time period, 2002-2012.  
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Even these amendments and good gestures have not uniformly satisfied all Alevi groups. 
Alevis mostly agree on their problems but differ on solutions, which makes finding a mutual way 
unlikely. The government and the Department of Religious Affairs consider Alevism under 
Islam. In this official view, Islam has only one place of worship and that is the mosque. 
Considering cemevis as an Islamic place of worship is, therefore, not acceptable. On the other 
hand, the majority of Alevis consider themselves Muslim even while pointing out that Alevis 
have prayed in cemevis, not mosques, for centuries. A deadlock continues on the issue. In these 
discussions, mostly the CHP, Associations of Kemalist Thought, and non-Muslim communities 
have supported the Alevi demands.  
In general, the Turkish state has a similar approach to all religious groups. At the 
beginning of the 2000s, the state was skeptical about religious activities, perceiving them as a 
threat to its sovereignty, especially against its secular structure. Increasing visibility of devout 
people and especially veiled women in public sphere and raising power of pro-Islamic parties in 
1990s ignited these fears. In addition, sharing the state power with the conservative AKP 
government increased disconformity among the previous state elites in the early 2000s. In these 
years, every public demand on religious rights met with suspicion: demands of Islamic groups 
were perceived as a threat to secularism as well as non-Muslims’ demands were perceived as a 
threat to the Turkish nationalism. Responding these demands, especially during the second half 
of the examined time period 2002-2012, proved that these fears were exaggerated: As of 2012, 
Turkey is not a more religious country or a less nationalist country than 2002. 
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V. SUMMARY 
 
 
 
State/religion relations can be combined into different categories of secular state and religious 
state. In the first option, state and religion are separate. This separation might be hostile/assertive 
or cooperative/passive/friendly. In the case of a religious state, a state has an official religion; 
nevertheless, this religion might or might not shape the legislature and the judiciary. In any case, 
all these categories mostly refer to constitutional claims rather than to social realities. For 
instance, Turkey is a secular country as explicitly stated in her Constitution. In mutual 
agreement, everybody defines the secular identity of Turkey in the Constitution as the separation 
of religion and the state. However, there is no agreement on how to implement this separation. 
Indeed, every state has similar discussions on the implementation of the separation of religion 
and the state.  
The principle that “Turkey is a secular state” entered the Turkish Constitution in 1937. 
However, the state has never held interfering in religious affairs. Since its establishment, Turkey 
has aimed to control religion through its national institution, the Department of Religious 
Affairs, and through school curricula. In the early years of the Republic, the state elite considered 
Islam a sign of backwardness. They eroded evidence of it in the state apparatus. However, the 
religion continued to live on public level as well as a private one. Repression of religion during 
the period of one-party rule was harsh indeed. However, this repression partly relieved after the 
transition to a multi-party system in 1950 as long as religion stayed in its place and did not 
interfere in state business. 
Before the multi-party system, it was easy to ignore public demands on religion. In this 
time period, the imam-hatip schools and theology faculties were closed, and teaching religion 
was removed from all education levels. This negative stance cost the then-ruling Republican 
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People’s Party (CHP) to lose power in the first free elections in 1950 and in consecutive 
elections. After the ascension to power of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, the Turkish state 
became more tolerant of public requests for religious rights. Imam-hatip schools were re-opened, 
and elective religion courses returned to the public schools, where they met with strong public 
support. Many devout families, especially in the villages, were wary of the state-run secular 
education system because of the state’s negative attitude to religion. The reintroduction of 
religious education in the schools convinced these families to send their children, particularly 
their daughters, to school. In addition, the imam-hatip schools increased their schooling of girls.  
Children of conservative families continued their education in universities. This helped 
them enter state institutions. In addition, after the 1980s, the Turkish state left state-centered 
economic politics and embraced more liberal economic programs. This helped the formation of a 
new middle class in Anatolia. Wealth and education were the two important components that 
helped transform Islamic groups since the 1980s. It was not easy to realize this transformation in 
the early years until the emergence of the AKP. If Turkey had not had an AKP government 
experience, today it would still be hard to prove this transformation. For instance, in the early 
2000s, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he had removed his Islamic National View shirt, this 
statement met with suspicion. For years, Erdogan and his AKP were accused of having a hidden 
agenda, since most people did not believe in this transformation.  
Other such signs were misinterpreted also. For instance, the schooling of female children 
was another sign of this change. It represented a change among conservative families on the 
issues of co-education, women working, and traditional roles that limited females to being 
housewives. In contrast, the secular side misinterpreted the visibility of headscarves in schools as 
a clear sign of Islamization of public education.  
The headscarf issue became the most discussed issue in the state/religion interaction, 
since it was the most visible one. All discussions related to religion went through the headscarf. 
The secular elite who ran the state at the time strictly enforced a ban on wearing headscarves in 
universities and public institutions. They saw the imam-hatip schools and Quran-based courses 
as the sources of this problem. The middle-level sections of the imam-hatip schools were closed. 
Attending high school section was discouraged by the unfair university entrance exams, which 
gave a lower score to imam-hatip school (IHL) graduates. Legal and non-legal Quran-based 
courses or any other programs of religious groups were prosecuted. As noted above, even 
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attending a legal Quran-based course during the summer was prohibited before completing fifth 
grade. Attending such courses during the school year was prohibited before completing the 
eighth grade. All these started after the military pressure on the Necmettin Erbakan government 
and the Welfare Party (RP) during a National Security Council (MGK) meeting on February 28, 
1997. Since then this course of action was named the February 28 process.  
Implementations of this process continued strictly until 2002. In that time period, the 
military insisted that the February 28 process would continue for a thousand years. Even 
optimists were not expecting an early resolution between religion and the state. In that 
environment, the Constitutional Court disbanded the Welfare Party (RP) in 1998 and its 
successor, the Virtue Party (FP), in 2001. These two parties were representing the National View 
(MG) movement of Erbakan. After the dissolution of the FP in 2001, the movement split. The 
traditionalists established the Felicity Party (SP), with Erbakan exerting leadership behind the 
scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with 
Erdogan as party leader. In that way, the Constitutional Court unintentionally assisted in the 
emergence of the AKP. In the meantime, the 2001 economic crisis brought political instability in 
its wake. In that environment, the AKP, just one year after its establishment, won the election in 
2002. Economic instability, the corruption of state officials, the embezzlement of state resources, 
and widespread poverty destroyed the trust of voters in the then-ruling party. In this economic 
and political atmosphere, the charismatic leadership of Erdogan helped the AKP to come to 
power.  
The effects of the February 28 process continued in the early years of the AKP 
government. All other state apparatuses gradually lost their power vis-à-vis that government. In 
the early years, the tension between the AKP and the secular establishment was high. This 
tension can be explained not only by the negative attitude of secularists toward religion, but also 
by a power struggle, in which the AKP represented entrance into the national government and an 
upper-class lifestyle by the middle class. This was not welcomed by previous elites.  
I have explained the power struggle in Turkey in terms of Serif Mardin’s center-
periphery concept. Accordingly, the confrontation between the center and the periphery has been 
the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics since the late Ottoman Empire. In 
this cleavage, the center represents the elite who possess economic and political power, while the 
periphery represents the rest of the people, who are mostly religious. Educational opportunities 
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have deepened this social stratification over time. In that context, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
social capital – along with economic, cultural, and symbolic capital – becomes useful to 
understand the power struggle between these two entities. To Bourdieu, social capital is a force 
that helps to create and sustain pre-existing social advantages. The center wants to extend its 
previous privileges and advantages, while the periphery wants to share in the same benefits. This 
is the origin of the power struggle between the AKP government and other secular state 
institutions in the time period, 2002-2012. In that struggle, the AKP has represented the 
periphery, whereas the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the military, the universities, and the 
higher judiciary have represented the center. The current literature also acknowledges the center-
periphery dichotomy in Turkish politics that has become apparent during the rule of the AKP 
since 2002. 
I examined state-taught religion and religious minority rights to reveal the changing 
relationship between the state and religion in the period 2002-2012 and the public response to 
this change. At first sight, this examination suggests an enormous change in both issues. 
However, a closer look suggests that most changes, far from being new experiences in Turkish 
society, essentially represented the effects of the February 28 process. On both issues, the AKP 
government made a constant endeavor to respond to public demand. The AKP’s early attempts at 
solving problems of religious education elicited strict opposition among the centrist coalition, 
including the military, the higher judiciary, the universities, the Higher Education Board (YOK), 
the presidency, the secularist opposition parties, the media, and business associations. The 
Constitutional Court almost dissolved the party in 2008 because of its endeavors related to 
religious education. In the following years, the negative stance of the state institutions regarding 
religious education diminished. In this change, the AKP government was the leading factor, 
since it won three consecutive elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011. The AKP’s then-Foreign 
Affairs Minister Abdullah Gul won the Presidency in 2007. Before Gul’s presidency, the AKP 
government had almost no influence with the above-mentioned opposition groups with regard to 
religious education. President Gul’s appointments of higher officials have begun to change this, 
as can be seen with regard to the presidents of universities, members of the Higher Education 
Board (YOK), and members of the higher courts. The 2010 Constitutional amendments, which 
passed by public vote, increased the party’s influence on the judiciary. Secularist business 
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associations and media groups have decreased their previous strict opposition, since the AKP has 
won three consecutive elections and proved that it will hold the power for a long time.  
Furthermore, in Turkey, the state is the biggest employer of businessmen. For this reason, 
it was hard for business associations and media groups to maintain a strict opposition to the AKP 
government. Indeed, the governmental pressure on business associations and media groups 
raised concerns about authoritarianism. In these discussions, the AKP government brought 
forward its electoral success, while opposition groups urged that democracy is not only evident 
in the ballot box. Even though these discussions seemed to become more prominent during the 
second and third terms of the AKP government, they were actually a factor in politics since the 
first day of the AKP regime. I mentioned them in connection with the social and institutional 
consensuses in politics. In the early conflicts, by representing the secular establishment, the 
secular state institutions confronted the AKP government. In most cases, the AKP had to step 
back. Since these state institutions gradually lost power vis-à-vis the AKP, secular opposition 
groups have felt they were being totally excluded from politics.  
The widespread summer 2013 public protests against the AKP government were an 
expression of this disappointment. The opposition groups could not find any institutional 
platform to raise their voices against the AKP government in its third term (2011- ). Public 
protests became a way to express feelings of these groups, but since they lacked sufficient 
institutional support in Turkey, they looked at international institutions. Paying full-page 
advertisements against the AKP government on The New York Times and The Times suggest that 
these opponents wanted to cover lack of the Turkish institutional support by seeking support on 
international level to force the AKP government for their demands. In this case, the issue is not 
so much the AKP government’s authoritarianism, but the need for other political parties to adjust 
to the new political environment. Exclusion of the secular opposition groups from power might 
be interpreted as a reversal of the previous center-periphery cleavage, but it is still too early to 
reach such a conclusion. The center-periphery cleavage relates not only to political power but 
also to the cultural and economic superiority of the center. During the AKP government, the 
lower and middle classes have found a way to achieve some social mobility in the direction of an 
upper-class lifestyle; however, this does not mean that the previous elites have lost their 
economic advantages. This is evident from the economic profile of some supporters of the 
protestors, who participated the 2013 summer anti-government demonstrations. According to a 
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survey on the 2013 protests, which surveyed the members of the CEO Club, an organization has 
more than 500 CEOs in Turkey, nearly half, 48 percent, of the 137 CEO’s in Turkey who 
participated the study expressed that they had visited the Gezi Park where the protests occurred 
to support them (Hurriyet Daily News 06/18/2013). While the Turkish economy has grown 
significantly under AKP rule, the previous elites, who held the most economic capital, have 
benefited from it more than other economic classes. That is why it is difficult to claim that the 
periphery replaced the center during that time period.  
Among all state institutions, the AKP has less influence, however, on the military. Since 
the military has strict rules in the choosing of personnel and advancing them to high-ranking 
positions, it is still adhering to its secularist ideology. However, the opposition of the military has 
also diminished for two reasons. In the first instance, the General Staff published a notice against 
the AKP government in the 2007 Presidential elections. This warning was named e-
memorandum, since it was published on the army’s official website. However, this e-
memorandum did not find the expected public support. In fact, it caused a negative reaction 
against the military’s interference in politics and helped the AKP government increase its votes 
in the following elections. The military learned from this experience that it should keep its voice 
in balance. The second instance was the arrest of hundreds of military personnel since 2008 on 
the ground that they had been planning a coup against the democratically elected AKP 
government in its early years. These arrests seriously diminished the military resistance to the 
AKP’s religion-related politics. When there was no longer any state institution that stood firmly 
against political changes related to religious education, in late 2011 the YOK eliminated the 
unfair procedures regarding the entrance of IHL graduates to universities, and a few months 
later, in 2012, the AKP government reopened the middle-level sections of the IHLs. The AKP 
removed restrictions on Quran-based courses in the same year. While these changes might have 
been seen as enormous, again as noted above, they actually reflected only a return to the policies 
in place before the February 28 process. Eliminating the effects of this process concerning 
religious education took almost 15 years. The only extra change regarding religious education 
was that of introducing new religious elective courses to primary and secondary school curricula.  
With regard to the public response to these changes, it can be said that the majority 
welcomed them. In the early years of the AKP government, reactions of secularists regarding the 
proposed changes were harsh indeed, but they faded in time. These reactions were not only 
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related to AKP policies, but also reflected the power struggle between the center and the 
periphery. As regards the majority, the electoral success of the AKP can be interpreted as a sign 
of their support. In addition, increasing registration in IHLs and enrollment in elective religious 
courses are other signs of the public support for these changes. One might ask why the centrist 
secular establishment has remained so strictly opposed to the provision of a simple vocational 
imam-hatip high-school education. It turns out that the imam-hatip schools did not serve to 
extend the previous social system, in which the upper class continued to enjoy its privileges, but 
quite the opposite: they helped lower-class religious families to enter the state apparatus. As an 
imam-hatip graduate, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the prime minister of Turkey, thereby 
confirming the fears of the elites.  
Regarding religious minority rights between 2002 and 2012, the Turkish state showed a 
pattern similar to its response to religious education. Until the early 2000s, the state was 
suspicious of demands coming from non-Muslim communities since it was still seeing the non-
Muslim community as a threat to its sovereignty, resting on its experiences in WWI and the 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. During the last few decades, these fears have been declining, since 
non-Muslims did not have much political, economic, or demographic power. Although 
missionary activities in the late 1990s and the early 2000s triggered previous distrust, because of 
non-Muslims’ lack of power, these suspicions never came close to the worries about the actions 
of Islamic groups during the February 28 process. When the AKP government improved the 
rights of non-Muslim communities, it did not encounter resistance from other state institutions 
similar to what happened on the issues of the IHLs and Quran-based courses. This silence was a 
sign of implicit approval of these changes by the Turkish state.  
On the public level, public reactions vis-à-vis non-Muslim demands are very similar to 
the Turkish state’s approach. In that way, it differs from religious education. Regarding religious 
education, public demand and the state’s response have confronted at times. In contrast, public 
and the state’s responses concerning non-Muslims’ demands have overlapped since the early 
Republic. In these early years, both the Turkish state and the majority of public saw the non-
Muslim communities, especially Greeks and Armenians, as a threat to sovereignty of Turkey. In 
that way, these reactions were not mostly against their religious affiliations but national 
identities. In these early years, non-Muslim communities experienced several negative practices 
from both sources. For instance, in 1942, the Turkish state used WWII as an excuse to receive a 
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wealth tax that mostly affected non-Muslims. In September 1955, during a tension regarding 
Cyprus issue, non-Muslim properties were vandalized. Although the Turkish state compensated 
victims of vandalism, this compensation did not erase worries of non-Muslims in that time. It can 
be argued that any negative reaction against non-Muslims have some connection to international 
politics in Turkey as examples can be seen in relationship with states including Greece, Armenia, 
and Israel.  
In 2000s, the Turkish public did not have the previous fears regarding non-Muslims 
anymore since this community had no meaningful power any longer. Missionary activities in the 
early 2000s were the only exception in this rule. Conservatives perceived these activities as a 
threat to Islamic religious identity of Turkey while for secularists it was a threat on nationalist 
identity. However, these fears diminished after 2005 since conversion to Christianity was 
limited. Official estimations suggest only a few hundred converts while non-official estimations 
do not calculate more than a few thousand converts. While the AKP government handed 
demands of non-Muslim communities largely after 2005, the majority of the Turkish public did 
not reject these changes.   
Overall, the Turkish state has never left religion alone even in its most secular phases. 
Even though this relationship has experienced constant changes, there was never a complete 
separation of religion and the state. The time period examined, 2002-2012, witnessed what might 
be called a “normalization” of the state/religion relationship: religion is no longer seen to be a 
threat to the state, and neither is the state seen as a threat to religion.  
However, this normalization was not an easy process and should not be taken for granted. 
Its development has taken almost a century and is still a working process, in which both the 
center and the periphery have moved a long way toward reshaping their ideologies, especially 
regarding secularism. In the early years of the Republic, the center, characterized by the 
Kemalist ideology, presented a top-down social engineering project that failed to provide upward 
social mobility. Assertive secularism became an inseparable part of this ideology. The transition 
to free elections and a multiparty system brought new opportunities for members of the periphery 
to increase their voices. The Democrat Party (DP, 1950-1960) became the first party that 
represented the periphery in politics. In that time period, the social cleavage was carried into 
political life. The 1960 and 1971 military interventions were a way for the centrist groups to 
return to the previous strict social cleavage in politics. The following years also did not bring 
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much opportunity for interaction between the center and the periphery until the 1980s. At that 
time, Turgut Ozal (1983-1993) introduced a liberal market economy and created more 
opportunities for the periphery for social mobility toward the center. Wealth and education 
became two important components that have helped transform Islamic groups since the 1980s. 
The center did not realize this transformation at first and misinterpreted its early signs, as we saw 
in examples of its attitudes toward the issues of headscarves and the imam-hatip schools.  
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was both a result of this Islamic 
transformation and its accelerator. In that way, the AKP represents the normalization of Islamic 
groups’ attitudes in opposition to the secular state. This normalization also suggests a change of 
Islamic ideology in politics. It proves that, when Islamists are allowed to participate in 
democratic political life, they do not necessarily temper it but may become a part of it. This 
brings a new breadth to democracy under the name of traditional conservatism that is becoming 
acceptable to a larger public, which suggests a pragmatic model in the wake of the Arab Spring 
for other Islamic countries. On the other hand, the AKP caused the state to reduce its assertive 
secularist policies in a way that can be termed the normalization of secular ideology. None of 
these processes was easy. They have shown a constant struggle between the AKP and the secular 
establishment, in which both sides have learned the limits and possibilities of each other. This 
development has helped bring about a mutual transformation and a moving away from the 
partiesʼ prior static propositions. The 2013 anti-government protests may be seen contradict to 
my normalization thesis but they did not.  During the first and second terms of the AKP 
government, secular groups had expressed their discomfort by talking about neighborhood 
pressure, which suggests that these groups feel social pressure for their secular lifestyle. In the 
third term of the AKP government, propositions about neighborhood pressure were replaced by 
allegations about the AKP authoritarianism. In previous years, religion was the base of 
arguments while the 2013 anti-government protests did not base their arguments solely on 
religious discourses. This discourse shift supports my argument on normalization of secular 
ideology.   
The normalization of state/religion relations was accomplished not only by the AKP’s 
success. International powers, especially the European Union (EU), supported democratic 
improvements in Turkey. Turkey’s eagerness to achieve EU membership made a military 
intervention during the early years of the AKP unlikely. This provided the AKP government with 
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a wider space in which to carry out its policies, in what can be called the normalization of 
democracy. Especially since 2010, democracy has become the only game in town. It is now clear 
that the AKP came in with elections and can go out only by elections. Secular opposition parties 
have stopped seeking the help of military or other state institutions, and have merely appealed to 
the public for their votes. Its first effects showed during the 2011 elections. The CHP’s election 
manifestos emphasized secularism as usual, but preferred stressing personal liberties to seek 
public support. In addition, the conservative periphery’s trust in democracy has consolidated 
since 2002. Since this group was excluded from politics for a long time, it had previously 
developed strong suspicions of democracy.  
Finally, the examined time period suggests a normalization of secularism. The Turkish 
state had implemented a strict secularism since the beginning of the Republic while the AKP 
government has embraced a friendly secularism since 2002. This transition provided 
normalization vis-à-vis state and religion relations.  
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   Religion:	   Effects	   of	   Political	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   Change	   on	   the	   Relationship	  
between	  State	  and	  Religion	  in	  Turkey,	  2002-­‐2012	  
	  
Introduction	  
	   Q1.	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  “politically	  Turkey	  has	  changed	  more	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  than	  it	  did	  in	  the	  previous	  eighty."	  Do	  you	  agree?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  	  	   Q2.	  What	  are	  the	  major	  issues	  confronting	  Turkey	  today?	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Is	  religion	  one	  of	  them?	  	  
1.	  Socio-­‐economic,	  political,	  and	  religious	  conditions	  before	  2002	  	   Q3.	  How	  would	  you	  compare	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  the	  state	  before	  2002	  to	  the	  relationship	  since	  then?	  Is	  it	  on	  the	  right	  track	  or	  wrong	  track?	  	  	  
2.	  Conditions	  that	  helped	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  AKP	  government	  	   Q4.	  What	   were	   the	   three	  most	   important	   conditions	   that	   helped	   the	   AKP	   to	   become	   the	  ruling	  party	  in	  2002?	  Were	  the	  same	  conditions	  relevant	  in	  the	  2007	  and	  2011	  elections?	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3.	  AKP’s	  discourses	  about	  religion	  and	  religious	  rights	  	   Q5.	  When	  we	  look	  at	  the	  AKP’s	  discourses,	  policies,	  and	  actions	  on	  religious	  issues,	  what	  is	  right,	  wrong,	  or	  insufficient?	  	  	   Q6.	   	  When	  we	   look	   at	   opposition	   parties’	   discourses,	   policies,	   and	   promises	   on	   religious	  issues,	  what	  is	  right,	  wrong,	  or	  insufficient?	  	  	   Q7.	   Is	   the	   AKP	   sincere	   in	   its	   discourses	   about	   religious	   issues	   and	   does	   it	   express	   the	  expectations	  of	  the	  general	  population?	  Or	  does	  the	  AKP	  abuse	  religion	  to	  increase	  its	  votes?	  Q8.	   Do	   the	   AKP’s	   discourses	   on	   religion	   conflict	   with	   the	   secular	   Turkish	   state’s	   official	  ideology?	  	  	  
4.	  The	  EU-­‐related	  reforms	  	   Q9.	   What	   role	   do	   you	   think	   EU	   accession	   concerns	   play	   in	   changing	   relations	   between	  religion	  and	  politics	  in	  Turkey?	  	  	  
5.	  Opinions	  of	  opposition	  groups	  for	  the	  AKP’s	  religious	  discourses,	  politics,	  and	  practices	  	  	   Q10.	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  the	  AKP	  has	  (or	  has	  ever	  had)	  a	  secret	  agenda	  (to	  change	  the	  secular	  establishment	  of	  Turkey)?	  Q11.	   Is	   there	  neighborhood	   (social)	   pressure	   in	  Turkey	   concerning	   religious	   issues	   (from	  religious	   groups	   or	   persons,	   family	   members,	   and	   friends)?	   Do	   secular	   neighborhoods	   have	   a	  similar	  pressure	  to	  become	  less	  religious?	  	  Q12.	  What	   do	   you	   think	   about	   “anxious	  moderns”	   (who	   think	   Turkey	   is	   becoming	  more	  conservative	  and	  religious)?	  Are	  you	  one	  of	  them?	  	  Q13.	  There	  are	  many	  people	  who	  are	  worried	  about	  the	  AKP’s	  politics	  on	  religion	  as	  we	  see	  from	  neighborhood	  pressure	  and	  anxious	  moderns.	  What	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  these	  concerns?	  How	  can	  we	  eliminate	  them?	  	  	  
6.	  Attitudes	  against	  congregations	  and	  Islamic	  groups	  since	  2002	  
	  
7.	  Attitudes	  against	  minority	  religious	  groups	  since	  2002	  	  	   Q14.	   The	   AKP	   government	   has	   a	   liberty-­‐oriented	   language	   for	   religious	   issues.	   Does	   this	  language	  include	  every	  religion,	  religious	  group,	  and	  minority	  religions?	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8.	  Religious	  institutions	  since	  2002	  	   Q15.	  Are	  you	  satisfied	  with	  the	  position	  of	  religious	  institutions	  and	  operations	  such	  as	  the	  Presidency	  of	  Religious	  Affairs,	  Koran	  courses,	  Imam-­‐Hatip	  schools,	  and	  theology	  faculties?	  	  	   Q16.	   Are	   you	   satisfied	  with	   the	   curriculum	   of	   religion	   and	   ethics	   courses	   and	  with	   these	  courses	  being	  obligatory	  in	  the	  Constitution?	  	  
9.	  Unsatisfied	  religious	  expectations	  since	  2002	  	   Q17.	  Which	  religious	  expectations	  have	  not	  been	  met	  since	  2002?	  What	  are	  reasons	  of	  this	  failure?	  How	  do	  we	  solve	  these	  problems?	  	  
10.	  Satisfied	  and	  unsatisfied	  implementations	  since	  2002	  	  
	  
11.	  Change	  in	  opposition	  parties’	  language	  and	  promises	  about	  religious	  issues	  since	  2002	  	   Q18.	   Opposition	   parties	   from	   both	   left	   and	   right	   have	   used	   a	   less	   assertive	   language	   on	  religious	  issues	  recently.	  What	  are	  reasons	  for	  this	  change?	  If	  the	  AKP	  was	  not	  in	  power,	  would	  the	  change	  still	  occur?	  	  	  
12.	  Effects	  of	  AKP	  politics	  on	  socio-­‐religious	  change	  	   Q19.	  Has	  political	  Islam	  gained	  or	  lost	  strength	  since	  2002?	  Please,	  give	  some	  examples.	  	  	   Q20.	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  AKP,	  for	  example	  would	  you	  use	  phrases	  such	  as	  Islamic	  or	  conservative?	  	   Q21.	  Has	   understanding/interpretation	   of	   Islam	   changed	   during	   the	   last	   decade	   in	   issues	  such	   as	   women’s	   rights	   (including	   covering	   women,	   coeducation,	   working	   women);	   rights	   of	  minority	  religions;	  and	  human	  rights?	  If	  there	  is	  a	  change,	  is	  it	  positive	  or	  negative?	  	   Q22.	  Has	  bureaucracy	  become	  more	  religious	  during	  the	  AKP	  rule?	  If	  so,	  is	  this	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  tendency?	  	  	   Q23.	  Has	  Turkish	  society	  become	  more	  religious	  during	  the	  AKP	  rule?	  If	  so,	  is	  this	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  tendency?	  	  	   Q24.	  What	  is	  the	  importance	  and	  place	  of	  the	  media	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  the	  state	  during	  the	  last	  decade?	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   Q25.	  What	  is	  the	  importance	  and	  place	  of	  the	  military	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  the	  state	  during	  the	  last	  decade?	  	  
13.	  Effects	  of	  changing	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  state	  in	  international	  arena	  since	  
2002	  	   Q26.	  How	  do	  other	  countries	  interpret	  the	  changing	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  state	  in	  Turkey?	  	  Q27.	   Does	   Turkey	   have	   a	   role	   model	   for	   Islamic	   movements	   in	   the	   Arab	   world	   as	   they	  ponder	  their	  post-­‐revolution	  role?	  	   Q28.	  Do	  you	  want	  to	  add	  any	  comments?	  	  ____	  
Specific	  Questions	  for	  Religious	  Minorities:	  1.	  Could	  you	  give	  general	  information	  about	  your	  community?	  How	  many	  members	  do	  you	  have?	  2.	  What	  kind	  of	  problems	  does	  your	  community	  encounter	  in	  Turkey?	  What	  are	  your	  expectations	  or	  suggestions	  for	  solving	  these	  problems	  in	  the	  short	  and	  long	  terms?	  	  3.	  What	  are	  the	  positive	  developments	  in	  your	  religious	  rights	  during	  the	  last	  decade?	  	  4.	  How	  do	  you	  interpret	  the	  Turkish	  state’s	  attitude	  towards	  religious	  minorities?	  	  5.	  Do	  you	  feel	  yourself	  as	  a	  stranger	  or	  a	  minority	  in	  Turkey,	  or	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Turkish	  society?	  Is	  there	  any	  harassment	  against	  you?	  Do	  you	  feel	  uncomfortable	  in	  society?	  	  
	  
  
	  	  
221	  
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
INTERVIEWEE LIST 
 
Akbay, Hıdır. The General director of the Cem Foundation 
Aköz, Emre. Sabah Newspaper 
Alkan, Ahmet Turan, Prof. Zaman Newspaper 
Altıntaş, Yusuf. The secretary general of the Chief Rabbi of Turkish Jews 
Anagnostopoulos, Dositheos. The spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate 
Bardakoğlu, Ali, Prof. the President of Department of Religious Affairs, 2003-2011 
Baluken, İdris. Member of Parliament, BDP 
Berkan, İsmet. Hürriyet Newspaper 
Bermek, Doğan. The President of the Federation of the Alevi Foundations 
Bozkurt, Nebi. Member of Parliament, AKP 
Çakır, Osman. Member of Parliament. AKP 
Çağrıcı, Mustafa, Prof. Mufti of Istanbul, 2003-2011 
Çeç, Mehmet Akif. SP 
Dora, Erol. Member of Parliament, BDP 
Ekşi, Oktay. Member of Parliament, CHP 
Esmerer, Selman. SP 
Gürkan, Recep. Member of Parliament, CHP 
Metin, Ahmet. Dr. President of ADD in Istanbul and Thrace regions 
Öner, Ertuğrul, ret. Colonel. President of ADD in Kadikoy city in Istanbul 
Özdağ, Ümit, Prof. MHP 
Pelatre, Louis. Istanbul’s Vicar Apostolic Monsignor of the Latin Catholic 
Sağ, Yusuf. The Turkish Syrian Catholic Deputy Patriarch Chorepiscopus 
Tarhan, Metin. The president of the Federation of the Alevi Associations 
Üzüm, Emrullah. Mufti of Fatih city in Istanbul, current 
Yakan, Francois. Monsignor, the Chaldean Catholic Church  
Yeniçeri, Özcan, Prof. Member of Parliament, MHP 
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TABLE	  5:	  IHL	  SCHOOL	  AND	  STUDENT	  NUMBERS	  
  
IHL school 
numbers 
IHL student 
Numbers 
% of IHLs 
among 
vocational 
schools 
% of IHLs 
among 
general high 
schools 
Prop. of IHL 
budget to 
total student 
budget of 
MEB 
1970-1971 72 48,475 21.8   0.9 (in 1973) 
1981-1982 374 216,864 43.0   2.5 
1990-1991 382 309,553 35.9 7.03 3.2 
1996-1997 *601 (500) 511,502 39.5 9.30 4.0 
2002-2003 450 64,534 7.4 2.65 1.7 
2003-2004 452 84,898 8.7 2.37 1.7 
2004-2005     9.4   1.7 
2005-2006     9.7   1.8 
2006-2007 455 120,668       
2007-2008 456 129,274       
2008-2009 458 143,637       
2009-2010 465 198,581       
2010-2011 493 235,639       
2011-2012 537 268,245       
2012-2013           
Source: National Education Statistics: Formal Education, 2006-2012. TESEV 2004: 64-68, 103. 
Ozcan 2010: 122-141.  
* Official numbers seems high because some school branches were estimated as separate schools.  
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TABLE	  6:	  IMPORTANT	  DATES	  IN	  RELIGIOUS	  EDUCATION	  	  
 Regarding IHL 
1924 Unification of Education Law and opening of IHLs 
1931 All imam-hatip schools were closed 
1951 IHLs were opened back 
Feb. 1997 Post modern coup: MGK recommendations 
1998 Middle-level sections of IHLs were closed 
July 1998 Coefficient factor: 0.2 to 0.5 
Sept. 1998 IHL students were restricted to transfer other schools 
Sept. 1998 IHL students were restricted to transfer distance education 
2002 YOK increased coefficient factor: 0.3 to 0.8 
Nov. 2002 AKP won elections by 34% 
2004 IHL bill was vetoed by President 
2004 Court decided YOK is the only authority in issue of coefficient  
2005 MEB allowed IHL student to transfer distance education but was annulled by the court 
April 2007 E-memorandum of the military 
July 2007  AKP won elections by 47% 
August 2007 Abdullah Gul became president 
June 2008 Constitutional Court annulled headscarf amendment 
July 2008 Constitutional Court ruled financial sanctions for AKP 
May 2009 ECHR ruled unfair coefficient is fair 
July 2009 YOK removed coefficient factor but it was annulled by the court 
Dec. 2009 YOK reduced effect of coefficient factor 0.13 to 0.15 but this was also annulled  
March 2010 YOK’s new coefficient 0.12 to 0.15, court did not cancel it 
Sept. 2010 Constitutional amendments passed by public vote, changed substance of higher courts 
June 2011 AKP won elections by 50% 
Nov. 2011 YOK removed different coefficient  
March 2012 IHL middle-level sections were opened back 
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LAUSANNE PEACE TREATY 1923: PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 
 
Protection of Minorities 
Article 37 
Turkey undertakes that the stipulation's contained in Article 38 to 44 shall be recognized as 
fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere 
with these stipulation's, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them. 
Article 38 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to 
all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise whether in public or private, of any 
creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and 
good morals. 
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the 
measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which 
may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public 
order. 
Article 39 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political 
rights as Moslems. 
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law. 
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Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters 
relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public 
employment's, functions and honors, or the exarchate of professions and industries. 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in 
private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public 
meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to 
Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts. 
Article 40 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and 
security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right 
to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social 
institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to 
use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. 
Article 41 
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, 
where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for 
ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish 
nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish 
Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to 
non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and 
application of the sums which may provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or 
other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. 
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and 
institutions concerned. 
Article 42 
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as 
concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these 
questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. 
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the 
Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. 
In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will 
appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. 
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The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, 
cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities 
and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable 
institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will 
not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary 
facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature. 
Article 43 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act 
which constitutes a violation of their faith or religions observances, and shall not be placed under 
any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business 
on their weekly day of rest. 
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall 
be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order. 
Article 44 
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem 
nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be 
placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the 
assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy 
and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is 
in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. 
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to 
bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these 
obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it 
may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. 
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out 
of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or 
any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute 
of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The 
Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto 
demands, he referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the 
Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under 
Article 13 of the Covenant. 
Article 45 
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of 
Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory. 
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